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Abstract
Over the past century, materials have faced notoriously long delays between invention
and commercialization. These delays make private investment very difficult, and can
prevent good materials from reaching markets. A systematic exploration of the
commercial histories of major commodity thermoplastics was performed, which showed
that these delays were attributable to technical deficiencies in materials and obstacles in
the application value chains. Contrary to popular wisdom, material costs, competitive
materials, and serendipity were much smaller factors in commercialization delay. The
factors that led to insertion of plastics into applications were different from the factors
that led to post-insertion growth.
The major plastics showed a characteristic pattern of commercialization. First, they
entered simple, small applications in which they solved new problems. They then
progressed to achieve insertion in a single major application, which they continue to
dominate today. Having established themselves with this application, they found
insertion in a wide range of large applications.
The commercialization pattern can be explained in large part by the concept of switching
costs. As knowledge of a material increases, switching costs are reduced; as value chain
complexity increases, switching costs increase. The earliest applications required little
understanding of plastics and had simple value chains, so switching costs were low,
corresponding to fast commercialization. Later applications had more complex value
chains and required much more detailed understanding of the failure modes and
processing parameters of the material, corresponding to high switching costs and slow
commercialization.
Materials can be deployed into many markets. By strategically selecting application
markets, materials producers can significantly improve the probability that new materials
will be adopted and can shorten the period of commercialization. Early markets should
be selected based on the ability of the material to solve unique problems and the
simplicity of the application value chain. When market selection is not an option,
materials producers can integrate forward in the value chain to shorten commercialization
times, but capital requirements are very high.
Once integrated into an application, the safest competitive position for materials is to be
the lowest cost option that meets the exact needs of the application.
Thesis Supervisor: Thomas W. Eagar
Title: Thomas Lord Professor of Materials Engineering and Engineering Systems
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Chapter 1: Beating the System
Motivation
The early history of man has been classified by archaeologists into three chronological
ages: the Stone Age, the Bronze Age, and the Iron Agel. Each of the Ages is named
according to the materials technology that was possessed by society. This is recognition
of the impact of materials on the welfare, economies, and technologies of societies.
Materials are the basis of manufactured good and the basis of construction. In fact, they
are the basis of most technological progress.
Because of the impact of materials on technology and society, there is a great deal of
research focused on creating innovative new materials. However, the track record of
commercialization of these materials is quite poor. Materials experts have asserted that
materials breakthroughs in the twentieth century required nearly 20 years from the time
of invention to gain widespread market acceptance2 . Some applications, such as the use
of aluminum in automobile bodies, have taken much longer, despite clear advantages in
materials properties. This lag can be caused by many factors, ranging from poor market
education to technical obstacles to political roadblocks to financial infeasibility.
No matter the cause, a 20 year commercialization horizon is simply too long for private
investment. Capitalism has proven to be the most effective means of diffusing new
materials into widespread use, but it works only if entrepreneurs and corporations are
willing to take the risk of commercialization3. A long commercialization period
increases this risk significantly, and also causes the present value of expected earnings to
become very small. Shortening the commercialization period can be the difference
between a successful new material and one that is dropped in the development stage.
The research presented here is designed to respond to a simple question: how can
materials be commercialized faster? This is a broad question, and the methods used to
answer it have also been broad. This thesis is not designed to test a simple hypothesis,
but rather to provide a roadmap for commercialization of new materials. Extensive
research has been performed to create this roadmap. More than 50 key papers from
business innovation literature were reviewed; over 250 contemporaneous articles from
the plastics industry were used as sources, including 65 years of annual technical,
marketing, and price reviews4' 5. Formal interviews or in-depth discussions were held
with over 25 industry experts6 .
These sources provided data for several different analyses. A core set of time series data
from the history of the most successful plastics was created to identify commercialization
patterns. This data was analyzed using quantitative statistical techniques such as
multivariate regression, and qualitative techniques such as expert scoring. In addition,
more than 15 case studies were created (many of which are reported in this thesis) to
reinforce the qualitative and quantitative analyses.
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These complimentary analysis techniques combine to show that strategies exist to
simplify the commercialization challenges of new materials. This thesis will show that
all of the most successful plastics followed a characteristic pattern of commercialization
which is counterintuitive to the traditional attitudes toward materials marketing. Most
materials marketing literature has been focused on materials substitution in situations
where both the attacker and the incumbent are well-understood7 . In these cases, the most
important factor is the value proposition (often expressed as multi-attribute utility), which
allows deep penetration into existing markets8 .
This theory breaks down when applied to many new materials, where value proposition
alone is not enough9. New materials are not well-understood-their design capabilities
and failure modes are not fully developed. Furthermore, application manufacturers don't
have experience processing them, and processing techniques are often nascent. Many
parts of the value chain have to be adapted to adopt new materials; the costs and risks of
these adaptations are unknown in the case of new materials, and provide rational
disincentives for adoption. These disincentives limit the speed of insertion of new
materials to the market, and must be overcome no matter how appealing the value
proposition of a material.
The core contribution of this thesis is quite simple: traditional materials marketing
wisdom is incomplete, and mindsets must be amended to deal with commercialization of
new materials. Because new materials are not well-understood, the adoption conditions
they face are different from the conditions faced by existing materials. New materials will
succeed much more quickly if mindsets are changed to focus on value chain management
in addition to value proposition. By doing this, materials producers can reduce the
uncertainty and expense faced by applications manufacturers in adopting new materials.
This assertion is as applicable to today's materials as it was to the plastics of the
twentieth century, and several value chain management strategies will be presented that
lead to shorter commercialization.
It is hoped that this research will be useful to materials researchers, innovators, and
entrepreneurs. This thesis represents the most comprehensive analysis of
commercialization of new materials to date, but is by no means complete. It is designed
to provide strategies which will be operationalized very differently in different
organizations. Within the operationalization lies opportunity for competitive advantage.
While this research is directly applicable to the materials industry, it also adds to the
general body of innovation theory by revealing and explaining anomalies to existing
models. In addition to explaining these anomalies, it uncovers several new questions for
future work.
Materials are Special
Research in other major industries has shown strategies and business models that can
significantly reduce commercialization periods of new technologies. Some of these
strategies and models are applicable to many industries, but many of them are industry-
specific. Although some tools have been developed for understanding the introduction of
new materials, there is currently no comprehensive framework for the business of the
16
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materials industry, and the existing general frameworks offer, at best, limited
applicability.
Part of the problem is that the "materials industry", per se, is a very broad classification.
Many definitions exist for the word "material", ranging from "anything for which an
engineering drawing does not exist"' ° to "The substance or substances out of which a
thing is or can be made"'' . Both of these definitions could include the chemicals,
textiles, mining, basic metals, polymers, ceramics, and composites industries, to name a
few. This thesis will deal with the basic materials sector, which includes a group of
industries that dwell at the same point in the value chain and share many common
challenges. This group includes those industries which process raw substances, such as
chemicals and ores, into commercial materials which can then be converted by
manufacturers into useful products which can be sold to customers. Under these
boundaries, the mining and basic chemical industries are excluded, and the basic metals,
polymers, ceramics, and composites industries remain.
It will be shown in this thesis that all of the basic materials in this group share some
common elements, which make them unique as a group and profoundly impact the
business conditions they face.
1. Materials come early in the value chain: As the basis of most products, materials
are the first point of competitive differentiation in the product manufacturing
value chain. They interact with every step in the manufacturing, distribution,
maintenance, distribution, and disposal processes. Their position in the value
chain facilitates commoditization, and makes introduction of major innovation
very difficult.
2. Materials are difficult to change: Materials are highly complex products. Their
properties are affected by raw materials (such as chemicals, ores,etc), production
techniques, and secondary processes. Because of the interdependence of these
factors on the properties of materials, they are very difficult to change compared
to assembled products, software, or services.
3. Materials are versatile: most materials can be used in a wide variety of
applications, and the properties of materials rarely "lock-in" users.
4. Materials arefiunctionally fungible: Processing steps in the value chain disguise
materials, and in most cases, end users neither know nor care what a product is
made of, as long as it works. Market pull is for functions, not for specific
materials. Funtional fungibility is related to versatility, but is slightly different in
that it is caused by end users, whereas versatility is caused by the properties of a
material.
While other industries have some of these factors, none has all. Because these factors
have such impact on the business conditions that materials face and can be isolated, they
make materials an interesting case study for other industries in which the factors are
17
present but less prevalent. It may be possible to generalize the insights that emerge from
the study of materials by recognizing and reintegrating these factors into the fabric of
innovation theory. Each of these factors will now be discussed.
Materials Come Early in the Value Chain
Materials, per se, have very little value. They are worth little unless formed into a useful
product and sold. In most cases, materials are produced and then sold to product
manufacturers who process them and integrate them into saleable components, parts, and
systems. Understanding the activities of the product manufacturers, and the interactions
of materials with those activities, is an important part of understanding the uniqueness of
the materials business for two reasons. First, product manufacturers are the direct
customers of the materials business. Second, product manufacturers add value to
materials so that they can be adopted by end users. Porter's value chain model is a useful
tool for gaining this understanding.
The value chain model was introduced in 1985 as a tool for analyzing the competitive
structure of industries and the competitive position of firms within that structure.
According to Porter, "the value chain provides a systematic way to divide a firm into its
discrete activities ... to examine how the activities are grouped"' 2. The model contends
that there exists a generic set of value adding activities (each with a corresponding set of
knowledge and equipment) that every firm undertakes in order to deliver a useful product
to its customer, shown in figure 1.1:
Porter's Generic Value Chain Model
Inbound Operations Outbound Marketing/
logistics Logistics Sales
Figure 1.1: Generic value chain. Each box (node) corresponds to a set of activities.
The generic model becomes more useful when adapted to describe a generic materials
value chain, as shown in figure 1.2:
Materials Value Chain
Figure 1.2: Generic materials value chain. Each box (node) corresponds to a set of activities.
18
Inspection of the materials value chain shows that materials manufacturing is the first of a
series of value added activities, and is the first point of competitive product
differentiation (since raw materials are almost always commodity products). Although
purchasing and supply techniques for raw materials can create lower costs for materials
manufacturers, their lack of differentiability makes them of little consequence to other
nodes of the value chain. For this reason, they will not be considered here.
Value chains are systemically interdependent but functionally independent. Each node
has specific functions to perform, which require different knowledge and equipment than
other nodes, yet each node is affected by decisions and activities in other nodes. The
nodes are also sequential, so that the effects of the activities and decisions of early nodes
cascade into later nodes. Similarly, inter-node compatibility can force decisions in later
nodes to have the effect of constraining flexibility in earlier nodes. Since materials are
the first point of competitive differentiation in the value chain, they play an important
role in determining the structure of the other nodes. Materials form the basis for end
products, and interact with all of the value creating activities-and the corresponding
knowledge and capital equipment-in the chain. Once a material is chosen, each
subsequent node must be designed or adapted to accommodate it, as well as to meet the
needs of the end customer. As a result, two vastly different products made of the same
material may have nearly identical value chains. Table 1.1 shows some of the equipment,
supplies, techniques, and knowledge that are required to produce two different parts of
the same material.
Value Chain Activity HDPE Hair Comb HDPE Bucket
Material HDPE HDPE
Part manufacturing Injection Molding Injection molding
Assembly none none
Distribution Truck/boat Truck/boat
Sales and marketing Retail (Wal Mart) Retail (Wal Mart)
Customer Household Household
Maintenance none none
Table 1.1: Two different products, nearly identical value chains
Likewise, two very similar products made of different materials can have vastly different
value chains (as shown in tablel.2).
Value Chain Activity
Material
Part manufacturing
Wood Picnic
table
Wood
Sawing, sanding
PVC Picnic table
PVC
Injection molding
Assembly bolts, glue, nails snap together
Distribution Truck Truck/boat
Sales and marketing Retail (Wal Mart) Retail (Wal Mart)
Customer Household Household
Maintenance Stain, etc none
Table 1.2: Two similar products, vastly different value chains.
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The position of materials in the value chain as the first point of product differentiation is
unique. It has important implications for the materials business: it creates disincentives
for major innovation, increases the risk associated with failure, and facilitates
commoditization. The interdependence of the value chain elements also raises the bar for
switching materials, since significant costs must be incurred to change from one material
to another. These switching costs will be shown to be very important factors in materials.
Materials are Difficult to Change
The relationship of materials to application value chains is not one-sided; the activities of
the value chain have a profound effect on the end state of a material. This is because the
properties of materials are intimately connected to the processing techniques used by
application manufacturers to form them. The relationship of materials properties to
processing is one of several important relationships that comprise a useful material. The
performance of a material is also affected by the internal structure of the material, the
quality of its raw materials, and the application itself. Figure 1.3 shows a diagram
created by the Materials Advisory Board of the National Academy of Engineering which
displays the factors that must be considered when developing a material.
Struotuse/
composition
user needs/
traints
Performance synmnesis/
processing
Figure 1.3: NAE materials polyhedron
The interconnected corners of the NAE polyhedron convey a subtle but important
message: materials are very complex.
Because of the complexity of materials, materials science has always been an
interdisciplinary field. Materials science has traditionally drawn on such diverse
disciplines as chemistry, physics, and mechanical engineering13 . It still draws on all of
these fields today, but now has a much larger pool, including biology, manufacturing
engineering, and even economics 14. This breadth of disciplines gives insight into the
complex interactions that take place when one (or many) of the corners of the polyhedron
is altered. These complex interactions make sweeping changes of the properties of
materials very difficult.
The net effect of complexity in materials is simple: it slows change. But slow change is
only part of the story. There are fundamental constraints on many properties imposed by
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the chemistry and thermodynamics of the constituent elements of materials. These
constraints have an effect that is at least as powerful as that of complexity: they limit the
envelope of properties that can be attained with a given material. Materials scientists
have developed tools to understand and manipulate fundamental constraints, and have
created wider ranges of properties than could be imagined decades ago, but the
constraints still exist. These constraints prevent materials from being all things to all
applications.
Thus, materials are difficult to change and have fundamental limits on their properties.
Materials do not have the luxury of being easily reconfigured to meet the needs of
customers, meaning that market pull for introduction is an option only when the
properties of a material coincide with needs of an application. This makes them very
different from the assembled products which have been studied in the development of
innovation theory, because assembled products can be rearranged to meet new
needsl5 '1 6'17. This difference is significant, and can be expected to cause materials to
follow different patterns of commercialization than other products.
Materials are Versatile
Luckily (since they are difficult to change), most materials are quite versatile. All but the
most specialized materials have properties that make them applicable to a wide range
(from dozens to millions) of applications. Although product redesigns are usually
required to take full advantage of materials properties, examples of materials versatility
abound. Car bodies are made of steel, ABS plastic, and fiberglass. Bicycles are made of
steel, carbon fiber composites, and aluminum. Even jewelry is made from many
materials, including gold, silver, titanium, and tungsten carbide. This does not mean that
every material is right for every application, but most materials can be right for many
applications.
The versatility of materials creates some interesting challenges in the materials business.
First, there is a high degree of cross-product competition-materials may face challenges
not only from other grades of the same material, but from completely different materials.
This means that attacks can come from all sides: better grades of similar materials can
attack by reducing cost; cheaper grades of similar materials can attack by improving
properties; different materials can attack from lateral markets.
Market positions can also shift quite easily, according to changes in technology, new
design specifications, or even the whims of consumers. This means that materials
producers must be constantly vigilant to maintain markets. Versatility also facilitates
commoditization. If two materials can easily fill the needs of an application, the
application manufacturer will naturally select the lowest cost material. The easiest way
for producers to compete in this situation is to lower the price of the materials. As
competitors respond, a downward spiral ensues until one competitor becomes
unprofitable. When many materials can fill the needs of an application, this pull toward
the bottom becomes especially strong.
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Materials are Functionally Fungible
The effects of materials versatility are exacerbated by another aspect of the materials
business: functional fungibility. Most consumers neither know nor care about the exact
material a part is made from, as long as that material performs its intended function
within expectations of cost and reliability; thus, materials are "functionally fungible" in
the eyes of consumers18 . The distance in the value chain between materials and end users
is quite long, and several of the intermediate nodes employ process technologies that add
value to the material while simultaneously disguising its identity to the end user. This
makes it very difficult for end use consumers to identify the exact materials used in a
product, and parts are commonly described simply as "metal", "plastic", "wood", or
"cement".
This long-value-chain induced ignorance is a key element of the materials industry: it
makes consumers insensitive to small switches in material grade and manufacturer. Free
from demands of end user loyalty, application manufacturers are free to switch materials
(as long as the new material offers enough value to overcome switching costs). This
freedom creates a rational incentive for materials producers to make clusters of nearly
interchangeable products-wide varieties of similar grades from a wide variety of
manufacturers-to compete for existing business. The same long, highly interdependent
value chain that creates a rational disincentive to major materials changes creates a
rational incentive for commodity competition.
The materials for which switching barriers between grades or manufacturers are very low
are considered commodities. Almost every family of materials has commodity grades,
and those grades generally account for the bulk of annual sales poundage. Because
commodities are easily switched, and because they account for the most sales, it follows
that the majority of materials changes occur in the commodity regime. Switches between
grades or manufacturers often carry very low switching costs-ranging from no costs at
all to small transaction or adaptation costs in a few nodes-because they are drop-in
replacements for existing products. The switches may offer slightly more utility to
consumers, may lower purchase costs of materials, or may reduce costs somewhere else
in the value chain.
Conclusion
Materials are probably the most ubiquitous manufactured products in the world, and are
the basis of almost all other manufactured products. They are several unique factors
about the materials business that make it interesting to study. By recognizing and
isolating these factors, it may also be possible to isolate their effects, so that insights from
the materials industry can be generalized into other industries.
Materials are the first point of competitive differentiation in the value chain of most
products, and have a large impact on the structure of value chains. Value chains can be
expensive to change, and provide a rational incentive for applications manufacturers to
stay with incumbent materials. Materials themselves are hard to change, because they are
very complex and are fundamentally limited by their structures and chemistry. They
aren't easily reconfigured to meet the needs of customers. Despite being hard to change,
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the properties of most materials lend themselves to a wide variety of uses. This creates
an extremely competitive landscape between materials. This competition is worsened by
the fact that, in most applications, end users neither know nor care about the material that
is used in an application, as long as it works' 9.
While each of these factors is interesting on its own, the interaction effects of the factors
are more interesting. The position of materials in the value chain and the difficulty of
change in materials interact to create very high barriers for materials innovation. Novel
materials often require expensive changes in value chains, and the switching costs can be
insurmountable. Since materials are difficult to change, technical deficiencies of new
materials can require significant resources and long periods of time to overcome-
barriers that can preclude the use of a material.
On the other hand, the versatility of materials interacts with functional fungibility to
create markets that are ripe for commoditization. When the properties of multiple
materials can fill the needs of an application, and consumers don't care about the material
in the product, switching costs in the value chain are the only barriers preventing
application manufacturers from switching materials. By creating materials that are
interchangeable with incumbents within value chains, low-cost producers can force a
downward commoditization spiral.
Perhaps the most interesting interaction is between the versatility of materials and the
difficulty to change them. This interaction requires that the primary tools of innovators
be changed. Innovators in industries such as assembled products and software often find
themselves in a market pull situation, where properties are selected to match markets.
These innovators must have an acute sense of market needs-and their primary tool is to
configure their products to meet those needs20. Since most materials are both versatile
and difficult to change, reconfiguration of materials to fit market needs is rarely a viable
option. This puts materials innovators in the opposite situation of other innovators--they
are faced with technology push, in which the primary tool is market selection. Markets
must be selected to match the appealing properties of a material21. If one also considers
the position of materials early in the value chain, and the fact that end users often don't
care about their identity, it becomes obvious that materials commercialization may be an
excellent field in which to learn about the behavior of technologies in a push situation.
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Chapter 2: Review and Commentary of Relevant
Literature on Materials Commercialization
Introduction
Chapter 1 discussed the some of the unique features of the materials business, with a
special focus on the interaction effects of those features. This chapter will review prior
work with respect to materials commercialization in order to establish a baseline for
further work. It will explain traditional materials marketing wisdom and will discuss
some barriers to introducing new materials, most of which are related to value chain
challenges. It will also discuss some of the limitations of general innovation with respect
to materials.
The principle driver for materials advancements has been the desire to build profits, and
the principle diffusion mechanism has been free market capitalism. It is doubtful that
much research and development would be performed without the promise of competitive
advantage--either military or commercial--and the associated spoils: most materials
advancements would be of little value to anyone without commercialization.
Given the importance of profits in materials development, there are remarkably few
papers in the technical literature about early commercialization of new materials. Most
of the references that pertain directly to new materials reflect the opinions and experience
of materials experts. However, a fairly strong body of work has been built around
substitution between existing materials'. While some efforts have been made to apply the
general substitution frameworks to new materials, they have met limited success. There
is no prior work that shows a systematic exploration of historical successes and failures in
materials commercialization.
In general, the opinions and experiences of experts and materials substitution models can
be distilled to four important foundation points. First, there is a need for materials
engineers, scientists, and entrepreneurs to improve their understanding of the business
realities of materials propositions. Second, a traditional materials marketing mindset
exists: new materials should be launched into large-market applications where they offer
a superior value proposition to incumbent materials. Third, there is a series of
systematic barriers that compound the difficulties of materials commercialization.
Fourth, materials don't seem to follow the same rules as other innovations: existing
innovation strategy frameworks do not completely describe them.
The purpose of this review is to reveal and expand the strengths and weaknesses of the
underlying principles of the foundation points in order to provide a basis for a systematic
investigation of the fundamentals of materials commercialization.
Understanding the Business Side of Materials Commercialization
The Technology Transfer Model
Most materials development in the United States is performed in government research
labs, universities, or pure commercial research labs. It is often performed as basic
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research, or is targeted directly toward the aerospace industry, where cost is secondary to
performance2. Because of the uncertain nature of materials research, it is often funded by
the federal government or with commercial research (not product) budgets. The business
of materials research could be the subject of another thesis, and will not be treated here.
Instead, this scope of this chapter will begin at the point at which lab-scale prototypes of
materials advancements have been built, and commercial development of the material is
being determined. This is a very common situation, usually called technology transfer
from research to product development. Technology transfers happen not only from
government labs and universities to businesses, but also between businesses and within
businesses, from research departments to product departments.
The business implications of technology transfer are substantial. Technology transfers
allow businesses to broaden their research portfolios by purchasing research at a cost that
is usually much lower than the actual research cost of the material, and to share potential
risk with the seller by paying future-and uncertain-royalties. Furthermore, businesses
have a much better idea of what they are buying in this situation; they can be reasonably
confident that their material is not a technological loser. Both of these factors make
technology transfer seem to be an attractive entry point.
Unfortunately, this model is not perfect. Materials research labs are generally concerned
with materials research; they seek high performance solutions and have little incentive to
develop processing methods for anything larger or better than lab scale3 , and tend to
suboptimize. These factors can result in materials that are polished only enough for
testing and which carry learning costs that make them far too expensive to be
commercially viable, regardless of their properties. They are often well understood
technically, but not ready for "prime-time" markets. Materials businesses and product
manufacturers must undertake the difficult and expensive tasks of reducing
manufacturing costs and refining the materials to meet practical market needs. Once
these tasks are complete, materials ventures face a risky future, since there is no
guarantee that their products will be accepted by the market4 .
Risk Factors in New Materials
In a recent report, the National Research Council declared that: "two sets of
perceptions-the desire for timely incorporation of change, and caution in the face of its
possible effects-create a significant tension between those charged with the
development of new technology capabilities and those who feel accountable for the
consequences of such technology incorporation"5. This statement reflects a belief that
materials researchers must grasp the dozens of sources of risk faced by materials
businesses if they are to succeed with commercialization. Most of these risks apply to
both large and small companies, although they may have different effects. They can be
generally classified into five categories, each of which will be briefly discussed.
Market/Product Risk6
There is an axiom in the business world that says market and sales forecasts are always
wrong. This problem is particularly acute in the materials world, where the "technical
community, in a wave of enthusiasm, systematically overestimates the value of its
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discovery", and almost always overprojects the size of a potential market. Materials
depend on filling needs in products, and there is no guarantee to investors that materials
will find product acceptance. In order to minimize risk, "materials must find applications
quickly or else lose user interest".
Even if a new material is fortunate enough to be integrated into a product, there is
significant risk that the product itself will not succeed. Because materials are embedded
in products, any risks that exist in the product market are amplified in the materials
market. This risk can be mitigated by integrating the material into a wide range of
products, which is very expensive and difficult to do in the early stages of the life of the
material.
Latent Liability Risk7
Materials almost always play "mission critical" roles in applications. If a material fails,
the part that is made of it will fail. Furthermore, materials issues are often very difficult
or impossible to fix, requiring part replacement in the event of their failure. In many
cases, such as flight critical aerospace or automotive applications, material failure can
cause injury or death to users. This means that investors in a new material assume
significant latent liability and warranty risk that could emerge at any time in the life of
the material.
The example of an automobile fender, shown in table 2.1, is useful to illustrate the
possible latent warranty costs in a material failure. Note the extent to which costs rise
(and blame shifts) as the damage extends deeper into the system. Note also that a
problem such as grain boundary corrosion would most likely not be limited to a single
vehicle.
Damage Correction Estimated Cost ($) Who Pays?
Procedure
Scratch Polish 15 Customer
Deep scratch Touch up, polish 50 Customer
Dent Dent pull, polish 150 Customer/At fault
Dent with crack Dent pull, sand, 300 Customer/At fault
weld, repaint, polish
Grain boundary Remove, scrap, 600 Manufacturer
corrosion replace, repaint,
polish
Table 2.1: Damage to an automobile fender.
Table 2.1 also offers a hint of the unknown costs that high volume manufacturers face,
and why they would be reluctant to integrate unproven materials into their products.
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Manufacturing Risk
Economies of scale are definitely present in materials manufacture. In fact, very few
materials can be cost-effective without large-scale production. Since most materials are
developed to lab scale first, there is significant risk that they will not be economically
producible. Technical cost models can offer "best guess" predictions of the
manufacturing costs, but it is impossible to foresee the magnitude of learning costs that
occur during manufacturing scale-up. This problem is aggravated by market risk,
because it is very difficult to project the proper manufacturing capacity to build.
Because of the cost of building materials processing capacity, manufacturing will be
considered as a barrier later in this chapter.
Time to Market Risk
Perhaps the biggest risk that new materials face is the "20-year barrier". Most materials
advancements of the 20 th century required 20 years to move from research stage to full
commercializations. This period is much longer than that faced by consumer products,
electronics, and biomedical devices, to say nothing of software9.
The anticipation of waiting 20 years to receive payback on an investment is not
appetizing to investors because it introduces several sources of risk and severely retards
the present value of cash flows. Given the pace of technology, there is significant risk
that another, better solution will be introduced during that period that will displace a new
material altogetherl°. That solution need not be a material, but could be a paradigm
shifting design. There is also risk that market tastes will be different--imagine releasing
in 1995 a new, more vibrant polyester for leisure suits that investors in 1975 thought
would be a big seller!
There is also general economic and government regulation risk". Wars, recessions,
regulatory changes, and even demographic changes can occur in 20 years, all of which
could eliminate the potential sales of a new material.
Capital Implications of the 20 Year Challenge
Experts have found it useful to educate engineers about the economics of a 20 year lag
time using present value calculations. In order to justify the risk of doing business over
the diversified risk of investing in the stock market, most large companies require an
internal rate of return (IRR) of at least 5% over the historical return of the S&P 50012,
15.55% over the past 10 years'3 . The equation for the required return on investment is
x=P(I +r)'
where x=dollars required, P=principle invested, r=IRR (required percentage return), and
t= time, in years'4. Performing this calculation shows that each dollar invested today
must return $42 in 20 years. However, if the period were shortened to 5 years, only
$2.54 would be required from every dollar invested.
Many engineers have wondered why, given the enormous upside potential of new
materials, venture capitalists don't take more interest in new materials enterprises. The
IRR calculation quickly shows the reason. Because venture capital is invested in risky
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ventures, a premium of more than 10% is required over the S&P 50015. Furthermore,
venture capitalists expect that 75% of their ventures will fail to make money, so they
must bet on enterprises that have solid business plans and the potential to returnfour
times their required IRR. Potential must exist to create annual returns of at least 100%16!
This means that every venture capital dollar invested in the first stage of a new materials
venture would need to return $1.05 million in 20 years! Shortening this period to 5 years
has the dramatic effect of reducing the required return to $32/dollar invested.
Executives at materials companies have stated that development costs for new materials
start at $10 million, and can be much higher if a material is very novel'7 . Most of this
investment is made before a material is ever sold. The risk and capital implications of
long commercialization periods create rational disincentives for investment. Shortening
the commercialization period of new materials would significantly reduce the risk
involved with introduction, and would also increase the net present value of materials
investments.
Traditional Materials Marketing Wisdom
The materials industry is quite old, and a general set of ideas has been developed that
seems to govern business behavior; it can be "traditional materials marketing wisdom".
The 20-year barrier is an example of traditional wisdom-many experts believe that it
simply takes a long time to commercialize new materials. The causes of the 20 year
barrier will be considered in the next section. Some other tenets of traditional materials
marketing wisdom will be discussed in this section.
Large Initial Markets
The first tenet of traditional materials marketing wisdom is simple and straightforward:
initial markets must be large. Because of the size of investment needed to develop new
materials, business principles dictate that returns be generated as soon as possible after
commercialization. In a 1988 study, the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment
showed that most producers required "a (projected) initial sales volume of $5 million to
$50 million per year to justify production investment"'8 . If potential markets don't meet
this criterion, the risk becomes very high.
While it may be possible to identify completely new markets that reach the volumes
necessary for investment, they are difficult to assess and can be very risky. If new market
risk is to be avoided, the large initial market investment requirement places an interesting
constraint on new materials-it practically forces them to attempt to replace incumbent
materials in existing markets. In this situation, unproven materials must offer enough
value to overcome the cost and risk of switching from existing materials (which already
work). This sets a very high bar, because switching to uncertain materials can be very
expensive. Switching costs will be considered more deeply in chapters 4-6 of this thesis.
Substitution Based on Superior Value
Most materials substitution occurs between two existing materials that are well
understood. Examples of this type of substitution would be aluminum body panels for
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steel ones in automobiles, ABS for polycarbonate in computer housings, and OSB for
plywood in houses. Research has shown that superior value proposition is key to
substitution between existing materials19. The importance of value proposition has
become a tenet of traditional materials marketing wisdom.
Two major tools have been developed to assess the value proposition of materials, and
both tools work best with established materials for which the properties are well-known.
The first tool is technical cost modeling, in which manufacturing, market, and technical
scenarios are analyzed using spreadsheet techniques20 . Good technical cost models are
very effective, because they take into account all known manufacturing costs and allow
sensitivity analysis of many different scenarios. Their output is a comprehensive
projection of material production costs over a range of production volumes, cycle time
estimates, capital costs, and other uncertainties. They can be manipulated and used as an
effective communication tool between business and materials people.
The cost data from technical cost models makes it possible to execute the second tool:
multiattribute utility analysis (MAUA). MAUA is a tool designed to measure the overall
value of a product to a certain set of users, and to group those users into potentially
profitable market segments21 . It is based on the concept that each feature of a product
provides utility to a user. Each feature can be separately coded and assessed using lottery
equivalent techniques, in which potential users are asked to identify the probabilistic
tipping point at which they might be willing to switch between features . Once
preferences are established, all factors can be added together with scaling factors to
identify the true sources of a value proposition.
The concept is rather easy to see when expressed mathematically2 3 . For any given
attribute, Xi, there exists a utility U(Xi). Since materials have many potentially useful
attributes, (X,X 2,X 3 .. .), their value must be defined in terms of multiattribute utility.
Once assessed, the different attributes can be combined into a weighted sum using scaling
factors (k), such that
N
KU(X) + 1= n (Kk(Xi)U(Xi) + 1)
i=l
where K "is a normalizing parameter used to ensure consistency between the definitions
of U(X) and U(Xi)"24.
Cost is considered an attribute in MAUA, so it is nominally possible to assess the cost at
which a material becomes a viable alternative. When coupled to a cost model, one can
obtain a rather wide prediction of the substitution potential between materials.
There are two important caveats that must be considered when applying MAUA. The
first is that substitution analysis almost always requires consideration of an incumbent
material and an entrant. This being the case, the utility functions are most often
compared on the attributes of the incumbent. While this is a realistic comparison for
most existing materials, it leaves little room for assessment of unique properties that a
new material might offer since it systematically defines the new material in terms of the
incumbent. Chapter 3 will show that this can be dangerous if a materials producer is
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aiming to commercialize a new material quickly, since the basis of commercialization for
most new materials is some unique combination of properties that enables new products.
The second caveat is more fundamental. MAUA is built on an intuitive, yet false,
premise: that cheaper, higher performing new materials will always be accepted over
incumbent competitors. While the converse--that more expensive, lower performing
materials will not be accepted over incumbent competitors-is almost certainly true, it is
important to remember that risks and switching costs must be overcome for adoption, and
that credible competition can come from many sources. The chapters that follow will
show that switching costs and risks are particularly high for new materials, and that value
chain elements must be managed to allow fast commercialization.
It should also be noted that proponents of MAUA do not explicitly claim that materials
which appear promising will be commercialized quickly, although that indication is
implicit.
A Special Focus on Lower Cost
The analytical assessment of value in multiattribute utility analysis was an important step
in the understanding of materials substitution, because it explicitly recognizes the
importance of utility, not just cost. While it is likely that other experts understand that a
value proposition is comprised of both utility and cost, there appears to be an underlying
belief with the materials community that the best path to substitution is to offer a lower
cost material. It seems that most reviews of new materials state that market insertion will
come as cost drops2 526 2 728 29
Cost clearly has an effect on the both the value proposition and the range of applications
in which a material can be used (see figure 2.1), but it must be considered in context with
utility. While the correlation between low cost, utility, and eventual sales volume seems
clear, the correlation between low cost and quick substitution (which is implied by the
clamor for lower cost) is dubious.
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Figure 2.1: Graph of production volume v. cost. Note that this graph does not take into account the
relative density of materials.
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We thus see that traditional materials marketing wisdom is comprised of a few core ideas.
Many materials experts believe that materials simply take a long time to commercialize.
When they are commercialized, they must enter large initial markets, and these markets
must be conquered by replacing existing materials. The basis of replacement is superior
value proposition, usually through incremental improvements of the same properties that
are valued in the incumbent material. Lower cost is considered by many to be the most
powerful of these properties.
The IMM: An Excellent Application of Traditional Materials Marketing Wisdom
Maine and Ashby of the University of Cambridge have developed a methodology based
on technical cost modeling and multiattribute utility analysis to help materials scientists
and potential commercializers make a first attempt at assessing the value of a material
innovation. This tool, called the Investment Methodology for Materials (IMM), integrates
common business and innovation concepts to create what could be titled "Business Plan
101 for New Materials"3 0 . The IMM is extremely broad, and its novelty lies in its
specific application of the concepts to materials applications. It is divided into three
parts:
1. Viability Assessment
2. Market Forecasting
3. Value Capture
IMM: Viability Assessment'
The strongest section of the IMM is the viability assessment. The viability assessment
uses quantitative methods to assess the technical feasibility, projected manufacturing
cost, and customer utility of a material. It is essentially a tool to describe known
switching costs and to compare them with expected costs and revenues of adoption.
The IMM technical feasibility approach is to compare the properties of a material with
those of other materials. Since many new material properties are measured, the analysis
usually begins with the most remarkable properties (i.e. specific strength of CFRP or
specific energy absorption of Al foams), and progresses to other properties. This step can
act as a research filter: unless a new material will be dramatically less expensive than
comparable solutions, its properties must demonstrate clear superiority to overcome
switching costs and thus warrant further development.
Once technical feasibility is established, the next IMM step is to build a technical cost
model. As in the applications cited earlier, the purpose of the technical cost model is to
identify the range of materials costs that might be feasible given different market and
manufacturing scenarios.
Knowing the technical properties and projected costs of a new material allows the
application of multiattribute utility analysis. This analysis acts as a filter to identify
potential opportunities in a known market. It does not help to identify new markets,
unless multiple iterations are performed. Multiple iterations can help reveal markets, but
technical and marketing intuition is still required because the market analysis tool
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depends on the results of the utility analysis and the utility analysis fails without a clear
market.
IMM Market Assessment
The IMM Market assessment presents two complementary strategies for identifying
markets for new materials: substitution and unmet needs. Both use the results of the
viability assessment stage to find potential markets in which better or cheaper products
could be created from the new material. No guidelines are given for executing the unmet
needs strategy, but the examples indicate that niche specialty materials (such as Gore-Tex
and Co-Sm magnets for headphones) are best suited for it.
The IMM substitution method is an excellent reflection of traditional materials marketing
wisdom. Like the viability assessment, the market assessment recommends that
producers of new materials survey the applications of materials with comparable
properties in search of areas in which the material can offer value, either through lower
cost or higher performance. It involves more detailed utility analysis than the viability
assessment for prediction of premium profits, and attempts to predict the penetration rate
of the new material by examining the histories of comparable products in the same
industry. The history required by the IMM market assessment makes it best suited to
large, established applications. While is superficially quantitative and robust, it ignores
switching costs and risks. For this reason, it is almost, but not quite, limited to the
simplest of drop-in application substitutions.
IMM Value Capture Assessment
It is well known in the business world that inventions have little value unless they can be
leveraged to make money. Maine-Ashby is one of the few of the papers to acknowledge
the importance of appropriability (protectability of intellectual property) in materials
development. The IMM uses very general and basic business tools, such as Porter's
Fiver Forces Analysis and Teece's model of appropriability to assess the attractiveness of
products and industry3 2 33. These are useful as first filters of markets, and provide a basis
for further investigation.
The IMM also addresses organizational structure of the materials developing company.
However, it is largely useless in this application because it doesn't include business
factors such as capital cost, existing assets (supply chain, distribution network,
engineering, etc.), and organizational capability.
Overall, the IMM is most useful as a no-go filter for further investigation into the
commercialization. If the IMM shows glaring flaws, such as high cost, low industry
attractiveness, inferior technical properties, or extremely long likely time to market,
commercialization of the material in present form is very unlikely.
The IMM accurately conveys the traditional wisdom of materials marketing, in which
decisions of market selection are based on incremental value to be added to existing large
market applications. It also accurately conveys the shortcomings of traditional wisdom:
passing through the IMM filters is not enough for an investment grade business plan
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because it doesn't provide a realistic assessment of risk, which, along with upside
potential, is one of the two most important factors in venture and commercialization
decisions3 4. Furthermore, it lacks a framework for identifying market opportunities
outside of copying existing material. A framework that provides guidelines for market
identification in consideration of risk and value chain challenges would be very useful.
Obstacles to Commercialization of Materials
The 20-year barrier a product of traditional materials marketing wisdom that is generally
well-accepted within the materials community. However, it is not a single, inherent
barrier; it should be considered as a composite barrier-one that is made up of many
smaller obstacles.
In a paper describing the application of the IMM to aluminum foams, Maine and Ashby
provide a useful description of the steps a material must take on the road from
development to commercialization35 . Stepping through this paper, in combination with
others, allows the creation of a map of the obstacles that are faced by materials. These
obstacles are all contributors to the 20 Year Challenge. This map is not meant to be an
exhaustive list of obstacles, but does convey the types of commercialization challenges
faced by new materials.
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Figure 2.2: Commercialization map showing obstacles faced by materials developments. Time spent
overcoming any obstacles increases the risk of competitive displacement.
The timeline on top of the map shows that obstacles tend to be grouped in phases.
Assuming that the research produces an acceptable lab scale material, the first obstacles
of commercialization arise in establishing the business and production capabilities. They
range from highly technical manufacturing and materials development challenges to legal
obstacles in obtaining intellectual property rights. The next set of obstacles comes from
elements of the value chain, which are resistant to change because of switching costs,
inertia, and risk. Only after research, materials production, and value chain obstacles are
solved does a material have a fair chance in the market.
It is clear that any of these obstacles can represent significant threats to
commercialization. In the best case, each obstacle will add to the time to
commercialization. In the worst case, progress and commercialization will be altogether
stopped. Each obstacle will be discussed, except for investment, which was discussed as
a risk in the preceding section.
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Materials Production/Technical Obstacles
Appropriability
Appropriability is the ability of a firm to protect the intellectual property of its invention.
There are many protection strategies, ranging from trade secrets to patents to high entry
barriers. Most materials producers will choose to patent new advancements. Many
technology transfer materials will come with patents, but these patents often need to be
extended to cover specific markets. The quickest patents are granted in several months,
but the process often takes many years.
Building Production Capacity
Manufacturing risk has already been discussed, but the magnitude of the challenge of
building production capacity is hard to overstate. Most novel materials require advanced
processes, and usually require new tooling and machinery3 6. Supply chains, distribution
networks, and production systems must be built or purchased. Due to the high cost of
creating capacity, most materials production systems start with pilot plants. Since the
cost of producing most materials is so sensitive to scale, it is very difficult for these
materials to compete economically with incumbent materials. Since they can't compete
economically, their adoption is limited, and it is very difficult to justify the construction
of a larger scale facility in order to be cost competitive37
Specialty materials, which solve specific, high value problems, can often sidestep the
scale challenge. Large manufacturers, who have existing distribution networks and
supply chains, are also more likely to be able to handle the production capacity problem.
Market Identification
Because materials are both highly complex and highly interdependent with the processes
that make them, they are not easily changed. They cannot be quickly reconfigured to
conform to market needs after they are launched. Furthermore, markets can be very
unforgiving with materials failures. For these reasons, it is crucial that the proper launch
markets be selected.
Market identification is a significant barrier for new materials. In most cases, target
markets are identified prior to investment but change over the course of manufacturing
development. Changes in target market can stem from many factors including
identification of new markets, shifts in needs of target markets, and even whims of
executives. Continuous identification of new markets is often necessary to create the
economies of scale necessary to compete.
Subsequent chapters will show that market selection is the most important factor in
speeding the commercialization of new materials.
Value Chain Obstacles
A generic materials value chain was shown in chapter 1, and challenges can arise from
any node therein. This section describes some of the more common obstacles that new
materials face in the value chain.
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Secondary Processing
Many new materials require completely different forming processes than existing
materials, forcing the development of new equipment and supplies. Developing these
forming processes can be a formidable task, and can range in scope from fundamental,
scientific research funded by materials producers to practical, applied knowledge funded
by product manufacturers. When processing techniques require the generation of new
knowledge by science, they should be considered technical barriers. When they are
solved with creative applications of common knowledge, they should be considered value
chain obstacles.
Whether processing challenges are solved by basic science or common knowledge,
process development effectively slows adoption of the material because new equipment
suppliers, designs, and processing parameters have to emerge. Users of new materials
must be willing to internalize the expenditures necessary for new processes; once
expenditures are made, the processes must be refined to compete in quality with existing
ones.
Codes and Standards
Codes and standards are written by government and professional organizations to ensure
that products meet certain specifications. They are most often related to safety, and are
explicit acknowledgements of familiarity with a material. Because they are designed as
watchdogs, they are inherently inflexible and almost always favor incumbent ways of
doing things. Changing codes and standards can be prohibitively expensive, and there is
little incentive for alteration unless the new material is extremely pervasive or offers
properties that are far superior to those of the incumbent. The challenge to change
standards is further exacerbated by another chicken and egg problem. Many materials
qualifications tests cannot be performed without changes to the standard, and the standard
cannot be changed without qualification testing3 8!
It is important to recognize that emerging standards and codes can be influenced by new
materials, and that skillful lobbying by new materials advocates can actually create
captive markets that are protected from competitors39'40. This is discussed in chapter 8.
Qualification
The qualification barrier is very similar to the codes and standards barrier. Qualification
processes are in-house corporate testing procedures designed to ensure that materials
meet corporate specifications for quality and safety. They test supplier claims, examine
compatibility, and test for unintended failure modes. They are designed to reduce
unknown costs and learning costs in the value chain for product manufacturers.
Because the costs of in-field materials failures are very high (see table 2.1), most
companies are very cautious with materials qualification. Intel, a company known for its
fast introduction of new products, requires a qualification period of 12-18 months for new
materials41. Other industries, whose products last longer and have larger failure
consequences (such as injury or death to users), require a proportionally longer
qualification period4 2.
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In cases where codes or standards and qualification apply, failing to meet code will
preclude qualification. However, passing code requirements does not ensure passing
qualification, although it is usually a good indication.
Design-In
Once a material is qualified, design-in begins. Designers rarely understand the properties
and usefulness of new materials and tend to be "gun shy" when using them. One expert
pointed out that drop-in replacement is seldom optimal for the use of new materials, and
often leads to premature field failure4 3.
Design-in is the first point at which a new material begins to merge with its application.
If the difference between the incumbent material and the entrant material is at all
significant, the application design will change from its previous state. This change will
cause significant ripples throughout the application's value chain, ranging from changes
in purchasing habits to overhauled supply chains to new production processes to different
assembly and distribution methods. An executive from Ford Motor Company estimated
the true cost of a material switch to be at least 10 times the apparent cost (the part design
and integration costs) because of value chain reverberations
Product Manufacturer Acceptance
Materials are generally integrated into one specific application first, and then transition
into other applications based on performance; they rarely take their target market by
storm. The period from first application to full market penetration (in which a new
material is seen by product manufacturers as a viable, acceptable substitute for others)
can be called the product manufacturer acceptance period. It is determined by several
factors, including product acceptance (acceptance of the product into which a material is
built), economic climate, etc. Obviously, this period varies greatly; Maine and Ashby
noted that it is useful to look at similar products in similar industries when forecasting
acceptance periods4 5. For example, cell phone base station materials are accepted more
quickly (-5years)4 6 than automotive body materials (-12-18 years)4 7.
Maintenance
New materials often require different maintenance than previous materials. Developing
maintenance procedures and techniques can be an obstacle. If field maintenance is to be
done, as with pipe or automobiles, a significant period can pass before the maintenance
processes are fully disseminated. Even if the processes are known, time elapses while
maintenance organization commit to the product. When BMW introduced its first
aluminum bodied car, the Z8, it was not available through all dealers. BMW would sell it
only through dealers who were willing to make the investment necessary to develop the
capability to weld and form aluminum, in case any Z8 customers were in accidents4 8.
Disposal/Recycling
New materials often require new methods of disposal. As environmental regulations
become more stringent, it is increasingly important that disposal and recycling issues be
addressed during design and commercialization of new materials. This fact is particularly
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acute in Europe, where new regulations require automakers and other major
manufacturers to take back their products at the end of life4 9.
Recycling has always been a difficult challenge for thermoplastics, but creative
applications of regrind have made it surmountable. In contrast, recycling concerns have
nearly destroyed the development of bismuth based solder (bismuth attacks grain
boundaries in steel and causes cracking)50 and have severely limited the application of
long-fiber composites in automobiles5
Applicable General Innovation Theories
There are many streams of theory in the general innovation literature, some of which are
more applicable to materials than others. This section is not meant to be a comprehensive
review of every theory of innovation which might be applicable, but rather to give the
reader a basis for the chapters that follow. There are three streams of innovation thought
that seem most applicable to the present work: Utterback's dominant design model, the
economics of standards, and Christensen's disruptive technologies model. Although
these models are interrelated, they are easiest to understand if considered alone.
The Dominant Design Model
The charter of business innovation as a field of study was written by Joseph Schumpeter
in 194352, in which he described the process of Creative Destruction-displacement by
new innovations of existing companies and industries. Framed in this way, innovation
was a competitive tool, both defensively and offensively. Once the tool was identified,
studies began to examine the emergence and displacement of products in the free market,
and forces of innovation began to be identified.
The first major descriptive model of the forces of competition and innovation in
industries was created in 1975 by William Abernathy (Harvard Business School) and
James Utterback (MIT Center for Policy Alternatives) 3. It has since been named the
"dominant design" model, and remains one of the most popular descriptive tools in
innovation. This model has several points, the most important being the observation of
three distinct stages in the development of innovation-based industries. Those stages
have since been named, and are as follows:
Fluid Phase: Firms compete on product innovation in market
Focus on finding the right product attributes to please market
Uncoordinated processes (general equipment, specialized labor)
Significant entry of many firms with fluctuating market share
Transitional Phase: Product innovation slows down, starts to be technology stimulated
Basic feature set emerges (dominant design), technology matters
Islands of automation begin to form
Mass exodus of firms begins
Specific Phase: Innovation is process based
Customer needs shift to price, quality, and convenience
Rigid processes minimize production cost
Small number of remaining firms compete for market share
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The most important event in this cycle is the emergence of a dominant design, which
embodies the basic needs of the customer and creates a paradigm into which new
products must fit. It effectively reduces the number of performance requirements because
products are simply expected to have them in order to meet the design paradigm. It also
marks the end of major product variation, and shifts the competitive base to incremental
innovations and process-based innovations. This results in a major shakeout of the
players, with only the best ones emerging. It is important to note that the dominant
design model applies to individual innovations and is a cycle, not an event. These facts
mean that incumbent products and companies are not exempt from the shakeout.
A central tenet of the dominant design model is that products can be reconfigured during
the fluid phase while manufacturers search for the most attractive set of features. During
this phase, competitive advantage can be based on innovation in individual components
without significant impact on the rest of the system, and completely new designs can be
built around the reconfiguration of parts. Changes can be made easily, quickly, and with
little cost.
The tenet of reconfigurability limits the direct applicability of the dominant design model
to the materials industry, because the properties of materials are highly complex, and are
interdependent with many factors, including raw materials, forming processes, and even
applications themselves. Instead of being quickly reconfigured to meet market needs,
materials must either find markets that can take them as they are, or delay
commercialization in markets while value chain obstacles and technical deficiencies of
the materials are worked out. However, materials seem to follow an analog of the
dominant design model in which they are initially placed in many markets, and then are
shaken out of the markets in which the don't work, eventually being placed in "dominant
applications" that they fit best. Understanding this pattern would be a significant
contribution to the dominant design school of thought, since the creators of dominant
designs have explicitly stated that the model is inapplicable to process industries54.
Standards and Externalities
Dominant designs can emerge for many reasons, including customer preference, strategic
maneuvering, or government regulation . Standards are a particularly powerful way to
influence the outcome of dominant designs. In the materials world, standards are usually
associated with building codes or engineering specifications, and they allow materials to
grow because application manufacturers can tap multiple suppliers to make materials that
meet the same standards.
The concept of standards can be applied at a deeper level to materials by considering
externalities. Externalities can be defined as a "change in benefit that an agent derives
from a good when the number of other agents consuming the same kind of good
increases"56. Examples of products with strong externalities are fax machines, VHS
video tapes, credit card networks, and (generally) materials. These products are of little
use unless more than one person has them, and their utility increases as more people get
them 57.
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In addition to age, there are two major differences between new materials and old
materials: new materials are less well understood than old materials, and a smaller
installed processing base exists for new materials than for old materials. The bases of
understanding and processing create externalities for materials. As knowledge of the
behavior and failure mechanisms of a material grow, and as more processors learn to
fabricate it into useful shapes, the material becomes more appealing to broad range of
customers. However, in order to be used in applications, sufficient knowledge and
processing bases must be in place.
Thus, even if a new material is inherently lower in cost and offers superior properties
than an incumbent, it may not be adopted unless the knowledge and processing bases are
sufficiently developed. This situation has been called "market failure" by economists,
since superior solutions exist but are not adopted by markets because of external
factors5 . When externalities are strong, then significant costs must be incurred to
overcome them. If these costs are greater than the perceived value of the switch, it is
rational not to switch. So if the value provided by a new material is lower than the costs
required to develop a processing base or than the latent liability costs imposed by
unfamiliarity with the material, then it is rational for application manufacturers to
continue using the incumbent material, regardless of the presence of a technically
superior solution.
This line of reasoning suggests that early applications of materials should be selected to
generate knowledge for both materials producers and application manufacturers and to
create capability within the processing base. By doing this, materials producers can
increase acceptance of a material and can more effectively generate further learning and
processing capability. Early applications should generate the credibility of knowledge,
capability within the processing base, and visibility with potential customers in order to
increase future use.
Disruptive Technologies
The concept of disruptive technologies, developed by Christensen in the 1990s, builds
upon the dominant design model and others to create a compelling framework for
understanding innovation. It is particularly focused on the competitive aspects of
innovation.
A key aspect of the framework is the separation of the concepts of sustaining and
disruptive innovations. Sustaining innovations can be radical or incremental, but share
the common thread of creating products that "help manufacturers to sustain the rate of
historical performance that their customers have come to expect"59. They allow
companies to create higher quality, higher performance, and higher margin products for
their best customers. Incumbent firms usually fare better than entrant firms at designing
and introducing sustaining technologies, because they have tremendous resources,
development and manufacturing experience, and direct lines of communication with their
customers. In fact, the theory asserts that the companies will make any technological
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jump, no matter how hard it is, in order to defend their best markets in the face of
sustaining innovations.
Disruptive theory argues that, ironically, listening to the voice of the best (highest
margin) mainstream customers causes firms to fail in the face of disruptive innovations.
Disruptive innovations are those that move up from less attractive markets to attack the
underbelly of an industry, causing redefinition of performance criteria and fundamental
modification of business models. There are several telltale signs of potential disruptive
technologies60:
· Their attributes do not appeal (initially) to mainstream customers.
· They are less expensive, more convenient, and more reliable than mainstream
products.
· They are built to cater to smaller, lower margin markets than mainstream
products.
· They have a steeper performance improvement trajectory than the mainstream
market requires, such that they intersect the mainstream market over time.
Technologies that show these signs tend to displace mainstream technologies by
increasing performance to meet the needs of mainstream customers. They are rarely
better than the products they displace when measured by the original performance
criteria, but they cause a value shift in the mainstream market once they are "good
enough"61 . Mainstream customers in many industries that have been invaded by
disruptive technology base purchases on new criteria, such as reliability, price, or
convenience instead of traditional performance measures.
The failure of established firms in the face of disruptive competitors is caused by
"asymmetric motivations" on the part of incumbents: they have established successful
value propositions and are unwilling to respond to attacks on low-margin businesses, but
will ferociously defend high-margin businesses6 2 . Christensen has shown that companies
follow pattern of natural drift toward providing higher value products for their best
customers, and that their cost base also follows this pattern. This drift causes disruptive
technologies to intersect mainstream markets from below and causes an upheaval among
incumbents whose value networks are structured to meet even higher performance and
profit margin markets. It is extremely difficult for firms to move their value networks
downward because it requires the unlearning and upending of all the things that caused
the success of the firm in the first place.
Like other innovation models, the disruptive technology framework works best when
products are easily reconfigured to meet consumer needs. It also works best if products
are sold directly to consumers. Materials don't fit either criterion. They are difficult to
change and dwell deep in the value chain, so they can be expected to show behavior that
doesn't agree with the disruptive technology framework.
This does not mean that the framework is useless for materials. At its broadest level, the
disruptive technology model encompasses any situation in which a product improves and
overtakes a higher-end market. If this definition is used, then materials may well fit the
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model-there are many examples of new materials improving over time and displacing
incumbents (plastics being the most obvious). However, this observation provides little
strategic insight; it is better used as a historical observation. A more strategic insight
from the disruptive model is the recommendation that materials be launched into simple,
low margin markets in order to avoid competitive response from incumbent materials.
This insight is a step toward recognition that market selection is a key tool in the
innovator's arsenal. The research that follows will build on this insight by showing that
simple markets are indeed the best entry point for new materials, but that the reason for
this entry is not competition. If early markets are selected correctly, they generate a great
deal of knowledge and credibility that is very important later in the life of a material.
This research will also show that there are limits to the ability of materials producers to
make technological jumps into vastly different materials. There are few examples of this
occurring outside of materials, but observance of the phenomenon will provide a platform
for future work.
Conclusion
History shows that materials developments can have major positive impact on society
when properly commercialized. Future materials advances will probably also improve
the quality of life of users. It is well known that research costs of new materials are
growing as scientists search for more advanced designs (although new computational
tools promise to minimize this trend)63. Commercialization costs will most likely also
continue to increase due to heightened competition as more materials flood the
marketplace.
Experience in other industries has shown that construction of industry-specific predictive,
descriptive commercialization frameworks can significantly reduce costs, increase
profitability, and improve probability of success. The foundations for understanding the
technical and business aspects of materials development are available through
conventional channels, and the IMM offers a good framework of traditional materials
marketing techniques for first-pass analysis.
Traditional materials marketing wisdom suggests that new markets for materials be
selected based on the substitution of incumbent materials in existing markets. This
substitution must be based on value-either lower costs or higher utility. While
traditional materials marketing wisdom seems to work for materials substitutions between
commodity materials, it fails to recognize the high risk of introducing new materials. It
also fails to capture the obstacles that must be overcome for materials to reach full
commercialization. For this reason, the applicability of traditional materials marketing
wisdom to introduction of new materials is quite limited.
There are many types of risk present when introducing new materials. Examples of these
risks include:
1. Market risk
2. Product risk
3. Manufacturing risk
4. Latent liability risk
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5. Competitive risk
6. Time to market risk
Time to market risk is well known within the materials community, and is often called
the "20-year barrier", reflecting the period that is often required for new materials to
move from lab stages to full commercialization (an imprecise point at which materials are
considered fully accepted by the market and designers). The 20-year barrier has
enormous capital implications, making investments in new materials unattractive, to the
say the least, to venture capitalists and other investors.
The 20-year barrier is not itself inherent to materials development, but is composed of a
series of obstacles that complicate and extend the period required to introduce materials.
Once a promising material has emerged from the research lab, the obstacles it faces can
be divided into two categories: materials production/technical obstacles and value chain
obstacles. While it is popular among materials scientists to believe that these obstacles
are caused by corporate obstinacy, there are logical reasons behind them. The costs
required to build production facilities and to change value chains are real, and are extra
high when many unknowns are present. Many system levels must change for
introduction of new materials (requiring heavy investment), and the cost of failure is
usually very high.
The internal complexity, depth in the value chain, and difficulty of change put materials
in an interesting category from the perspective of general innovation theory. There are
several theories that offer some insight into the behavior of materials, but none is
complete. Because materials don't fit perfectly into the existing models, studying them
provides an opportunity to build additional insight which can be used to strengthen the
applicability of the innovation models.
The chapters that follow will use historical data from the plastics industry to show that
there are strategies that can shorten, sidestep, and take advantage of the barriers that slow
materials commercialization. By identifying the factors of materials that make these
strategies work, it will be possible to use them in other industries in the context of general
innovation theory.
43
This page intentionally left blank
44
Chapter 3: The Pattern of Materials Commercialization
Introduction
Technically interesting devices or materials do not automatically become commercial
successes. They must first be made into products that offer compelling value
propositions and then must be placed into markets that can absorb them. The field of
product development offers many competing processes to develop ideas, materials, and
devices into valuable products64 . The fields of marketing and strategy offer many
competing methods for market selection6 .
The field of technology management operates at the intersection of marketing, strategy,
and product development. One of the more popular branches of technology management
is innovation. An important branch of innovation literature is focused on the concept of
architectural modularity, in which market feedback is used to drive product development.
Architecturally modular products contain components which can be reassembled in novel
ways to meet unmet market needs66 . This process has been shown to be a powerful force
in reshaping industries, and in destroying the competencies of existing firms67 68'6 9. It has
also been shown to be an important path to market entry and growth.
Abernathy and Utterback indirectly described architectural modularity in their seminal
paper on industry cycles in 197570. They showed that the basis of competition in the
early stages of an industry is product innovation, in which many firms compete to find
the product attributes that are most desirable to a market. The players make their wares
with highly specialized labor and highly flexible processes so that features can be added
or removed very quickly. As the market provides feedback, products are reassembled
into new iterations with more appealing feature sets. In this stage (called the Fluid
Phase), market share fluctuates wildly as new designs emerge.
This cycle continues until the most desirable set of features is obtained, and the product
meets the needs of the market. When the best set of features is identified, the Transitional
Phase begins. Product innovation slows, processes become more rigid, and a "dominant
design"--a set of features that is most appealing to the market-emerges. Firms with
designs that are not easily adapted to the dominant design leave the market, and the
remaining firms begin to focus much more on process innovation, which reduces costs
and increaes reliability. Then the Specific Phase begins, in which price, quality, and
convenience become the basis of competition, and only the most efficient firms survive71 .
The easiest indicator to measure in the dominant design cycle is the number of firms in an
industry. In later work, Utterback presented a characteristic pattern and stated explicitly
that this pattern is not evident in materials. He further stated that materials and other
process industries do not follow the dominant design pattern of industry development at
a1172, 7 3 .
That materials do not follow this pattern is relatively easy to explain: iterative cycles are
very difficult. There are two reasons for this. First, materials are rarely part of the direct
consumer feedback loop. They are integrated into applications, and feedback related to
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materials is often confounded with feedback on applications. The two can be hard to
separate. However, even if material information is discerned, the second problem
remains: it is very difficult and very expensive to alter the properties of a material.
Materials are not assembled products, and their features are not modular: they are
technically complex and highly interdependent. Materials properties are intimately
intertwined with the quality of raw materials, control of manufacturing parameters, and
forming processes. They can be refined only through careful research and extensive
testing, and this research and testing falls in the realm of chemists, physicists, materials
scientists, and engineers from many disciplines. Furthermore, the economies of scale
present in the manufacture of materials are substantial; large, inflexible plants have
proven to be the lowest cost production method. Altering materials often means that
plants have to be altered as well, and the changes can be very slow and expensive. This
is not to say that changes don't happen or that materials don't improve-they do-but not
as quickly as assembled products.
Because they do not have the luxury of quick reconfiguration to meet market needs,
market selection and positioning becomes the key skill that materials producers must
develop. It is important that materials producers identify markets which are able to
accept and utilize the properties of their materials. This is a particularly important issue
in the early commercialization of a new material.
As was shown in chapter two, traditional materials marketing wisdom prescribes a "one
size fits all" approach to market selection. The traditional approach is based on three
factors, all of which seem to be logical predictors: cost of a material (compared to
existing materials), properties of a material (also compared to existing materials), and
large market size. The predicted outcome of the approach is also logical, and is quite
compelling: if a material offers lower cost and higher performance in a large market, it is
bound to quickly reach total market dominance and earn handsome returns for producers.
Because there are significant pressures to generate early returns, traditional wisdom
implicitly asserts the belief that the factors that lead to quick placement into a market are
the same as the factors that lead to deep penetration in that market.
This chapter will use historical data from the plastics industry to demonstrate that this
one-size approach is fundamentally flawed. Traditional materials marketing wisdom is
applicable only after a material has earned credibility in the market and viability for
producers.
It will be shown first that, contrary to popular wisdom, the factors that lead to quick
market placement are different from the factors that lead to deep market penetration. It
will then be shown that the successful plastics all followed a three-phase progression of
market placement. In the first phase, the materials enabled simple, new applications that
could not be done well without them. Having established a degree of credibility in the
first phase, they then firmly established their commercial viability in a single platform
application. With this application, they quickly and permanently displaced an incumbent
material in a large market because their properties fit the needs of the users better. Only
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after having passed this platform phase were they able to enter the markets that fit the
traditional model, with competition and replacement based on both lower cost and better
properties.
Subsequent chapters will provide further resolution into the materials commercialization
pattern. This chapter intends only to establish that the pattern exists.
Plastics Industry Data
The plastics industry has been selected as the primary data pool for this research. There
are three reasons for this. First, plastics have had a significant impact on the products,
markets, economies, and lifestyles that are present in the world today. Second, the
industry is fairly new: all of the commercially important plastics have been developed in
the last 90 years. Finally, the development of the plastics industry has been well
documented. The chemical and processing aspects of the industry have been tracked by
dozens of peer-reviewed technical journals7 4 and by thousands of US patents.
There are two important contemporaneous sources of data on the business, markets, and
applications of the plastics industry. The first is a monthly periodical called Modern
Plastics (MP)-"the voice of the total plastics industry". Published continuously since
1925, it was, until very recently, the most prominent publication in the plastics industry7 5.
It is an integrated magazine, with technical, engineering, and business sections, and the
development of important applications was often tracked from early research in the
technical section to full market penetration in the business section. Reviews of new
plastics applications were printed monthly, and the Modern Plastics editorial staff went
to great lengths to track the basic histories of new developments. Particular focus was
given to the first applications of new plastics, and to the challenges faced and time
required in commercializing them. It the 1950's and 1960's, it was not uncommon for an
issue of MP to have more than 350 pages, mostly filled with advertisements and in-depth
coverage of market developments. There are very few important plastics applications
today whose inceptions, insertions, and growth were not covered in considerable detail.
In 1938, Modern Plastics began publishing an annual review of the US plastics industry.
The review was remarkably thorough, covering sales data (as reported by manufacturers),
application developments, market analyses, and technical developments for each
commercially important material. The annual review serves as a record of the challenges
and triumphs of the plastics industry through its own eyes. From 1938 to 1980, a
technical review of the chemical and processing developments of the previous year,
written by Gordon M. Kline, (MP Technical Editor and Chief of the Plastics Section
(1935-51) and Polymers Division (1951-63) at National Bureau of Standards) was
included 7 6. This technical review is the authoritative record of the state of the art of the
plastics industry during its development.
The other important record of the plastics industry that will be used as a source of data is
Synthetic Organic Chemicals (SOC), a report published by the US Tariff Commission
from 1917-1995. Publication of SOC was started in 1917 as an annual statistical survey
of the American coal-tar chemical industry. It was mandated into a useful annual
statistical survey of the plastics industry with the Tariff Act of 193077. Included in SOC
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are the self-reported production volumes, sales volumes, and dollar values of all US sales
in the plastics industry, classified by material categories. SOC provides thousands of
data points on the industry, including the names of all producers of each material.
Several books have been written describing the evolution of the plastics industry. In
cases where MP and SOC are unclear, these books have been consulted7 8 . Primary data
has also been obtained by interviewing some of the pioneers of the industry and by
reviewing their memoirs.
The key data for this chapter come from a collection of Modern Plastics articles and the
1999 Modern Plastics annual review.
Dataset: Biggest Plastics Applications of 1998
It was noted earlier that the purpose of this research is to develop strategies and principles
for accelerating the commercialization of new materials (not just plastics), under the
assumption that those materials offer some technical value proposition-that their
properties are somehow compelling to the market. Working under this assumption, the
presence of value proposition becomes a control variable, and it is possible to focus on
factors that are intrinsic to the market and to the actions of the players. It is therefore
reasonable to examine only the patterns of commercialization of historically successful
materials-those that offer a clear and compelling value proposition and became
commercially important79 . Since materials have little value unless they are integrated
into applications, it is further reasonable to examine only the most successful applications
of the most successful materials. For these reasons, the most successful applications of
the seven most successful plastics will be examined in this chapter. This is not to
indicate that a thorough examination of the unsuccessful plastics would not be equally
telling-it would most likely yield very interesting results. However, this examination is
beyond the scope of this thesis.
In 1998, the last year for which Modern Plastics provided reliable data, eight families of
plastics accounted for 90% of total reported plastics sales volume (lb)80 . These should
be considered the most successful plastics. They are polyvinyl chloride (PVC), low
density polyethylene (LDPE), linear low density polyethylene (LLDPE)8 , high density
polyethylene (HDPE), polypropylene (PP), polystyrene (PS), polyurethane (PUR), and
polyethylene terephthalate (PET). Because of its extreme similarity in composition,
processing, and application to LDPE (it was not separated from LDPE in trade journals
for nearly 10 years after its introduction), LLDPE is considered a special case, and will
not be used in the following analysis.
52% of the 1998 sales volume of the seven largest plastics consisted of sales into 34
application categories with volumes larger than 300 million lb. These are the most
successful applications of the most successful plastics, and will be the subjects of the
analysis that follows. Descriptive histories were prepared of the introduction of each of
these applications, with a particular focus on time to market, challenges faced during
introduction, and cost factors at the time of introduction. More than 250
contemporaneous articles were utilized, in addition to 63 years of Modern Plastics annual
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reviews and dozens of US patents. In each case, data were substantiated by more than one
article, with sources other than Modern Plastics consulted when possible.
There are several limitations to this dataset. First, the generalizability of the model is
constrained by the examination of only the most successful applications of the most
successful plastics. Its direct applicability is limited (at best) to new products with clear
technical value propositions. This is deliberate, because this research does not attempt to
predict or describe whether technical value propositions exist, but rather how to proceed
once a technical value proposition is identified. The model built on this data will not
predict the success or commercialization time of technically impractical materials, nor
will it predict which properties of a given material will lead to commercial success.
Focusing only on the most successful applications of the most successful materials also
makes it difficult to identify potential pitfalls with any model that is created. It is entirely
possible that failed materials followed the same strategies with different results.
However, there is little data in the literature on failed materials, making analysis of them
very difficult. While limits of any proposed models will be discussed, the findings
should be applied with caution.
The generalizability of the findings will also be limited by the historical nature of the
data. It is possible that the market conditions in which the materials that will be
examined are different from current conditions and that the model is no longer applicable.
If this is true, the model would be purely descriptive and of limited use for future
materials.
It is also important to question the reliability of data extracted from industry publications
such as Modern Plastics. It is possible that MP offered insufficient coverage to some of
the applications that are examined here. However, it will be shown that most of the
applications that are examined were known well ahead of their insertions, and were
expected to be commercially important. Data for those that were not known earlier were
taken from articles which covered their development but were released slightly after their
insertion into the market.
Modern Plastics and Synthetic Organic Chemicals were the dominant sources of
information in the plastics industry for nearly seven decades. In the absence of other
sources of substantive market records, it is impossible to completely disregard the notion
of erroneous data. However, the status, reputation, and role of Modern Plastics and
Synthetic Organic Chemicals make them the de facto record of the history of plastics
application development, and the structure and goals of the publications lend credibility
to their coverage.
Understanding Volume in Plastics
In order to identify a pattern of commercialization in plastics, it is necessary to
understand more of the basic business facts facing the industry. The first important fact
is that plastics are of little use unless they are integrated into an application. They are
rarely specified, except in very general terms, by the consumer. The product/application
manufacturer is the most common specifier of the exact material. This being the case,
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plastics can add many forms of value, ranging from cost savings (because of lower
materials, processing, shipping, etc. costs) to value-added features for which consumers
are willing to pay extra.
Plastics have been used in millions of specific applications, and have become the
dominant material in a small portion of them. For convenience, the plastics industry
groups the applications of each plastic family into categories according to a variety of
classification schemes. The categories can be based on processing method (i.e. injection
molding, blow molding, thermoforming), on broad application market (i.e. automotive,
construction, consumer goods), on final form (i.e. film, sheet, bottles), or on specific
application market (i.e. shower curtains, milk bottles, paint pails). Each category entails
many specific designs and applications.
Some categories are more applicable to specific plastics, so Modern Plastics developed
an aggregate classification system for its annual reporting in which the most applicable
group of categories was used for each plastic. This makes it relatively difficult to
compare categories across plastics, but gives an excellent annual snapshot of the position
of each plastic. Table 3.1 shows the major plastics and the number of categories listed
for 1998, the last year for which reliable data was published in Modern Plastics annual
resin report 82.
Material Number of Categories Example categories(MP 1998)
HDPE 30 Sewer pipe, motor oil bottles
LDPE 17 Blowmolding, food packaging film
PET 6 soft drink bottles, ovenable trays
PP 16 Fibers and filaments, rigid packaging
PS 58 Toilet seats, tumblers
PUR 17 Bedding, industrial insulation
PVC 21 Textile coating, siding, pipe and conduit
Table 3.1: Number of categories and example categories for each major plastic, MP 1998.
It is easy to see from this table that each of the large-volume plastics is sold in a wide
variety of applications. In 1998, 83 billion lb of plastic resin was sold. The smallest
reported categories consumed about 3 million lb of resin and .5% of total sales of a
plastic, and the largest reported categories consumed about 6 billion lb and over 50% of
the total sales of a plastic.
The fact that all of these highly successful plastics are sold in many disparate applications
shows that these plastics are all very versatile-they have a range of properties that
makes them appealing to many markets. It follows that an important factor in the
commercial success of a plastic may be the ability to be adapted to fit many needs.
However, while placement in many markets seems to be important to the commercial
success of the large-volume plastics, placement is only part of the equation. Penetration
into those markets must also be considered. Each of the large-volume plastics has
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established a dominant foothold in a few large application categories. Table 3.2 shows
the largest categories for each plastic in 1998.
Portion of totalTotal sales
Material volume Top 3 Applications(million b) applications over 300
million lb
HDPE 14065 .44 Liquid food bottles
Pipe and conduit
Household chemical bottles
LDPE 7748 .41 Food packaging film
Extrusion coatings
Nonfood packaging film
PET 4330 .82 Soft drink bottles
Custom bottles
Thermoformed sheet
PP 13739 .61 Fibers and filaments
Consumer products
Rigid packaging
PS 6589 .16 Oriented film and sheet
Vending and portion cups
Cassettes/reels
PUR 5265 .55 Furniture foam
Building insulation
Transportation foam
PVC 14698 .66 Pipe and conduit
Siding
Windows and doors
Table 3.2: Biggest applications and portion of total sales of major plastics, 1998.
While these materials cannot be directly compared to each other because of discrepancies
in category type, it is clear that the top categories account for a large portion (ranging
from 16-82%) of total volume of each of the large-volume plastics. In fact, the top 34
application categories accounted for 42% of the total sales volume (in pounds) of all
plastics in 1998.
It is useful at this point to acknowledge that placement of a material into an application is
different from penetration of a material in an application. In order to reflect the active
role of materials producers in developing applications, this thesis will refer to initial
placement of materials in applications as "insertion". Insertion is an event--the first step
in commercializing an application. Penetration, on the other hand, is a process, which is
defined here as developing widespread use of a material in an application.
Differentiating insertion and penetration is a contribution made by this work to the
general body of innovation, because it asserts that the conditions of insertion are different
from the conditions of penetration. While this seems to be a general premise of the
innovation literature, the author is unaware of any direct citations where it is explicitly
stated.
The implications of this idea are clear: since insertion is the first step, it should be the
first focus in the commercialization of a new material.
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Is Compelling Value Proposition Enough for Quick Insertion?
Given the pressure to generate profits quickly upon commercialization, the ideal situation
for a marketer of new materials would be achieve quick insertion and rapid, deep
penetration of a large application market. As presented in chapter 2, traditional wisdom
indicates that a compelling value proposition-lower cost, higher performance, and
attractively sized markets-would lead to both83. Since they achieved such deep
penetration and have enjoyed long dominance in their markets, it is obvious that the 34
biggest applications of 1998 offer compelling value propositions. If traditional wisdom
were correct, one would expect to see at least three patterns. First, one would expect that
insertion of the plastics into their largest application markets would come very soon after
commercialization, and would be relatively uniform among the applications. Second, one
might also expect to find the reciprocal-that the earliest plastics applications would
become very large. Finally, one would expect to find a high negative correlation between
insertion time and application category size.
Table 3.3 shows the commercialization year of each plastic, and the insertion year of each
of the applications larger than 300 million lb. It also shows the elapsed time between
commercialization of each material and its insertion into each application. This elapsed
time will be referred to as "insertion delay" from here forward.
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Plastic Application Sales, Material Application Elapsed First
Million Commercial Insertion time Application?
lb (1998) Year Year (years)
HDPE Liquid food bottles 4 1334 1957 1963 6 no
HDPE Household industrial 954 1957 1958 1 no
chemical
bottleS85,86,87
HDPE Grocery sacks" ' 648 1957 1972 15 no
HDPE Trash and can 406 1957 1978 21 no
liners° _
HDPE Pipe and conduityz 1240 1957 1960 3 no
HDPE Pails w3 930 1957 1958 1 no
HDPE Crate and totes", w° 312 1957 1961 4 no
HDPE Industrial drumsr 301 1957 1958 1 no
LDPE Food packaging 1018 1941 1947 6 no
film97 ,,,
LDPE Extrusion coating 958 1941 1949 8 no
LDPE Non-food packaging 856 1941 1947 6 no
film 99
LDPE Stretch and shrinkuu 310 1941 1965 24 no
PET Soft drink bottles Tu 1975 1967 1975 8 No
PET Custom bottles ,u 1570 1967 1979 12 No
PP Fibers and filaments 3610 1958 1958 0 yes
104
PP Consumer 1660 1958 1959 1 no
products' 0 5
Plastic Application Sales, Material Application Elapsed First
Million Commercial Insertion Time Application?
lb (1998) Year Year (years)
PP Rigid packaging'w 1329 1958 1960 2 no
PP Oriented film', 995 1958 1961 3 no
PP Transportation ,' 460 1958 1959 1
PP Appliances" u 302 1958 1959 1 no
PS Oriented film and 380 1938 1957 19 no
sheet'. 
PS Vending and portion 340 1938 1956 18 no
cups112
PS Cassettes, Etc" 330 1938 1965 27 no
PUR Furniture (padding) 866 1953 1954 1 no
114
PUR Building insulation" 780 1953 1960 7 no
PUR Transportation 604 1953 1955 2 no
(flexible) 11 6
PUR Household and 322 1953 1956 3 no
commercial
refrigeration '7,118 ,119
PUR Rug underlay 302 1953 1957 4 no
PVC Pipe and conduit''' 5904 1938 1953 15 no
PVC Siding 1z 2148 1938 1961 23 no
PVC Windows and 538 1938 1958 20 no
doors' 12 3
PVC Wire and Cable'z 482 1938 1938 0 yes
PVC Extruded 352 1938 1948 10 no
packaging1 25
PVC Pipe fittings 308 1938 1954 16 no
Table 33: Elapsed time between commercialization of new plastics and insertion of major
applications.
Uniform Quick Insertion
A histogram of the elapsed time between commercialization of the major plastics and
their insertion into major applications is shown in figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Histogram of time elapsed between introduction of new materials and their insertion in
biggest applications.
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Insertion Delay of Major Plastics into Biggest Applications
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This chart shows that the skew of insertion of materials into major applications is clearly
toward the early years after commercialization. The largest group of applications
(comprising slightly more than 1/3 of the total) was introduced between 1 and 3 years of
the commercialization date of the plastic. In the materials world, an insertion delay of 1-
3 years is indeed quite rapid, and this fact would seem to validate the wisdom of the
traditional materials marketing approach. However, the statistics of the pool directly
contradict it. Over 50% of the biggest applications of the major plastics were inserted
more than 5 years after the commercialization of the plastics. The mean insertion delay
for the pool is 8.5 years (8.19 years with high and low delays removed). The standard
deviation of the pool-8.188 years (7.61 years with high and low delays removed)-is
equally telling: a very high degree of variability exists in the insertion delay of the major
applications.
Did First Applications Get Big?
It has been shown that more than 1/3 of the biggest applications of 1998 were inserted
within 1-3 years of commercialization of their respective plastics. However, only two of
the 34 biggest applications of 1998 were the first for their respective plastics, although
this can be said of one of them only because of very broad categorization. PVC wire
coating was the first commercial use for PVC. It was proposed for use in boiler rooms
because of water resistance and flame resistance and grew to be the most commercially
important wire coating material available today'27. PP fibers and filaments are slightly
more deceptive-the first uses for PP were in marine ropes and lawn chairs, which are
both relatively small volume applications today. The real growth of PP fibers and
filaments has been driven by the use of PP in carpet fibers, which didn't exist until
several years later, were sold to a different market, and required significantly different
production and processing capabilities2 8 .
If the category deception is acknowledged and PP rope fibers are excluded, the first
application of a plastic turned out to be one of the largest applications in only one of the
seven major plastics (PVC). The first applications of the other six materials did not make
the list.
Correlation Between Sales and Insertion
If value proposition is the main driver of both quick insertion and deep penetration, a
strong negative statistical correlation between insertion time and overall sales volume of
the biggest applications should exist. These two variable were tested, with insertion time
coded "COMTIME1" and overall volume coded "SALES"; the results are displayed in
table 3.4. No relationship was found.
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Correlations
SALES COMTIME1
SALES Pearson Correlation 1.000 -.015
Sig. (2-tailed) . .934
N 34 34
COMTIME1 Pearson Correlation -.015 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .934
N 34 34
Table 3.4: Correlation matrix of insertion periods and overall sales of major applications in 1998
Value Proposition Alone is Insufficient
The experience of the most successful applications of the most successful plastics stands
in contrast to the traditional materials marketing wisdom presented in chapter 2. Only
half of the major applications were introduced within five years of commercial
availability of the major plastics, despite the presence of factors (whatever they might be)
that led to very deep penetration of the plastics into all of the major applications. The
average insertion time of materials into their most successful applications was over eight
years. The first application of only one major plastic grew into a major application
category by 1998. There is a very high degree of variation in the insertion periods, and
no correlation exits between the depth of penetration (as measured by overall sales) and
the insertion period.
These facts indicate that quick insertion is not a simple function of value proposition. As
stated earlier, all of the major plastics offer compelling value propositions to their major
applications--but these propositions did not lead to uniform quick insertion. Of equal
importance is the indication of the data that the factors that lead to quick insertion are
different from the factors that lead to deep penetration. In the preceding section it was
proposed that insertion and penetration are different stages in the life of a material. It is
shown here that the factors that influence each should be explored and treated differently.
From this point forward in this thesis, the factors that affect quick insertion will be called
"insertion factors", to distinguish them from the "penetration factors" which are
presumed to stem from the value proposition of major materials. Insertion factors will be
explored more deeply in chapters four through six; penetration factors will be explored in
chapter seven.
The Enabler Phase: Establishing Credibility
Having established that the major plastics did not follow the patterns predicted by
traditional materials marketing wisdom, it is necessary to identify the pattern that they did
follow. The earliest commercial applications of a material were important not only
because they were the first opportunities to generate cash for the materials producer, but
because they introduced a material to both the market and to processors.
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Table 3.5 shows the earliest commercial applications for 14 important plastics, as
reported in Modern Plastics. The major plastics of 1998 are listed first, followed by
other plastics.
Plastic Earliest Applications Year Reason for Adoption
HDPE"z Hula Hoops 1957 "not too flexible, not too rigid, and safe for
children"
LDPE3u Radar wire 1943 "oustanding qualities as a high frequency
dielectric"
PET T 'M Bearings 1967 "allows higher loads and speeds than nylon
bearings.. .resistance to oils.. .good resistance to
high temperatures"
ppl3Z Marine rope/ integral 1958 good strength/weight ratio--"cannot become
hinge coolers waterlogged or change its properties because of
water absorption"
PS TM Capacitor insulation, 1938 "excellent dielectric properties...low power
synthetic gems factor"
(costume jewelry)
PUR'" Foam stuffed tubbable 1953 "the first stuffed animal in toy history that can
toys safely be laundered in a washing machine..
.thanks to the moiusture resistance of this type of
stuffing.. .mildewproof, non-allergic"
PVCU Wire coating 1938 "extruded insulation of comparatively permanent
flexibility"
ABS1t Tote boxes for textiles 1948 Lightweight (also very tough)
Acetal' 3t Fishing rod parts, toy 1959 Moldability with "strength, rigidity, dimensional
train bases, egg beater stability, and heat resistance.. .oustanding
gears corrosion resistance"
Nylon" Dr. West's Miracle Tuft 1938 "dramatic reduction in production costs...ability to
Toothbrush control bristle texture..(not) prone to bacterial
growth"
PTFE 3"" Gaskets and seals for 1942 Corrosion resistance
Manhattan project
Acrylic (PMMA)""4 Highway 1938 "nearest approach to glass yet developed", but
reflectors/molded may be "formed or molded into many useful
spectacle lenses/aircraft shapes"
windshields
Polycarbonate (PC) 4 ' Tiny electrical 1958 "high impact strength, good insulation properties,
connectors and good color and gloss properties"
Reinforced Polyester.' Radomes 1942 Radar transparency
Table 3.5: First applications for 14 commercial plastics. Seven largest plastics of 1998 shown in
bold.
There are several common threads amongst these applications. Possibly the most
important common thread is the fact that each application solved a problem for its users.
These plastics were not simple improvements over incumbent materials in these
applications-their properties enabled fundamentally new product features. Furthermore,
the materials features enabled products that were not simple improvements over
incumbent competitors- users of these products could do things that they could not do
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before: unmet needs were filled. In fact, performance dominated cost in these
applications: cost was listed as a factor only in Dr. West's Miracle Tuft toothbrush (see
nylon, table 3.5).
The second important common thread is that, with the exception of reinforced polyester
radomes and PMMA aircraft canopies, all of the applications were fairly simple-they
had few parts and were integrated painlessly into their value chains. Many of them, such
as the hula hoop and Dr. West's Miracle Tuft toothbrush, were standalone products for
which a simple new value chain was assembled. They did not require tremendous
research to develop, were made using existing equipment, and were sold through existing
channels. Others, such as polystyrene capacitor insulation, PVC wire coating, and acetal
fishing rod gears were not stand alone products but were drop-in replacements for
existing parts. They worked with existing machinery, and few other parts in the final
application were affected by their adoption. In fact, substitution was only visible to the
buyer by the enhanced performance that the materials enabled.
The third common thread is that the markets for most of the applications were relatively
small. It was noted in the previous section that PVC wire coating is the only first
application that became one of the largest for any of these plastics. That these markets
are small is significant, because it strongly contradicts traditional materials marketing
wisdom: how excited could a materials producer be about the costume jewelry market
after spending several years and millions of dollars to develop polystyrene? In order to
recoup high R&D costs, it would seem important to insert new materials into large,
attractive markets as soon as possible. Memoirs of some of the early materials pioneers
indicate this pressure existed, but the plastics were still used in small market applications
first14 3 .
The fourth common thread between these applications is that the materials solved
problems that were relatively new. Researchers and consumers were still searching for
the best solution, and were willing to take risks with new materials in order to find it. In
the dominant design parlance, the applications were in the fluid state. Utterback and
Abernathy have shown this to be very important, since the value chains of such industries
and markets are flexible and are more able to accommodate change than established
value chains'44. The expectations of applications in the fluid state are also lower-users
tend to be more willing to tolerate product failure. PS capacitor insulators, PVC wire
coating, the PMMA aircraft canopy, and the reinforced plastic radome all solved new
problems in applications that would become quite inflexible and very intolerant of failure
as they matured.
When woven together, these common threads form a pattern of first phase of applications
for new materials, which can be called the "enabler phase". Each application in this
phase was relatively simple, solved a relatively new problem, had a relatively small
market, and enabled people to do things they couldn't do before. The entrance of PUR
into foam stuffed tubbable toys and PMMA into acrylic highway reflectors are excellent
examples of applications in the enabler phase.
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Polyurethane in Foam Stuffed Tubbable Toys
Polyurethane (PUR) was developed by Otto Bayer in Germany during World War II but
was not commercially produced in the United States until the Mobay Chemical Company
was formed to commercialize it in 1953 (Mobay was a joint venture of Monsanto
Chemical Company of the United States and Farbenfarbriken Bayer, A. G. of
Germany)145' 46 147. PUR was first introduced in foam form, and was purported to be
"self-extinguishing, (would) not age, oxidize, or rot, (was) not attacked by oils, greases,
or solvents" and was "moth proof, verminproof, and non-allergic to skin". In short, it
was claimed to be better than rubber foam (which dominated the foam market in 1953) in
every way. Its properties made it especially attractive as a natural sponge replacement,
and at least two manufacturers undertook programs to develop it into a household sponge.
Unfortunately, PUR development was slowed in this application because of some
technical difficulties, not the least of which was the hydrophobic nature of the material.
Although it was highly porous, the walls did not absorb water, and the proper cell
structure had to be designed for it to work.
It was this hydrophobic property, along with the resilience of the material, that made
PUR perfectly suited for use in the Bendix "All"--washable teddy bear. This bear was
made by the Ideal Toy Co. and was "co-sponsored by Bendix and Mobay". It had a Du-
Pont Orlon acrylic "fur" shell, and was stuffed with PUR foam. Both Orlon and PUR
were waterproof, and tests showed that the bear could be repeatedly placed for "30
minute periods in an autoclave under 18-lb steam pressure and at temperatures of 2250 F".
Having proven itself in this harsh test, the Bendix bear was sold to the public as the first
stuffed animal of any kind that could be washed in the washing machine'4 8! Figure 3.2
shows a Bendix bear.
Figure 3.2: Mobay/Bendix bear149 .
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The Bendix bear followed the enabler pattern very well. It was a simple, stand alone
product that could be sold with through existing channels with minimal impact to the
value chain. Its market was relatively small and relatively new-children in homes with
washing machines in 1954. Most importantly, it let people do something they couldn't
do before: wash their toys in the washing machine.
Acrylic (PMMA) in Highway Reflectors
A new problem emerged as the WPA highway projects of the Great Depression neared
completion: the lights on cars had not kept up with the speeds that the new highways
afforded. At night time, cars were prone to drive off the highway since they could not
see the curves. Instead of electrifying and lighting the highways, it was shown that
crystal-clear, moldable Lucite and Plexiglas (the tradenames for PMMA) could be made
into shapes that would "return a narrow beam of illumination" from the side of the
highway 15 .
The shapes, of course, were cat eye highway reflectors that are so common today. This
type of reflector has a very unique structure, which guides beams of light through three
reflective surfaces, and then redirects the light back into the headlights of the oncoming
car. To be most effective, a material with very high transparency must be used. Fine
glass has similar transparency to PMMA, but the second requirement made PMMA the
only material that could make the reflector in 1938: excellent moldability. The
compression molding process that was used to press PMMA into the reflector shape
would have shattered glass. Furthermore, the toughness of acrylic made it more suitable
for the harsh environmental conditions that were encountered beside the roadways. A
Smithsonian archive photo of these reflectors is shown in figure 3.3.
Figure 33: Acrylic reflectors on Michigan highwayl51.
These reflectors were shown in 1938 to be visible for one mile, and made a "definite
contribution to the safety and utility of highways at night", according to the chief of the
United States Bureau of Public Roads. At $340/mile, these reflectors were not cheap, but
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were considerably more economical than the alternatives of electrifying and lighting the
highway grid or of continuing on with the high accident rate.
Like the Bendix bear, acrylic highway reflectors followed the enabler pattern well. They
were simple, stand alone products that could be installed by existing highway crews with
minimal training or retooling. Their market was relatively new (though not particularly
small)-paved highways with curves. Most importantly, they let people do something
they couldn't do before: drive safely on highways at night.
Enabler Phase Applications Establish Credibility
The enabler phase appears to have filled very important roles in commercial development
of the commercial plastics. By solving new problems in simple applications, enabler
applications were able to sidestep many of value chain and design-in barriers that might
have slowed entry into more established applications, so that commercial material
production and processing could begin. Enablers allowed materials producers and
processors to learn to use and make the new plastics in a "real world" situation which was
relatively fault tolerant-potential failure modes were revealed and corrected without the
enormous liability that could accompany mainstream markets. Forming and processing
challenges were also solved, making the material more broadly applicable.
In addition to process development, enabler applications served as extended evaluation
tools. Enablers introduced new materials to the market and to other potential users, who
could observe and evaluate their performance. Producers used enabler applications as
case studies to convince hesitant customers in major markets of the utility of their
material. In short, enablers were the key to solving the dilemma that one materials
executive described: "people line up to be the second buyers of new materials, but no one
wants to be first"' 52.
In most cases, the enabler phase included several commercial applications because the
knowledge and credibility necessary for integration of new materials into mainstream
markets was not necessarily generated by a single application.
Platform Applications: the Path to Further Growth
While enabler applications were important steps in the commercialization of the major
plastics, they were rarely large enough to carry the material to full profitability. The
preponderance of insertion delays in the 1-3 year period (see figure 3.1) shows that
enablers preceded a concerted push by producers into new applications. Although the
majority of the early applications of every plastic were destined for commercial failure,
one major success was found by each major plastic in the early years of
commercialization. In each case, this major success punctuated the enabler phase, and
facilitated mainstream growth. For this reason, it will be called a "platform application".
One plastics executive recently commented that every major plastic has found a "killer
application" early in its life . In the software industry, a killer application is a program
that is "so successful that it corners the market and/or inspires users to upgrade their
systems in order to use it"154, thereby creating a path for future growth of the system.
While this definition is not directly applicable to the plastics industry, it can be altered to
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become a definition of the platform application: "the first large-market application in
which a plastic is so compelling that all application manufacturers must use it in order to
be competitive, thereby creating a path for future growth of the plastic in other major
markets". The term "large market" is intentionally broad in this definition, because the
scale required for a market to be considered "large" depends on the size of embedded
investment in a material. As a general rule with platforms, the first "large market"
application should be considered the one that is large enough to create reasonable return
on the development investment of a material.
This definition was used to generate the list in table 3.6.
Plastic Platform Platform Replaced? Reason for adoption
application year
HDPE1M Household 1958 Glass 6 to 1 consumer preference, "Less
industrial bottles commercial look", "more feminine
chemical bottles in appeal", reduce shipping costs,
resist denting, will not rust, do not
leak, more easily handled, color
can be molded in
LDPE'" Polyethylene 1946 Paper, transparency, toughness, low temp
food pacakges cellophane toughness, chemical inertness,
resistance to tastes and odors
PET T ' 2 liter bottles 1975 Glass Safety, lighter weight
bottles
PP1 ' Consumer 1960 PE, PS good impact resistance, resistance
products to high and low temperatures,
(luggage) worked on same tools,
PS19' Refrigerator 1940 Metal dimensional stability, low
parts temperature performance
PUR '" Seat cushions 1957 Rubber flame resistance, lighter than latex,
foam slow springback (to provide firm
seat), excellent ventilation,
PVC'11 Shower 1941 Glass/rubber waterproof, mildew resistant,
curtains/rain formable
wear
ABS' Chemical/DWV 1955 Iron, lead stiff, light, corrosion resistant,
pipe chemical resistant,
Acetal h"" Auto parts 1960 Zinc lighter weight, moldable
Nylon"= Hosiery 1940 Silk strength, clarity, resilience (runless
stockings)
PTFER= Nonstick 1950 n/a nonstick properties
coatings
Acrylic Aircraft 1940 Glass lightweight, moldability, clarity18(PMMA canopies
Polycarbonate TM Tough glazing 1964 Glass toughness, clarity
Reinforced Boats 1944 Metal lightweight, moldability, corrosion
Plastics 1 68 resistance
Table 3.6: Platform applications for commercial plastics. Seven largest plastics shown in bold.
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While the credibility necessary to emerge from the enabler phase could be generated by
one or many applications of a material, each material had only one platform application.
Like the enabler phase applications, the platform applications of the major plastics had
several common threads. First, each of the platform applications (except Teflon 69 )
replaced an existing material in a major application. Second, each substitution was
based on utility from superior relevant properties of the plastic (not low cost). In fact, all
but one plastic (ABS) is still, in 2004, the dominant material in its platform application,
suggesting that the properties were nearly perfectly matched to the needs of the
application. Third, each platform market was very large at its inception and has remained
large-all but one was still listed as a category in the 1998 Modern Plastics review, and
the one that wasn't listed (PVC shower curtains) was simply overshadowed by even
larger applications. A fourth characteristic of platform applications will be shown in
chapter four: they were all recognized as potential applications during research and
development of the plastics. The final (and very important) characteristic of platform
applications is that they provided a springboard into other large markets.
HDPE Detergent Bottles
High density polyethylene's (HDPE) conquest of metal containers in detergent bottles in
the late 1950s is an excellent platform application example. The development of HDPE
was announced in 1955 by Phillips, and the material was formally released in 195717°.
The material was sold to the industry as a superior replacement to LDPE, offering higher
heat resistance and higher modulus (stiffness)'7 1 . Its enabler application was the Hula
Hoop (1957), a thinwalled tubular ring that could be rotated around the hips of
children'7 2 . While the Hula Hoop achieved considerable success (1 million lb/week at its
peak), it was hardly enough to justify the enormous investment that had been made by
several producers in the catalyst technology required to produce HDPE 73"l74. Because of
its stiffness and temperature resistance, it had been proposed in early publications as a
potential material for high quality bottles 7 .
There were many segments of the bottle market in the late 1950s, ranging from oil
bottles, which were metal/cardstock composites, to soft drink bottles, which were glass,
to milk bottles, which were also glass. While HDPE would eventually find applications
in all of these applications (except carbonated drinks), its chemical resistance, light
weight, and toughness made it most attractive to 400 million unit/year dish detergent
market7 6. Prior to the HDPE invasion, detergents were packaged in metal containers,
and were primarily sold to consumers through neighborhood stores.
Hercules Hi-fax resin was used in the first HDPE detergent container, a shapely pink
bottle for Lever Brothers' new Swan detergent. Its cost was slightly higher the same as
glass bottles, but it offered several advantages. First, it matched the Swan image. Swan
was designed to "overcome consumer objections to previous detergents. . .which were
considered 'hard on the hands. The pink colored HDPE offered a "less commercial look
and more feminine appeal", would not "rust, dent or leak", and could molded into
appealing shapes, making it seem less harsh'77 . It was preferred 6:1 by consumers, and
was much lighter, offering savings in shipping7 8 .
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Within one year of this introduction, six major detergents manufacturers-- representing
half of the detergent market-- had switched to plastic bottles7 9. Six producers had entered
the market with bottle resins, and several glass and metal manufacturers had begun
processing plastic bottles 80. However, even after a year ofl roduction, the cost of the
plastic bottles was higher than that of metal or glass bottlesl 1.
The appeal of the bottles to consumers was real: one detergent manufacturer reported
25% increases in market share when it changed its package'8 2! The replacement of glass
bottles by HDPE was complete by 1961, when over 500 million bottles were sold'83 .
Figure 3.4 shows a plastic bottle used by one of the players.
Figure 3A: Chiffon HDPE bottle M .
It was a short jump for HDPE to move from the detergent bottle platform into its next big
market: bleach bottles. The bleach bottle market, in which HDPE offered safety and
huge weight savings (58 lbs/box of bleach) to housewives, absorbed 80 million lb. of
HDPE within two years of introduction'85 ' 86. Figure 3.5 shows two examples of early
bleach bottles.
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Figure 3.5: Early plastic bleach bottles1 87.
The experience gained by producers in making detergent bottles, and the experience of
consumers with those bottles, were important factors in 1963 when HDPE was inserted
into what would become its largest market: milk bottles.
The move of HDPE into plastic detergent bottles showed all the characteristics of the
platform applications. First, it replaced a different material (metal) in a major market
(detergent bottles). Second, the replacement was based on property advantages (consumer
appeal, rust proof, dent proof, no leaks), not on low cost. Third, HDPE is still the
dominant material in detergent bottles, and household industrial chemical bottles remain
one of the largest categories for HDPE. Fourth, the application was recognized years
before it was introduced. Finally, (and most importantly), detergent bottles provided a
platform for other major applications: bleach bottles and milk jugs.
Platforms are Key to Commercial Success
Platform applications filled important roles in the commercial development of the major
plastics: they established commercial viability. They were the first applications that were
likely to generate profits large enough to justify the investment necessary to develop the
major plastics18 8. They forced the development of processing methods and
manufacturing parameters that would lead to consistent, reliable end products. They also
forced markets to recognize and become familiar with the new plastics, while
simultaneously further proving the utility of the materials. An important result of this
exposure was the entry of additional producers into the market, creating new competition
which resulted in lower costs and superior products 8 9.
In short, the emergence of a platform application marked the end of the enabler phase,
and was a key step in creating a mature material (although applications with similar
characteristics to the enabler applications would continue to appear throughout the lives
of the plastics). After conquering their platforms, the plastics were proven-markets
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were familiar with them, processors could make parts with them, and application
producers could design with them. They could launch from their platforms into other
markets, where they were ready to compete with existing materials on a level playing
field.
The Widespread Substitution Phase: Realm of Traditional Materials
Marketing
According to traditional materials marketing wisdom, market selection for materials
should focus on three factors: cost of the entrant material compared to incumbents,
properties of the entrant material compared to incumbents, and overall market size. Thus,
if a material is lower cost and offers better properties in a large market, this wisdom
suggests that it is bound for success.
This wisdom is certainly useful as a "no-go" test for market assessment: if a new material
is more expensive and offers worse properties, it is unlikely to succeed. However, the
opposite is not necessarily true. Technical difficulties, consumer unfamiliarity, value
chain issues, competitive response, and codes and standards can all prevent a superior
material from entering a market. However, once a material has established itself in the
enabler phase and has found a platform application, many of these challenges are
eliminated. Having been established in these applications, market hesitations and
switching costs for the new material are reduced, and the material can compete on level
ground with existing materials. The widespread substitution phase begins, and traditional
materials marketing wisdom reigns supreme. It is in this phase that long-term profits are
generated, and in this phase that materials become commodity products.
In the widespread substitution phase, entrant materials are able to compete with existing
materials in large markets based on lower cost as well as on superior performance.
While some of the switches create lasting dominant positions (similar to those in the
platform applications), many of the switches are more fleeting. Incremental cost
differences can trigger massive materials switches (assuming that switching costs, which
will be discussed in chapter 5, aren't prohibitive). Materials switches can also be
precipitated by other factors, such as fashion and the whims of the market.
The battles between materials in the widespread substitution phase can be fierce, with
different materials serving different segments of the same market. Examples are visible
in many markets today. For example, there are battles in the auto industry between
aluminum and steel for auto bodies, between leather and leatherette (vinyl) for seating
surfaces, and even between ABS, PP, and PUR for dashboard surfaces. While these
materials are clearly used in different segments (aluminum, leather, and PUR are only
available on upscale automobiles), examples from the housing industry show more subtle
competition. "Wood" floors can be solid hardwood, engineered laminate, and
paper/melamine coated fiberboard (Pergo). Carpets are made from PP fibers, nylon
fibers, polyester fibers, and even recycled vinyl.
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It appears that the eventual winners are the materials whose properties align perfectly
with the needs of an application at the least cost-they are the lowest cost perfect
matches. The lowest cost perfect match concept has broad strategic implications for
materials, and will be discussed in chapter 7. The competition among established
materials for the washing machine agitator market is an example of both competition in
the widespread substitution phase and the principle of the lowest cost perfect match.
Washing Machine Agitators: a Race to the Bottom
The first modem, electric washing machine was introduced in 1908 by the Hurley
Machine Company of Chicago, Illinois'90. The Maytag Company introduced the next
major breakthrough in clothes washing technology in 1922: the agitator, which forced
water through clothes instead of pulling clothes through water 91. Early agitators were
metal, mostly aluminum. Aluminum was well suited to the application: it was light
weight, castable, strong, and relatively corrosion resistant. Although it dominated the
market for awhile, it faced a tough competitor in 1941: phenolic, which displaced
aluminum in several machines based on "greater utility and lower cost" 92. Phenolic,
which had established itself in electrical parts and consumer products, was better suited to
agitators than aluminum in many respects. It was more corrosion resistant, lower density,
and more attractive to "housewives"...who were "said to like the color' "93. Figure 3.6
shows a phenolic agitator.
Figure 3.6: Phenolic agitator.
Phenolic's attack on aluminum was accelerated in 1947, when plunger molding and die
preheating made it possible to produce phenolic agitators "faster than diecasting"' 94. By
1953, 12 million lb. of phenolic was used in washing machines, representing
approximately 3 million agitators-a significant portion of the market. A 1955 survey of
producers showed that 23 of 25 used phenolics, which had become especially appealing
because of their resistance to corrosion by the detergent-type laundry soaps that had taken
the market by storm'95' 196. Its lower cost per cubic inch also helped solidify its position.
66
_I I
As would be expected, sales of phenolic agitators largely reflected the trends of the
durable goods industry through the late 1950sl97 . Agitators were sold to manufacturers
for $1 in 1961, and were well-proven and highly reliable. Overtures by the nascent
polypropylene industry to enter the market were considered ridiculous by phenolics
producers, who said they "had nothing to fear"'98 .
Kelvinator's introduction of the first polypropylene washing machine agitator in 1963
showed that the phenolic producers had grown overconfident'9 9 . Polypropylene, which
had proven itself in luggage and chairs, did not perform as well as phenolic in washing
machine agitators-it was softer and could become "limp" at washing machine
temperatures. At the time of its introduction, PP was more expensive than phenolic, but
its thermoplastic nature gave it attractive advantages in molding speed. Furthermore, the
price of PP had shown a downward trend while phenolic had held steady for several
years, indicating to washing machine manufacturers that PP might become far more
attractive in the near future
By 1964, the price of polypropylene had indeed dropped further, and PP had claimed
nearly 10% of the agitator market. Three types of PP agitators had been introduced, and
five more were expected in 1965201. The expected switch did not come, and phenolics
regained in 1965 at least half of the market share that had been lost, citing that the
mechanical properties and price of phenolic remained attractive, and also citing that their
previous predictions of continued dominance were right20 2.
Unwilling to give up the fight, PP makers countered by teaching appliance makers about
designs with a "degree of flex action", which could not be matched by phenolic2 03 .
Furthermore, PP began to replace metals in many other appliance parts, particularly the
wash tub204. This gave appliance makers more experience in molding large thermoplastic
parts, and the agitator added to economies of scale in manufacturing. At this point, PP
was clearly less expensive, and its limp hot water properties had been designed into
strengths. It was the lowest cost material that was good enough for customers.
Phenolic sales in washing machines dropped from a high of 24 million lb in 1966 to a
mere 7 million lb. by 1971, and were removed from Modem Plastics as a category in
1972, never to return205,206. Washing machines today use PP or HDPE agitators, with
battles for individual products fought on very small differences in cost and properties20 7.
The agitator battle was a typical one during the widespread substitution phase.
Traditional materials marketing wisdom held-materials competed for large markets
based on incremental differences in cost and performance. However, this type of
competition took place only after the completion of the enabler phase and the
establishment of a platform. The potential cost savings of PP in washing machine
agitators must have been obvious to both PP producers and appliance makers, but PP was
unable to make inroads until it had completed its enabler phase (dominated by ropes,
fibers, and portable coolers) and established its platform application-luggage. It was
then given a chance to perform, and several years passed before acceptable designs were
produced.
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Another important point of the widespread substitution phase was also highlighted in this
battle: there are no guarantees. Phenolic had passed its enabler phase and established its
platform application before the advent of the agitator, but it did not displace aluminum
for nearly 20 years, despite obvious advantages. Phenolic producers believed that their
product was immutable in the agitator market, and the entire business was destroyed by
PP. It is likely that PP producers believed the same thing, until HDPE entered the
market.
In this story and others, plastics demonstrated that the only safety in the widespread
substitution phase comes from being the lowest cost material that meets the exact needs
of the market. This condition can be filled many ways-some materials take dominant
positions in applications because their unique properties are perfectly suited to the
applications. In other cases, several materials can do the job, and cost becomes the most
important driver. It is significant that both PP and HDPE can work in washing machine
agitators, because there are many applications that do not need the exact unique
properties of a material. They simply need something that is good enough, and the
competing materials are simple commodities.
The overwhelming majority of competition for applications occurs between materials that
are in the widespread substitution phase, and this fact provides insight into the application
of traditional materials marketing wisdom to new materials. If the conditions facing new
materials are not explicitly identified, then they appear face the same challenges as
existing materials. This is logical but false. New materials display different behavior
than existing materials because they face different conditions, and these conditions make
them better suited to enabler applications than to widespread substitution or platform
applications. Since traditional materials marketing wisdom seems to hold in the
widespread substitution phase, it needs to be amended to account for new materials. The
next two chapters will discuss the conditions and challenges faced by new materials, and
chapter 6 will present strategies to amend traditional wisdom.
Conclusion
An examination of the most important plastics applications has shown that the factors
that lead to quick application insertion and deep market penetration are different. In
particular, it is clear that the presence of a clear value proposition, although necessary,
does not necessarily lead to uniformly quick market insertion. For this reason, the
traditional materials marketing approach (in which producers focus on attacking the
existing markets of similar materials and winning with incremental cost and performance
advantages) should not be applied in all situations.
The traditional approach is streamlined to achieve penetration, and is sound advice for
most battles between established materials. However, new materials are different from
established materials. Insertion factors dominate until the materials are fully established
and ready to play by the same rules as older materials. A clear three phase pattern was
observed in the commercialization of successful plastics. Traditional materials marketing
wisdom was largely inapplicable until the third phase. The pattern is shown graphically
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in figure 3.7.
Enablers
(0-2 yrs)
Figure 3.7: Commercialization pattern of plastics.
Important milestones were achieved in each phase of the commercialization pattern, and
the applications shared common characteristics. The milestones and characteristics of
each phase are shown in table 3.7.
Enabler Platform Widespread
Phase Application Phase Substitution Phase
Goals/ Establish credibility End enabler phase Generate profits
Milestones with application
producers Establish commercial Mass marketing of material
viability by generating
Learn to make/ profits
process material
Introduce material to mass
Introduce the market
product to some
consumers Invite new producers to
market
Identify faults of
materials
Application Solves new Single application Mostly replacement, but
characteristics problems some enabler and platform
Replaces existing material type applications
Simple by doing job better
applications- (properties) Lower cost than incumbents
simple value chains
Not necessarily lower cost Slightly better properties
Applications can than incumbents
only be done with Permanent dominance
new material
Cost not an issue
Table 3.7: Goals and characteristics of phases in materials commercialization pattern.
The commercialization pattern displayed by plastics appears to hold in other materials, as
well.
In addition to identifying the characteristics of situations in which the traditional
materials marketing approach doesn't work, this pattern can add resolution to innovation
69
theory. This materials commercialization pattern is fundamentally different from the
patterns described by innovation theorists for several reasons. First, it forces discernment
between insertion and penetration, whereas previous descriptions and theories have done
so only implicitly, and have thus confounded the two. Second, this pattern also deals
with products that are not easily changed, whereas most previous work has focused on
adapting products to meet market needs. At its core, this pattern describes a pure push
situation-producers of new materials must fight their way into the market, and don't
have the luxury of quick reconfiguration to meet market needs-forcing a more careful
examination of the factors relevant to market selection. Finally, development of this
pattern in the next chapters will show that the relevant insertion factors are limiting
factors. By exposing limiting factors, materials producers and innovation theorists can
build strategies to minimize their effects or avoid them altogether.
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Chapter 4: Insertion Factors
Introduction
Chapter three showed that the major commercial plastics followed a clear pattern of
market progression. It also revealed a convincing difference between the factors that
affect placement of a material into a market (insertion factors) and the factors that pertain
to large scale success in that market (penetration factors). It further identified insertion
factors as limiting factors.
Since market insertion is the first step in commercializing a new material, it should be the
focus of producers of new materials. If insertion is to be successful, the producers must
successfully deal with any limiting factors. In order to do this more effectively,
producers need to have a better understanding of the limiting factors than they do now.
The limiting factors of insertion might be avoidable (or at least manageable) if they are
explicitly identified and their effects recognized.
This chapter will explore the limiting insertion factors of the most important commercial
plastics in their most important applications. It will be shown that some of the
traditionally recognized insertion factors, such as cost and market identification
serendipity were much less important than technical deficiencies and value chain
obstacles. In fact, the presence of technical deficiencies and value chain obstacles
accounts for the majority of the insertion delay of the major plastics in their most
important applications.
Additional resolution will be added to the pattern of materials commercialization that was
shown in chapter three. A progression of insertion factors corresponds to the progression
of characteristic applications in each phase of the pattern. Enabler phase applications face
very few limiting insertion factors. Platform applications face value chain obstacles.
Widespread substitution phase applications often face both technical challenges and value
chain obstacles.
Insertion Factors
The major plastics offer a clear and compelling value proposition in their biggest
applications. However, in most cases, the plastics and the major applications did not
come together until years after the plastics had been commercialized in other
applications. There are several possible explanations for this seemingly paradoxical
behavior:
1. No one thought to place the new plastics in the applications-identification of the
applications was serendipity.
2. The material was more expensive than incumbent materials and therefore was
unattractive to use.
3. The material was technically incapable of meeting application demands.
4. Elements of the value chain were unable (or people in the elements were
unwilling) to accept the new material for a given application.
Each of these possible explanations will now be discussed.
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Materials Serendipity
Perhaps the simplest explanation for the delay in insertion of major plastics into their
biggest applications is "materials serendipity": that no one thought of using them for
those applications prior to insertion. This hypothesis would indicate that the inventors
and marketers were unable to recognize potential applications, and would follow the
popular assertion that the only way to find the real applications for materials is to release
them to customers and see how they get used (or who finds them)1.
While this explanation is elegant in its simplicity, it is hardly accurate in describing the
insertion of the biggest applications of the major plastics. There are cases in the history
of plastics in which commercialization of a plastic predated the existence of an
application, but these are relatively rare. Only one of the 34 biggest applications in 1998
falls in this category: polystyrene cassette tapes. In this case, polystyrene was chosen as
the material for the new invention because of its relatively low cost and ease of molding2.
Its use grew as adoption of cassettes and 8-track tapes grew.
The major plastics were proposed as potential suitors for all of the other biggest
applications earlier than they were inserted into those applications. The properties of the
plastics lent themselves to these applications, and early patent, technical, and industry
literature often suggested them. Table 4.1 shows the date and source of early application
suggestions.
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Material Application Insertion Year Early Suggestion Date Early Suggestion Source
HDPE Liquid food 1963 1955 Industry publication--review paper3
bottles
HDPE Household 1958 1955 Industry publication--review paper'
industrial
chemical
bottles
HDPE Grocery sacks 1972 1970 Industry Publication--article°
HDPE Trash and can 1978 1968 Industry Publication--article0
liners
HDPE pipe and 1960 1955 Industry publication--review paper'
conduit
HDPE Pails 1958 1955 Industry publication--review paper'
HDPE Crate and totes 1961 1958 Industry publication--articles
HDPE Industrial 1958 1955 Industry publication--review paper"
drums
LDPE Food 1947 1936 Inventor memoirs
packaging film
LDPE Extrusion 1949 1936 Inventor memoirs TM
coating
LDPE Non-food 1947 1936 Inventor memoirs 3
packaging film
LDPE Stretch and 1965 1960 US Patent 14
shrink
Material Application Insertion Year Early Suggestion Date Early Suggestion Source
PET Soft drink 1975 1969 US Patent"
bottles
PET Custom bottles 1979 1969 US Patent t
PP Fibers and 1958 1956 US Patent'
filaments
PP Consumer 1959 1956 US Patents
products
PP Rigid 1960 1956 US Patent'"
packaging
PP oriented film 1961 1956 US Patent
PP Transportation 1959 1957 Industry publication--review paper"'
PP Appliances 1959 1957 Industry publication--review paper'
PS Oriented 1957 1943 US Patent z2
film/sheet
PS Vending/portion 1956 1954 US Patent z 4
cups
PS Cassettes, Etc 1965 1965 Industry publication--articlezo
PUR Furniture 1954 1947 Inventor Review Paperzo
(padding) 
PUR Building 1960 1955 Industry publication--review paper f
insulation
PUR Trans. 1955 1947 Inventor Review Paperzs
(padding) 
PUR Refrigeration 1956 1955 Industry publication--review paper'
PUR Rug underlay 1957 1955 Industry publication--review papers
PVC Pipe and 1953 1946 Industry publication--review paper'
conduit
PVC Siding 1961 1951 US Patent" z
PVC Windows and 1958 1953 US Patentf'
doors
PVC Wire and Cable 1938 1936 Industry publication review paper '35
PVC Extruded 1948 pre-1946 Used in military gun covers ~
packaging _
PVC Pipe fittings 1954 1946 Industry publication--review papere'
Table 4.1: Introduction dates and early suggestion dates of major plastics applications.
These data show that the mean time elapsed between suggestion of an application and
insertion therein was 4.625 years. With the exception of household refrigeration
applications for PUR, all of the applications were recognized as potentially large markets
at least two years (usually more) before insertion. 82% of the applications (all but six:
LDPE shrink film, HDPE grocery sacks, HDPE trash bags, PS cups, PVC siding, PVC
windows and doors) were recognized very early in the commercial lives of their
respective plastics-either in the foundation patents of the material, the memoirs of the
inventors, or in pre-production published reviews. It will be shown in a subsequent
section that significant technical barriers had to be overcome for each of the six
applications that were not suggested early, indicating that technical problems may have
masked the potential of the materials in these applications. However, insertion of these
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applications still did not occur until well after the early suggestion date, so only part of
the overall insertion delay is explained by the delay in suggestion.
It may be concluded that, except for PS cassettes, the need for each major application
existed before insertion and was known to the plastics industry. The data show that it
would be unreasonable to categorically assert that the delay in insertion of the major
plastics into their biggest applications was due to incompetent or serendipitous
identification of markets. However, in cases where technical improvement was
necessary, some of the delay can be explained by the fact that the properties of the
materials did not lend themselves to specific applications, effectively delaying their
identification as potential outlets.
It is also important to note that the fact that the applications were suggested much earlier
than they were introduced, coupled with the fact that all of the applications grew quickly
to become very large, indicates once again that the key factors affecting insertion are
limitingfactors.
Plastics Were Too Expensive to be Attractive
As noted in chapter two, much of the advice and research of materials commercialization
experts is focused on reducing cost. In their Investment Methodology for Materials
(IMM), Maine and Ashby recommend identifying opportunities based on the applications
of materials with similar properties3 8. The cost modeling and multiattribute utility
techniques developed at MIT by Field and Clark are designed to identify costs in two
existing materials to predict the probability of substitution-with the assumption that
rational actors will switch to lower cost materials of equal utility3 9 (or, significantly, to
higher cost materials of superior utility). This method has been shown to be remarkably
accurate in predicting switches between established materials.
The prominence of cost in these and other models suggests that cost is a major limiting
factor in the insertion of materials into applications. In fact, a strict interpretation of the
prevailing cost theories would dictate that new materials be inserted into new applications
only if they were less expensive than competing options, and significantly less expensive
than existing materials in those applications. The Field and Clark multiattribute utility
models depart from this interpretation, since they allow for insertion based on the overall
value of a product (utility/cost).
Table 3.5 shows the biggest applications of the major plastics in 1998, the material that
was replaced with insertion of each material, and whether the cost of the finished plastic
product was lower than that products made of the displaced material at the time of first
insertion, as reported in Modern Plastics and other sources. In most cases, MP simply
reported the substitution costs in one of three states: lower, equal, or higher. If the actual
(numerical) price difference was explicitly reported, it is also listed in the table.
The price differences in Modern Plastics were judged to more reliable than simple
historical materials price data. They generally reflect the change in part cost to the
application manufacturer. Because of differences in density, materials prices cannot be
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compared solely on price per lb, as they are usually reported. Converting the price per lb
costs to price per unit density would be more accurate, but would not reflect processing
costs. True comparison of historical pricing would require data on both materials costs
and state of the art processing costs for each material at a given time in history, which is
not available because of the pace of process developments in the periods under
consideration. However, Modern Plastics' attempts to compare changes in part costs
reflected at least some of the processing costs.
The best comparison of historical pricing reflect total system cost, which can be defined
as the sum of the costs of all the nodes of the value chain of an application. Ideally,
total system cost would be reflected in the end-user price of an item or in the profits of
the item's manufacturer. However, the true total system cost of a product is very difficult
to assess because value chains are most often disaggregated-nodes are owned by
different entities, each of which bases prices on market factors. Because of this
disaggregation, it is unlikely that materials selection was based on total system cost in
any but the most obvious situations.
Application
Liquid food
bottles 40
Household
industrial chemical
bottles 41
Grocery sacks4z
Trash and can
liners4 3
Pipe and conduit"
Pails4 '
Crate and totes"
Industrial drums 4'
Food packaging
film4 8 '4 9
Extrusion coating"
Non-food
packaging film515 52
Stretch and
shrink53
Soft drink bottles4
Elapsed
time
6
1
15
21
3
1
4
1
6
8
6
24
8
Replaced
paper
Paper/metal
paper
LDPE
Metal pipe/LDPE
pipe
Metal (steel)
Softwood,
hardwood, AL
Metal
Paper, cellophane
Asphalt laminations
paper, cellophane
Non-shrink plastics
Glass
Less
Expensive?
No
No
Equal
No
No
No
No
Yes
No (1950)
No
No (1950)
Yes
No
Price Difference?
$0.06/bottle
equal, or slightly higher
20-100% more,
depending on replaced
material
"Approximately 1/3 the
cost"
"only slightly higher
than an asphalt
lamination of
comparable protection"
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Material
HDPE
HDPE
HDPE
HDPE
HDPE
HDPE
HDPE
HDPE
LDPE
LDPE
LDPE
LDPE
PET
Material Application Elapsed Replaced Less Price Difference?
time Expensive?
PET Custom bottles* 12 Glass/plastic No
PP Fibers and 0 Nylon,PE, dacron Equal (within 8.17/ft (PP), 8.26/ft
filaments 56 1%) (nylon) (1961--both
20% higher in 1958)
PP Consumer prod." 1 PE, PS No 109%
PP Rigid packaging " 2 Urea Yes 20-30%
PP Oriented film " 3 Cellophane No
PP Transportationu 1 Zinc Yes
PP Appliances' 1 Metal Yes price based on similar
applications
PS Oriented film and 19 Cellophane, Yes
sheet62 acetate
PS Vending and 18 Paper No sundae dishes:
portion cups 63 "somewhat more costly
than paper"
PS Cassettes, Etc 27 nothing--new (least expensive)
application
PUR Furniture 1 Rubber foam Equal "about the same"
(padding) 65
PUR Building 7 Foamed styrene No
insulation6 6
PUR Transportation 2 Rubber foam No
7flexible padding)
PUR Household and 3 Cork, fiber glass No
commercial
refrigeration"
PUR Rug underlay 4 Rubber foam No "premium price"
PVC pipe and conduit 15 Iron No >$.28/ft
PVC Siding'u 23 Fiberglass,glass, No
Al, steel
PVC Windows and 20 Aluminum Equal "comparable"
doors 7 1
PVC Wire and 0 Rubber No
Cable72,73
PVC Extruded 10 Cellophane No (1953)
packaging 7
PVC Pipe fittings 16 n/a (only material
useful with PVC)
Table 4.2: Prices of new plastics compared
major applications
to displaced existing materials at time of introduction in
Because they were not replacements for existing materials applications, PVC pipe fittings
and PS cassettes will be excluded from the rest of the cost discussion, although it should
be noted that one of the reasons cited for adoption of PS in cassettes was its low cost75 .
Excluding these two applications, the table above shows that the entry price point for
plastics in the vast majority-81.25%/--of their major 1998 applications was equal to or
higher than the price point of existing applications. This observation indicates that strict
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interpretation of the low cost theory, in which substitution occurs only when the entrant
material costs less than the incumbent, does not describe the entry of the major plastics
into their biggest applications. It also debunks the explanation of insertion delay that is
being tested: new materials clearly do not have to be lower cost than incumbents to be
attractive, and can be inserted at higher cost.
A pure utility-based substitution theory, in which players switch materials based on both
utility and cost, fits the data much better. If one assumes that the producers of the major
applications were rational actors, it is unreasonable to believe that insertions of new
plastics at higher costs were done arbitrarily. A better explanation is that the entrant
materials offered additional utility to the application-that the basis of competition at the
insertion point was superior performance on some dimension that could not be matched
at the same cost by incumbent materials. The entrant materials did the jobs that
customers wanted better than incumbent materials did.
It should not be assumed that cost played no part in insertion-it probably did. Cost was
explicitly cited as an insertion challenge in six of the applications listed above7 6and was
implicit in many others. However, the cost challenges were to get the material down a
feasible price point for each application-not to get below the cost of incumbents. The
feasible price point was usually not lower than existing materials, but neither was it
extraordinarily high-there were no "golden trash bags". While the data on price
differences shown in table 3.5 are admittedly sparse, the greatest price difference shown
was in polypropylene housewares, with the costs of PP 109% higher than the plastics it
replaced. This seems like a huge difference in cost, but the application in question was a
plastic tumbler for household use, which jumped in price from $.21 to $.43. Since
tumbler spending was most likely only a small portion of the budget of the average
housewife (the stated customer), this was a very affordable price to pay for a plastic cup
that could hold ice but would not melt in the dishwasher!7 7
The other application in which the price difference of the entrant material was very high
was HDPE crates and totes, in which HDPE beverage cases replaced wood cases at
approximately 100% higher cost. Since beverage cases were sold in large lots, this price
difference required dairies (the main customers) to make significant investment.
However, HDPE beverage cases required no maintenance, which could cost up to
40%/year of the original cost of the wood cases. HDPE also offered longer life and lower
weight, allowing major reduction in shipping costs. The HDPE cases were priced at a
point in which the relationship between utility and cost made them slightly favorable to
customers.
Although the majority of the major plastics applications of 1998 were more expensive
than competitors when they were inserted, some of them were less expensive or equal in
cost. Figure 4.1 shows a histogram of the insertion periods of the major applications of
1998, with bars divided according to the cost position of entrants (lower, equal, higher).
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Figure 4.1: Insertion periods of major 1998 applications, showing cost position of entrants.
As expected, the more expensive entrants represent the largest portion of most categories,
but the concentration of less expensive entries in the 1-3 year category stands out as an
interesting feature of the histogram. There are four less expensive entries in this
category, three of which are polypropylene applications, with the other being HDPE
industrial drums. In each of these applications, the entrants followed the patterns of the
entrants in applications with higher cost positions-they offered additional utility. In
fact, the additional utility may have warranted adoption even had they been slightly
higher in cost. Polypropylene was relatively strong and much more corrosion resistant
than the small metal windshield wiper motor housings it replaced in automobiles and the
metal wire dishwasher cutlery racks it replaced in appliances79' 80 . It was also a
thermoplastic, making it much faster to mold than the thermoset urea it replaced in bottle
closures (rigid packaging)81. High density polyethylene drums were far lighter and more
corrosion resistant than the stainless steel drums they replaced, making them very
attractive for the shipment of corrosive materials8 2.
Value Chain Obstacles or Technical Deficiencies Delayed Insertion
Deficiencies in the properties of materials and value chain obstacles are also possible
explanations for the insertion delay of the major plastics into their most important
applications. However, before exploring these possibilities, it is necessary to draw sharp
lines of delineation between the two, because the difference is not always clear.
For the purposes of this analysis, technical deficiencies can be defined as limitations in
the intrinsic properties of materials that prevent their use in some applications. Technical
deficiencies are solved by technical advancements, which include both advancements in
materials science and breakthroughs in processing techniques.
It is obvious that different materials offer different properties, and that different
properties are useful in different applications. For example, the low cost and relative
toughness of paper makes it useful in bags, but its low strength and flammability makes it
useless in jet engines. While each major plastic displayed a unique set of properties at its
initial commercialization, significant performance and property improvements were made
as the plastics matured.
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Both chemistry and processing drive the properties of plastics, and advances in either one
can have a dramatic effect on the range of applicable applications. Polymer chemistry is
generally recognized as a basic material science, and research is most often executed by
materials producers, or by research institutions such as universities or national
laboratories. However, changes in chemistry technology are always executed and
controlled by materials producers themselves. Thus, any changes in chemistry would be
confined to the materials manufacturing node of the value chain, and would be
considered technical advancements.
In contrast to polymer chemistry, polymer processing technology is generally considered
an applied field. It is developed by a wider range of institutions, ranging from
universities to materials producers to processing machinery makers. Advances in
commercial processing techniques can be introduced by either materials producers or by
processors--and processors are clearly part of the value chain. However, since major
advancements in processing techniques can have enormous impact on the properties and
applicability of a material, it is necessary to classify them (regardless of their origin) as
technical advancements, as well. Major advancements in processing will be defined as
process developments which enhance the properties and applicability of a plastic and
which were previously unknown or unavailable to all processors. Processing
breakthroughs such as the invention of extrusion coating of paperboard with polyethylene
or biaxial stretching of polystyrene, both of which required significant basic research,
changed the physical properties of their respective markets, and opened huge new
markets to many processors, will be considered technical advancements.
Not included in the technical deficiencies category are value chain obstacles. A generic
value chain is shown in figure 4.2.
Part design 
Raw
eals Materials Assembly Distribution Sales/ Customer s Service/ Disposal/processing Mrketing maintenance Recycling
Furchasing
Figure 4.2: Generic product value chain, showing position of material manufacturing.
Value chain obstacles will be defined in this analysis as challenges that stem from nodes
that reside in the value chain after materials manufacturing (excluding customers). These
include processing, assembly, distribution, sales, purchasing, part design and service,
along with other application-specific nodes. Value chain issues are not solved by
changing the technical properties of materials-they are solved by learning to deal with
the existing set of properties. A key difference between value chain issues and technical
issues is that value chain issues are solved with empirical testing while technical issues
are solved with basic or applied science. Value chain issues are solved by people or
groups outside of the materials manufacturer by adapting and implementing knowledge
that is freely available.
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Smaller processing challenges, such as label printing for HDPE bottles or heat sealing PE
films, for which solutions existed but were not in widespread use, are considered value
chain issues. Other value chain issues include code qualification for plastics pipe,
refinement of parameters to allow injection molding of PP on existing tools, and
designing PET bottles to work directly with the existing bottling equipment in a Pepsi or
Coke factory.
Testing the Effects of Value Chain Obstacles and Technical Deficiencies
Since processors and end users were the largest readership of Modern Plastics, the
magazine was remarkably candid about the challenges that limited entry of materials
entering new applications. Appendix A shows the actual challenges listed. These
challenges were categorized into value chain obstacles and technical deficiencies
according to the criteria listed above (technical: challenges solved by advances in
chemistry or by the introduction of new processing techniques; value chain: challenges
solved with empirical testing by entities besides the materials manufacturer using
commonly available knowledge). The results are tabulated in the matrix shown in table
4.3. A "no challenge" column was also created for applications in which no challenges
were cited. Challenges solved before the first commercialization of a material were not
considered in this analysis, since the goal is to identify sources of delay of insertion of a
plastic into specific applications, not sources of delay during development of the plastics
themselves.
Insertion No Value Chain Technical
Material Applicationela Challenge Obstacles Deficiencies
HDPE Liquid food bottles 6 _
HDPE HIC bottles 1
HDPE Grocery sacks 15
HDPE Trash and can liners 21
HDPE ipe and conduit 3
HDPE Pails I _
HDPE rate and totes 4
HDPE Industrial drums 1
LDPE Food packaging film 6
LDPE Extrusion coating 8
LDPE Non-food pack film 6
LDPE Stretch and shrink 24
PET Soft drink bottles 8
PET Custom bottles 12
PP Fibers/filaments 0
PP Consumer products 1
PP Rigid packaging 2
PP oriented film 3
PP Transportation I
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Insertion No Value Chain Technical
Material Application Delay Challenge Obstacles Deficiencies
PP pliances 1
PS riented film/sheet 19 c
PS ending cups 18
PUR Furniture (padding) 1
PUR Building insulation 7
PUR Trans. padding 2
PUR Refrigeration 3
PUR Rug underlay 4
PVC ipe and conduit 15
PVC Siding 23
PVC indows and doors 20
PVC ire and Cable 0 
PVC Extruded packaging 10
PVC Pipe fittings 16
Table 4.3: Table of value chain obstacles and technical deficiencies.
Figure 4.3 is a histogram of application insertion times, with each bar showing
proportions of value chain and technical challenges.
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Figure 4.3: Histogram of major plastics divided by value chain and technical challenges.
This histogram shows an important trend: there is a progression of challenges as insertion
time increases. The first few years are dominated by applications for which Modern
Plastics did not report technical or value chain challenges (mean time to insertion for "no
challenge" group: .875 years). From years 2-6, value chain issues are the dominant
challenges (mean time to insertion for "value chain obstacles" group: 4.75 years).
Beyond 6 years, value chain and technical factors combine to dominate the graph (mean
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time to insertion for "value chain + technical": 16 years). This leads to preliminary set of
null hypotheses:
1. H: Applications with no stated challenges will take equal or longer time to
insert than applications with value chain challenges.
2. H: Applications with value chain problems will take equal or longer to insert
than applications with both value chain and technical challenges.
One sided t-tests with insertion time as the dependent variable were performed to test
these null hypotheses. The results of the tests are shown in table 4.4.
Value
Chain+ Value
Technical Chain
Mean 16 4.75
Variance 27.55556 14.56818
Observations 10 12
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0
df 16
t Stat 5.646518
P(T<=t) one-tail 1.82E-05
t Critical one-tail 1.745884
Table 4.4: Results of one sided t-tests showing that the categories of "no challenge", "value chain
obstacles", and "value chain obstacles + technical deficiencies" are robust.
These tests allow sound rejection of both hypotheses. The t-score of the test of the first
hypothesis is 3.44481, and is significant at the .004 level. The t-score of the second test
is 5.6446, and is significant at the .0000364 level. Since value chain is the variable tested
in each case, the "value chain+ technical" group is also statistically different from "no
challenges" group. Thus, we can conclude that value chain obstacles and the
combination of value chain obstacles and technical deficiencies each have a statistically
significant effect on the period of insertion required for the major plastics into their
biggest applications of 1998.
Further understanding of the relationship between value chain obstacles, technical
deficiencies, and insertion delay can be gained by performing multivariate linear
regression. Although the generalizability of the results is limited by the small size of the
sample pool, multivariate regression is useful as a descriptive tool to recognize basic
effects of variables. In the following regression, performed on SPSS, insertion time (in
years) is the dependent variable coded COMTIME, with dichotomous variables assigned
to the presence of value chain obstacles (coded VALCHAIN) and technical deficiencies
(coded TECH). The results of this regression are shown in table 4.5.
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t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
Value
No Chain
Challenge Obstacles
Mean 0.875 4.7E
Variance 0.410714 14.568182
Observations 8 12
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0
df 12
t Stat -3.444813
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.002426
t Critical one-tail 1.782287
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
Model Summary
Adjusted Std. Error of
Model R R Square R Square the Estimate
1 .816a .665 .643 4.5543
ANOVAP
Sum of
Model Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 1237.630 2 618.815 29.834 .000 a
Residual 622.249 30 20.742
Total 1859.879 32
Coefficients a
Standardi
zed
Unstandardized Coefficien
Coefficients ts
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
1 (Constant) .981 1.445 .679 .503
VALCHAIN 3.699 1.708 .232 2.165 .038
TECH 11.405 1.648 .742 6.920 .000
a. Dependent Variable: COMTIME
Table 4.5: SPSS output of regression of value chain obstacles and
time.
technical deficiencies vs. insertion
The regression model adds resolution to the role of value chain obstacles and technical
deficiencies in insertion of materials. It allows easy separation of value chain obstacles
from technical deficiencies, and shows that both are statistically significant descriptors of
the insertion delay of the major plastics into their biggest applications. The high R2
shows that a large portion (66.5%) of the variation in insertion time can be explained by
these factors. Technical deficiencies have a higher level of statistical significance
(p=.000) in the model, and their effect is illustrated by their high beta- 1.405 years.
While value chain obstacles are clearly statistically significant (p=.038), they are less
significant than technical factors. The beta attached to value chain obstacles is 3.699
years.
In order to test the interaction effects of the presence of value chain obstacles and
technical deficiencies, a dichotomous variable multiplying the two individual
dichotomous variables (TECH and VALCHAIN) can be created. This variable can then
be added to the model presented in table 4.5. However, this model is suspect from the
outset because the ratio of datapoints to variables is very low. Nonetheless, the model
was created. The interaction variable was insignificant in the model (t=.340), and the
model gave a worse fit (R2=.592) with lower overall model significance (F=13.542).
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It was mentioned earlier that there appeared to be a relationship between the presence of
technical deficiencies and the delay in suggestion of new applications for the major
plastics. Another regression was performed to test this relationship, in which the elapsed
time (in years) between the early suggestion for the use of a plastic in an application and
its insertion into that application is used as the dependent variable (coded SUGTIME).
The dichotomous variables VALCHAIN and TECH remained the same as in the previous
regression. The results are shown in table 4.6.
Model Summary
Adjusted Std. Error of
Model R R Square R Square the Estimate
1 .589a .347 .303 3.0231
ANOVA b
Sum of
Model Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 145.698 2 72.849 7.971 .002a
Residual 274.181 30 9.139
Total 419.879 32
Coefficientsd
Standardi
zed
Unstandardized Coefficien
Coefficients ts
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
1 (Constant) 2.406 .959 2.508 .018
VALCHAIN 3.907 1.134 .516 3.445 .002
TECH 1.512 1.094 .207 1.382 .177
a. Dependent Variable: SUGTIME
Table 4.6: SPSS output of regression of value chain obstacles and technical deficiencies vs. elapsed
time between suggestion and insertion.
In this regression, the independent variable TECH, which represents the presence of
technical deficiencies, is not statistically significant. In contrast, VALCHAIN, which
represents the presence of value chain obstacles, is statistically significant at a much
higher level (p=.002 vs. p=.038) than in the COMTIME model shown in table 3.8. This
suggests that much of the variation in insertion time explained by technical deficiencies is
removed from the model by using time of suggestion as the baseline instead of time of
commercialization. If this is the case, one would expect a high correlation to exist
between the presence of technical deficiencies (TECH) and the elapsed time from
commercialization of a material until suggestion of use of that material in an application
(coded COMSUG). An SPSS bivariate correlation matrix of these variables is shown in
table 4.7.
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Correlations
COMSUG TECH
COMSUG Pearson Correlation 1.000 .707*
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 33 33
TECH Pearson Correlation .707* 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 33 33
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Table 4.7: SPSS output of regression of value chain obstacles and technical deficiencies vs. elapsed
time between suggestion and insertion.
The correlation between the COMSUG and TECH variables is quite strong (-71%, and is
clearly statistically significant. However, the presence of a correlative relationship does
not necessarily indicate a causal relationship. It seems equally feasible that suggestion of
an application could lead to technical development (which would expose technical
deficiencies) as it would be for new applications to be suggested as technical problems
are solved. However, if suggestions were presented before technical challenges were
solved, one would expect the presence of technical deficiencies to be a predictor in
explaining the delay between initial suggestion of a plastic and its actual insertion (the
model shown in table 4.6). The presence of technical deficiencies was not a statistically
significant factor-it was dwarfed by value chain obstacles. This indicates that technical
factors were largely solved before the suggestion was made to place the major plastics
into their most important applications. Further evidence of this conclusion is seen by
examining the sources of the suggestions-in all cases, the suggested applications cited
existing materials, and many of the suggestions came from review articles on new
properties of those materials. Keeping in mind that materials in general-and plastics in
particular-can take many different forms, and that those forms depend on the state of
technical development, it is easy to see that at least some technical barriers had to have
been overcome for plastics to be suggested for these applications. It would have been
unreasonable to suggest them otherwise.
It is clear at this point that both technical deficiencies and value chain obstacles are the
most important limiting factors to the quick insertion of the major plastics into the large
applications that were examined in this chapter. Technical deficiencies are more
important-regression analysis showed that applications with technical deficiencies
required nearly three times as long to insert as those with only value chain factors, and
technical deficiencies are more statistically significant in the model. Having said this, the
presence of value chain obstacles is very important, adding 3.7 years of insertion delay in
the regression model.
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Adding Resolution to the Commercialization Pattern
The market progression pattern explained in chapter three is shown in figure 4.4.
Enablers
(0-2 yrs)
Figure 4.4: Materials commercialization pattern
The market progression shown in this pattern corresponds to the progression of obstacles
that were shown in figure 4.3. Applications in the enabler phase followed a characteristic
pattern. They were simple applications that were uniquely suited to solving a new
problem. The applications into which they were inserted took advantage of their unique
properties, which were obvious even early in the life of the material. Because they took
advantage of their unique properties, there were few technical challenges to cause
insertion delays.
It is also significant that the enabler applications were relatively simple-they were
standalone products or could be easily dropped into existing value chains. This meant
that value chain limiting factors would be minimal, since very little investment in
adaptation was required. The fact that the problems solved by the applications were
relatively new also minimized value chain resistance. When new problems arise, markets
are less demanding on their solutions-they don't have to be perfect, they just need to do
the job. This meant that liability factors that might have created value chain challenges
were minimal for many of the enabler applications.
Most of the platform applications dealt only with value chain challenges-they were
replacing existing materials in major markets. The value chains of the applications were
designed to supply products made from existing materials, and time was required to make
the changes necessary to accommodate the new entrants. Furthermore, the existing
applications had established dominant designs-performance criteria were set and
customers expected the products to perform in certain ways. They were much less
forgiving of failure. Thus, testing and development had to be performed to ensure that
the new materials would meet expected performance standards and that they could be
produced in a consistent, defect-free manner. This testing and development period
contributes to insertion delay.
Many of the major applications that emerged during the widespread substitution phase
faced challenges that stemmed from both the technical and value chain arenas.
Refinement of both processing and materials had to occur for the entrants to conquer
tough existing markets. In some cases, such as PP washing machine agitators, the new
material was not understood well enough to be useful in replacement applications and
materials and process development were required before competitive designs emerged.
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In other cases, the markets themselves were extremely demanding yet incredibly
attractive, and warranted development throughout the chain. This was the case with PET
soft drink bottles, for which new materials and entirely new processes were developed8 3.
The difficulty of overcoming obstacles seems to increase with each phase, but the
attractiveness of the application markets also increases. Each phase of the
commercialization pattern generates knowledge and credibility so that a material can
progress into more demanding, challenging, and attractive markets. Both time and
money are required to solve technical difficulties and beat value chain challenges. By
following the progression shown in the materials commercialization pattern, producers of
new materials can to accelerate knowledge development with real world experience and
generate progressively larger amounts of cash needed to fund development of
progressively more difficult challenges.
The most severe insertion delays occur when the materials commercialization pattern is
not followed. When new materials producers fail to understand the technical and value
chain obstacles in an attractive application market, they are prone and focus all of their
new material introduction efforts on conquering it, leading to either failure or very slow
insertion.
Perhaps this pattern is best understood by examining the experiences of three startups,
each of whom took a different path to commercialization. Microcool Technology is an
example of a company that failed because of insertion factors, despite its efforts to
market a material that offered revolutionary performance. Nanomagnetics also had a
material with revolutionary performance, and was on the brink of failure until it changed
its strategy to dodge insertion factors. Selectech achieved very quick insertion and record
of success by following the pattern of commercialization, despite the limited performance
advantages of its core material.
Microcool Technology, LLC' 4'8s '86
Microcool Technology was started by a group of students in the Leaders for
Manufacturing program at MIT in October, 2001. Microcool's core intellectual property
was a process for making "Linear Metal Foam", a highly porous metal with aligned,
controllable internal microchannels. Theirs was the first process capable of making this
type of material in an economical way.
Developed in the MIT Welding and Joining Lab, linear metal foam (LMF) was originally
proposed as a metal/metal composite for thermomechanically compliant anisotropic
structures, sound deadening submarine skins, and heat transfer devices for
semiconductors87. During development, researchers discovered that, because of its tiny
pore size and high surface area, LMF had extraordinary heat transfer properties (see
figure 4.5). When charged with pressurized air, the material could transfer nearly 50
W/cm2, far more power than other cooling devices. With full water cooling, 1000W/cm2
was possible. In fact, microchannel cooling had been shown to have the best heat
transfer of any medium88. Furthermore, the MIT process was inexpensive. The value
proposition was clear: superior heat transfer at a low cost.
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Figure 4.5: Microcool Linear Metal Foam
Because of its extraordinary properties in heat transfer, the Microcool team decided to
propose a business that would use LMF to attack the market in which it offered the most
obvious value: semiconductor cooling. Its small form factor made it ideal for
microcomputers, and the Joining group had developed techniques to fuse it directly to the
surface of silicon chips. This eliminated the thermal interface material that was a major
contributor to overall thermal inefficiencies in semiconductors8 9.
Microcool estimated the semiconductor cooling market to have sales of approximately $3
billion per year, with a highly disaggregated structure-the largest semiconductor cooling
manufacturers had revenues of less than $100 million in 2001. Furthermore, the market
was clamoring for thermal management solutions-Intel had stated that thermal barriers
were fast approaching, and that they would limit the overall performance of its
products9 .
Venture capitalists also recognized the opportunity. Microcool won the MIT 1K business
plan competition, and gained audiences with several prestigious firms, some of whom
encouraged the founders to leave graduate school to attack the market. The financiers
were interested by the quality of the technology, the size of the market, and the
attractiveness of the industry structure. What they did not understand was the complexity
of the value chain of cooling products in the computer market.
Microcool did not understand this complexity, either. The strategy it had proposed was
to attack first the semiconductor test equipment market, which was facing incredibly
challenging thermal barriers as it sought to increase the chip density on its motherboards.
LMF was to be formed into large sheets, then attached to existing water cooling systems.
Unfortunately, this application was infeasible due to very strict reliability requirements
within the industry. Semiconductor test equipment was required to have very high
uptime, and producers were unwilling to take the risk of incorporating a new material.
The semiconductor test manufacturers were not appetized by the technical difficulties
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that would be present in developing LMF to fit their products. The largest piece of LMF
that had been produced was 1" square. The test machines would require pieces 30" x
50"! Although the basic LMF technique probably could have been adapted, it would
have been very difficult.
The second market that Microcool intended to attack was the emerging blade server
market. The blade server market was estimated to grow to 2 million units within 3 years,
and Microcool incorrectly estimated that $90 of the $2200 selling price would be spent
on cooling. At the time the business plan was written, blade servers used low performing
chips, and Microcool speculated that it could enable the use of the "latest, greatest chips".
Microcool did not understand the value chain barriers that it would face in this market.
LMF could not work with existing fans-it required compressed air to be forced through
its channels. Since microcompressors with sufficient capacity did not exist, the only way
to accommodate this requirement would be to install compressors in the buildings that
housed servers. This was impractical for many reasons-it would consume enormous
amounts of energy, require revisions in the standard rack mount architecture, and
necessitate fluidic logic systems within the blade servers, to name a few. Had the data
requirements been impossible to solve in any other way, these value chain obstacles
would have been surmountable-within 5-8 years. However, there were several
competing methods of both cooling blades servers and delivering data services. Value
chain obstacles made Microcool's approach unacceptable.
The final market that Microcool proposed to attack was the chip lid market. Chip lids are
the heat transfer covers that are installed in semiconductor packages, and Microcool
proposed to use its bonding technology to create a lid with and integral heat sink that
would be metallurgically bonded to the chip. This would eliminate two thermal
interfaces, which caused the majority of thermal loss in the cooling system, and would
replace the existing heat sink with a much more efficient one. Once again, technical
deficiencies and value chain obstacles foiled Microcool's plans.
Intel, the largest manufacturer of microprocessors, showed interest in the chip lid idea,
but promptly rejected any partnership ideas once it discovered that the material was still
in lab stage. Intel needed a proven solution that could go directly into its 18 month
thermal proving qualification testing. If it passed qualification, it could be designed into
a chip lid (-6 months) and could then be incorporated into a product within 1-2 years.
Had the product already been incorporated into a chip lid, the commercialization time
would have been around 3 years-on the edge of acceptability for venture capital.
However, because the technical challenges to creating a lid were significant, at least two
years were necessary for technical development. The total time would probably have
been 5-7 years, an unacceptably long period for venture capital.
There were other value chain problems with the Intel deal. For a critical part such as a
chip lid, Intel required multiple suppliers. This meant that Microcool would be forced to
disclose its processes to potential competitors. The compressor was also an issue--
Microcool would have been required to partner with compressor companies to design and
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build a microcompressor that met the reliability standards of consumer electronics; it is
doubtful that a compressor maker would be willing to attempt such an undertaking.
Significant time and effort was expended trying to develop these markets, but, four years
after its invention, LMF has not been commercialized. LMF remains the highest
performing heat transfer medium, but the founders of Microcool decided to abandon the
venture because of the insertion factors it would face. These factors included both
technical deficiencies and value chain obstacles, and stemmed from fundamental
challenges in the applications that were selected. The founders of Microcool recognized
that simpler applications existed for LMF, such as for steaming milk in cappuccino
machines, where they could directly compliment existing heat pipe technology.
However, they chose not to pursue those applications because their potential paled in
comparison to the potential of the semiconductor cooling market.
Nanomagnetics'993
Microcool Technology failed because it founders failed to appreciate the effects of
insertion factors. Nanomagnetics is an example of company that reached the brink of
failure by chasing applications with major insertion barriers, but was able to survive by
switching its strategy to attack enabler applications.
Founded in 1997 at the University of Bristol by Dr. Eric Mayes, Nanomagnetics' core
intellectual property was a process for embedding nanoscale Co/Pt magnetic particles
into apoferritin protein cells (see figure 4.6). These cells were then spincoated or
dipcoated onto smooth substrates where they would self assemble into arrays. Once the
arrays were formed, the apoferritin was removed, leaving an extremely dense ordered
array of magnetic particles94 . In early research, this magnetic array offered data storage
density (areal density) that was as good as or better than any existing technology, and
foreseeable technological advancements promised much higher densities.
Figure 4.6: Nanomagnetics apoferritin-embedded magnetic particle.
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When Nanomagnetics received $10 million of venture capital in 1999, the areal density
achievable by its process was groing at 1500%/year, while the areal density of
commercial technologies was growing at a mere 1000/o/year. Nanomagnetics' initial
strategy was to attack the most attractive (and most complex and demanding) area of
storage technology: hard disk drives. Nanomagnetics assessed the hard disk drive storage
media market to be worth approximately $2.2 billion, and believed that it could capture a
significant portion of that market by licensing its superior storage technology to
manufacturers of completed disk drives.
Unfortunately, Nanomagnetics did not understand the insertion factors of the hard disk
drive market. Although the areal density of the media was superior to any existing
technology, it was technically deficient in several other areas. Commercial magnetic
media were built to extremely tight specifications for smoothness, coercivity (magnetic
parametrics), and magnetization (a signal to noise ratio). If these specifications were not
met, the existing drive mechanisms-particularly the drive heads-would not work
properly. Since the value chains for the drive heads and mechanisms were well
established, the drive manufactures required that a new solution drop directly into the
system. Maxtor, Quantum, and Komag all wanted the same thing: a finished piece of
media that fit into an existing disc drive.
Faced with the challenges of merging its new materials technology with existing value
chains, Nanomagnetics sought to establish a joint venture with a disc company.
However, the burst of the Internet bubble in 2001 was causing turmoil in the industry,
and no company was willing to partner. By 2002, the incremental progress of
commercial technologies was bringing them closer to the performance of the
Nanomagnetics material, and it appeared that the two would converge.
As they came closer to convergence, another difficulty arose: the forming technology for
the apoferritin product (inkjet) was totally different from the existing forming technology
that the hard disk market used (sputtering). Nanomagnetics tried to respond to this
challenge by partnering with sputter machine makers Intevac and Litrex, but neither
company was interested in developing an unproven technology.
Nanomagnetics abandoned its quest for hard disc drive media in 2003. Although its
product was clearly superior in a highly relevant dimension, and could be produced at a
reasonable cost, it did not achieve insertion. The technical requirements of the
established industry (which were derived from the uptime demands of hard disc
customers) proved difficult, and the value chain challenges of changing the production
processes and disc drive machinery would be extraordinarily expensive. The limiting
insertion factors were insurmountable for a company with limited resources, and the
timeframes required to get around them would be outside the tolerable limits of the
venture capitalists who had funded the company.
Nanomagnetics' second round of funding (2003) was based on a different strategy-
attacking the flexible media market. The flexible media market was starting to re-emerge
in low performance products; inspired by The Innovator's Dilemma, the CEO of
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Nanomagnetics believed that the market would grow rapidly as technology improved.
The flexible media market offered another advantage: it purchased powders, not finished
media. This meant that the magnetoferrtin particles could be sold directly to
manufacturers, making integration into the value chain much less painful.
Nanomagnetics supplied its first product to Imation in 2004-1 Kg of Data Ink.
However, even in the absence of technical deficiencies and with lower performance
requirements, a significant testing period was required by the flexible media
manufacturers, and several nodes in the value chain would need to change to adapt to the
new material. Nanomagnetics expected its first revenues from this market in 2007-four
years after starting its attack.
By 2004, Nanomagnetics had spent almost all of its venture funding, and it needed to
starting gaining revenues. In realization that revenues from the flexible disc industry
would also be delayed, Nanomagnetics began to explore other properties of its material.
One of the unique properties of apoferritin is that it can be manipulated to attach itself to
other types of molecules. Once attached, the embedded particles can be manipulated by
magnetic fields. The most obvious application for such technology was in MRI contrast
enhancers, since the ferritin could be "programmed" to attach to certain antibodies, which
could be targeted to areas of interest for doctors. The techniques were relatively
straightforward, and would give doctors new visibility into the human body. Because of
this enabling ability, a major medical company began a development project with
Nanomagnetics in 2004-the first ever development partnership for Nanomagnetics.
While Nanomagnetics was working on MRI scanning, a company in the United States
had developed a new water purification pouch for the US military. This pouch used
forward osmosis to make desert water drinkable. By wrapping a sports drink powder in a
polymer membrane pouch, it was possible to filter water by drawing it through the pouch
into the powder, where it created a sports drink. The system could start with "any water
source.. .(including) a septic tank or a toilet", and could filter any bacteria to create a
high quality sports drink . However, the pouch had a significant drawback: because it
required a concentration gradient, the filtered water had to be mixed with some type of
powder. There was no way to make pure, clean water.
Nanomagnetics' embedded nanoparticles turned out to be the solution to this problem.
Apoferritin powder proved capable of drawing water through the membrane. Once the
water was in the pouch, it did not mix with the protein wrapped nanoparticles. Since the
particles were magnetic, it was possible to remove them easily with a permanent magnet
as the water was poured out of the pouch. The remaining product was pure, filtered
water. An added benefit was also found: the pouch was reusable. As soon as the water
was poured out of the bag, the magnet could be removed and the nanomagnetic particles
would return to their original position, ready for another round of osmosis.
The forward osmosis pouch was a new product that was very simple and allowed people
to do things they couldn't do before. Although some small technical issues were
anticipated, the powder would streamline very easily into the existing value chain of the
osmotic pouches-and if it didn't, the value chain of the pouches was simple and new
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enough that it could be easily changed to accommodate the new material. Upon
discovering Nanomagnetics' product, the maker of the pouch quickly partnered with the
company, and anticipated sales into the recreational market (much less demanding than
the military) within 1.5 years-much faster than the data storage or MRI applications.
Both companies hoped that the utility of nanoparticles and forward osmosis would be
shown in this product so that they would have the credibility necessary to move into
markets of their other development partner-a major water purification company.
Like many new materials producers, Nanomagnetics attempted to follow a strategy that
was exactly opposite the commercialization pattern established by the major plastics. It
first pursued an attractive application that fit the characteristics of late entrant in the
widespread substitution phase. The hard disk media market was well established-
performance expectations were in place, and Nanomagnetics' product offered
improvement over incumbent in one of the aspects of competition. However, the
application had many limiting insertion factors, stemming from both technical
deficiencies of the material and value chain obstacles of the application.
Since Nanomagnetics found that entry into this market would require much longer than
its venture capitalists could endure, it was forced to switch its strategy to focus on a
market that had the characteristics of a platform application: flexible disc media. The
flexible disc media market was large, and Nanomagnetics offered substantial benefit to
both producers and consumers-they would be able to do the same things they had been
doing, but do them better. There were far fewer limiting insertion factors than in hard
disc drives, and they stemmed mostly from value chain obstacles. Although
Nanomagnetics found flexible media manufacturers to be more receptive, overcoming
value chain obstacles would delay product revenues by at least four years.
At the time of this writing, water purification pouches--enabler applications-were the
savior of the company. The simple, new forward osmosis process was in need of the
exact properties that apoferritin embedded nanomagnetic particles offered, and was
willing to incorporate them quickly into a product. Nanomagnetic's products would let
people do things they couldn't do before. This prospect renewed venture interest, and
allowed the company to move forward toward the MRI and flexible media markets.
Selectech 96
Microcool and Nanomagnetics marketed products which offered properties that were
vastly superior to those of incumbent materials. In each case, they tried to attack
applications in which the insertion factors had strong limiting effects, and failed in those
applications. The experience of Selectech, an injection molder of recycled plastics, was
very different. Selectech's new material was not vastly superior to incumbent
materials-it was recycled from trashed plastics-but Selectech followed the materials
commercialization pattern and has enjoyed quick insertion in each market it has attacked.
Selectech was founded by three environmental entrepreneurs in 1995 "with the objective
of becoming an integrated, low cost manufacturer of injection molded plastic parts using
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post-consumer and post-industrial feedstock". Its core intellectual property is a process
that can convert "commingled, dirty plastic into commercially viable injection molded
products"9 7. Given the highly technical nature of plastics, it is obvious that
"commingled, dirty plastic" did not offer properties to match those of virgin grades. The
basic Selectech feedstock was PVC and HDPE wire coating that had been removed from
wire by copper recovery companies.
Selectech's initial strategy was to produce recycled products for other companies, who
could use the products to enhance their environmental image. Because its feedstocks
were wither free or very inexpensive, Selectech could offer substantial savings in many
applications. However, these savings were not enough to overcome the risks of failure in
the application markets that Selectech had chosen to attack. The costs of plastic in these
applications constituted only a small part of the overall costs of the application itself, and
the application manufacturers were unwilling to shoulder the risk of a new material for
these small savings. The fears of these application manufacturers were perfectly
rational-why would computer makers, whose plastic cases accounted for less than 1%
of the total cost of the computer want to risk warranty repairs if the cases broke? This
would have been a bad decision even if Selectech had given the cases to the computer
companies at no charge!
Selectech changed course as soon as it realized the flaws of its original strategy. It
decided to focus on large parts, where any savings it could offer would be compelling.
However, its ability to enter this market was limited by the its appearance-
"commingled, dirty plastic" did not make beautiful parts, especially with Selectech's
early process. It chose a market that was very simple, relatively new, and in which its
product could offer significant cost advantage: plastic parking stops. (see figure 4.7).
Figure 4.7: Selectech plastic parking stops.
The limiting factors of the parking stop market were minimal. Since they were
accustomed to dealing with concrete stops which routinely crack, chip, and break, users
of plastic stops were very fault-tolerant. The light weight of the plastic stops made them
very easy to replace and even gave them portability-something which was hardly
available with concrete stops. They also offered color throughout the stop, so painting
was not required. In the words of the founder, the Selectech parking stop "look(ed) like
crap, that's what it's supposed to look like!".
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Plastic parking stops had been available previous to the Selectech product, but had been
either too thin to be reliable or too expensive to appeal to a wide market. Selectech was
able to become the largest producer of parking stops within one year. However, the
plastic parking stop market is quite small (stops last a long time!), and was insufficient to
build a sustainable business.
The parking stop market helped Selectech establish its large part injection molding
capability, and also built a degree of credibility-the plastic had been used successfully
in an application that seemed demanding. Selectech used its experience and credibility to
move into its platform market: large plastic planters. The overall planter market was
roughly 500 times the size of the plastic parking barrier market, so it offered much more
room for growth.
Selectech's EcoPlanters were designed to enter the existing planter market through
existing channels to compete with terracotta and HDPE. The EcoPlanter material
offered advantages over terracotta in that it was practically unbreakable and would not
crack in cold weather. It offered both price and performance advantages over HDPE,
which had to be formed into pots by rotomolding, a very slow process that could only
yield hollow parts. The solid EcoPlanters were much tougher, and were less expensive
(see figure 4.8).
Figure 4.8: Selectech EcoPlanter
Although the planter market was more sensitive to appearance than the parking stop
market, Selectech had achieved sufficient finish quality to be competitive. The
EcoPlanter was a standalone product, with a short manufacturing value chain, and
Selectech used its parking stop experience to quickly work out any potential technical
deficiencies. However, despite the simplicity of the planters, value chain obstacles did
exist. The first value chain obstacle was distribution. Selectech received orders from
Wal Mart and Home Depot very quickly, and found that each company demanded that
the planters be shipped to stores throughout the US, presenting a significant logistical
challenge for Selectech. Each company also required special types of labeling,
packaging, and palletting. Since Selectech was a relatively small company, it couldn't
afford to automate these processes, and the packaging costs were quite high.
Selectech made significant inroads into the large planter market, which it still dominates.
However, further growth in planters would have required it to develop a much wider
variety of planters, and to develop a much higher degree of operational expertise,
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accompanied by large investments in logistics management. Given the investment that
would be required, Selectech decided to devote only enough resources to planters to
maintain its position, and to divert the rest of its development budget to more attractive
market: commercial free lay flooring.
The commercial flooring market was far larger and more competitive than either of
Selectech's previous markets. Standards had been established, and users were not
tolerant of failure. Furthermore, competition was fierce. Despite these challenges, the
commercial hardsurface flooring market was very large, and producers enjoyed healthy
profit margins. The properties of Selectech's recycled plastic were well suited to the
market. In short, the pull to flooring was irresistible.
Selectech believed that its experience with the home improvement industry would be
applicable to its new enterprise. However, Selectech found that its commercialization
experience with parking barriers and planters would be more important than its technical
experience or the relationships it had built with big box stores. It chose to enter the
flooring market with an enabler application.
Figure 4.9: Selectech SelecTile
The first Selectech flooring product was SelecTile, an interlocking plastic tile system (see
figure 4.9). The system was "free-lay", meaning that it did not need to be glued to a
subfloor. This feature greatly decreased installation costs and allowed SelecTile to
economically solve problems that had been previously been very expensive to fix, such as
replacing flood damaged vinyl tiles in commercial applications. In fact, one of the first
applications for SelecTile was in a carpentry supply store in which a faulty floor had been
installed. Replacing the floor with conventional tile would have required the store to be
closed for nearly a month, during which time the lack of cash flow would have driven it
out of business. Instead, SelecTile was overlaid onto the existing floor over a weekend,
allowing the store to continue business as usual.
The SelecTile product line was industrial-it was not attractive. However, Selectech used
it to establish credibility in the market and to develop the technical capabilities it needed
to enter the mainstream free lay market with FreeStyle flooring. At the time of this
writing, this entry was just beginning, but the product was received quite well. It had
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been used in several large retail stores, and was beginning to find acceptance in home
garages.
By starting with application markets that were small and simple, Selectech was able to
avoid insertion factors that might have limited the limited the progress of its new
material. The material found commercial applications quite quickly, despite the fact that
its properties were worse than existing applications. The learning and credibility it
established in its first market, parking stops, allowed it to move easily into EcoPlanters,
which generated Selectech's first profits. Using the planters as a platform, Selectech
moved into the more competitive and rewarding flooring market with a disruptive entry.
In short, Selectech followed the materials commercialization pattern, and achieved quick
insertion into all of its application markets.
Conclusions and Contributions
The analysis presented in this chapter adds significant resolution and understanding to the
pattern of materials commercialization in several ways. It reinforces the fact that that
the factors that lead to quick insertion are different from the factors that lead to deep
market penetration. This is a very important point for the materials industry, because it
requires different attitudes toward research, development, and commercialization.
This analysis has also refuted the traditional belief that serendipity is a major driver of
insertion delay. Most of the biggest applications were known early in the lives of the
major plastics, but still did not enter the market quickly, despite clear value propositions
that propelled them to incredible commercial success after insertion. If serendipity did
play a role in the biggest applications, it occurred during development of the material.
The analysis has also shown that, contrary to popular belief, entrant materials did not
need to be lower than competitors to be inserted into the market. Finished costs of most
of the plastics were equal or higher than the materials they replaced at insertion; they
were inserted on merit, for some property that could not be matched by the incumbents.
Even the plastics that were inserted at lower cost offered additional value beyond price.
The fact that the major plastics were more expensive than their competitors yet still
displaced them constitutes an anomaly in Christensen's disruptive theory of innovation9 8.
Christensen asserts that large-scale replacement happens when several conditions are
met, one of them being that the entrant is less expensive and attacks from the bottom
up-the entrant actually offers worse performance in conventional measures, but is better
on other measures. In most of the replacement cases, plastics offered new properties that
couldn't be matched at a similar price by incumbents. However, the plastics captured this
value by entering at higher prices, not from below.
The most important limiting insertion factors for the biggest applications of the major
plastics were technical deficiencies and value chain obstacles. The finding that technical
deficiencies limit insertion of materials into applications would probably seem intuitive,
obvious, and mundane to most materials scientists; after all, why would anyone place a
material in an application for which it is not well suited? However, a component of this
finding has important implications for research and development of materials. Many of
the most important applications of the major plastics weren't suggested until later in the
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lives of the plastics because the properties of the plastics weren 't developed to the point
that people could see their value. If this pattern is generalized, it indicates that
specialized development approaches, though attractive in the short term because they
keep development costs down, face the distinct danger of concealing important properties
of a material and missing major market opportunities. Indeed, finding the right balance
between breadth of development and market potential could be a fruitful area of further
research. Preliminary evidence suggests that the cost of lost opportunities may make it
far less expensive to undertake a broader (and more costly) development approach so that
both marketers and users can more easily identify potential applications.
The second important limiting factor, value chain obstacles, is well known but widely
overlooked, making it interesting and important to study. The evidence is strong that
value chain factors play an important part in insertion delays. In the course of this
research, several experts have proclaimed that "materials just take a long time to sell".
This seems to suggest that users are unwilling to change, even in the presence of superior
value. The field of switching cost analysis has shown that this is rarely the case-unless
there is a compelling reason not to change9 9. Value chain obstacles may be the
compelling reasons that products don't change materials as often or as quickly as
producers of new materials might like. Subsequent chapters of this thesis will show that
value chain obstacles are understood by experts, and that judgments on the degree of
challenge associated with value chain obstacles correlate quite well with the insertion
delay of materials into applications. It will also be shown that strategies exist for dealing
with value chain obstacles-they can be managed and manipulated to the benefit of new
entrants.
As bigger materials data sets become available, further research can focus on identifying
exactly which value chain factors are most important. It is likely that specific value chain
factors will vary among applications, but useful patterns may emerge.
Technical deficiencies were shown to be the insertion factors with the largest effect-
their presence added over 11 years of insertion delay. Value chain factors were less
important, but still added four years of insertion. The presence of these factors showed a
strong pattern of insertion delay. Neither technical deficiencies nor value chain obstacles
were cited as limiting for any of the earliest big applications of the major plastics. Value
chain obstacles were the dominant limiting factors for the applications that achieved
insertion in 2-6 years after commercialization of the plastics. Both technical deficiencies
and value chain obstacles were cited as factors in the majority of the biggest applications
that were inserted more than 6 years after commercialization.
The progression of insertion factors correlates well with the materials commercialization
pattern shown in chapter three. If the two are overlaid, it becomes apparent that:
1. Applications in the enabler phase faced few limiting insertion factors
2. Applications in the platform phase faced value chain obstacles
3. Applications in the widespread substitution phase faced both technical
deficiencies and value chain obstacles.
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Given the characteristics of the applications in each phase, the progression of limiting
factors is logical. Characteristic applications in the enabler phase were very simple (they
did not have large value chains) and solved new problems based on their properties (the
properties that were sought were already present-no new technical development was
necessary). Characteristic platform applications were also adopted because of their
properties (no new technical development necessary), but had to replace existing
materials in major markets. Replacing existing materials is a large undertaking, since
value chains must change to adapt to the new material. Furthermore, existing markets
had established expectations, so value chains had to be refined to the point that they
produced products that could meet those expectations while offering the additional value
brought by the new material. Plastics in widespread substitution applications entered
into markets where they offered less revolutionary performance, and could be subject to
switching based on cost. Competition in this phase requires that a material be
competitive based on both technical competence and value chain refinement. This is only
possible with significant development of both areas.
The case studies presented in this chapter highlight the importance of insertion factors.
Although the often appear attractive, markets with high technical barriers and inflexible
value chains are very difficult to enter for new materials. A more reliable path is to
identify and enter markets in which the insertion factors are minimal, and then progress
into other applications as the material becomes more mature and markets become more
familiar with it.
Once a material shows potential value, and can be produced reliably, market selection
becomes the most important competency of the producer.
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Chapter 5: The Effects of Value Chain Complexity
Introduction
It was shown in chapter four that technical deficiencies and value chain obstacles were
important barriers to quick insertion of the 34 biggest applications of the major plastics.
Insertion delay caused by technical deficiencies is attributable to two factors: the time
required to solve technical problems and the concealing effect of undeveloped properties
on new application identification. It is well known that some technical challenges are
more difficult to solve than others, and that a corresponding distribution exists in the time
required to solve them: difficult problems often take longer. The field of materials
science is constantly producing new tools with which technical problems may be solved,
with the goal of finding the best solutions in the shortest amount of time. This
development effort has made significant contributions-companies like Accelrys have
demonstrated the ability to develop new polymers from scratch in less than three years 1!
New technologies will doubtless lead to even faster development of future materials.
From a strategic standpoint, the correlation of technical deficiencies with delayed
suggestion of new applications is more interesting. The sequence of technical solutions
and application suggestions indicates a causal relationship: technical deficiencies caused
suggestion delays. The properties that made materials attractive for applications had to
be exposed by technical advancements for the applications to be proposed. This
phenomenon may also partially explain the quick insertion of PP and HDPE. The
inventors of PP and HDPE (Phillips and Ziegler) both licensed their technology to several
US producers, and those producers entered the market simultaneously. Because the
producers were all entering simultaneously, they had incentives to develop different
properties of the materials. Having developed different properties, each producer could
identify different markets, leading to a barrage of insertions very soon after
commercialization of the materials2 .
PP and HDPE were also unique in that they were the only major plastics that were highly
compatible with existing processes upon commercialization. Both were billed as
polyolefins, similar to existing low density polyethylene except that they would offer
"improved stiffness", "better gloss or finish", and be "harder, with higher temperature
performance"3. They would be superior in every property that mattered, and thus offered
a clear value proposition. They were claimed to work on the same molds and extrusion
machines, with slightly higher temperatures required. Integration into existing value
chains was not as seamless as was promised, but turned out to be quite easy.
This ease was crystallized into history when "scores of extruders" made 20 million
HDPE hula hoops in 1958, the first full year of HDPE production4 .
The field of materials science was developed to deal with technical deficiencies of
materials, and has done a remarkable job of improving their quality. However, very little
attention has been given to the development of techniques for dealing with the effects of
value chain obstacles. The previous chapter established that value chain obstacles are
limiting factors to insertion of new materials. This chapter will seek to give additional
resolution to the concept by measuring the effects of complexity in application value
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chains on insertion times of new materials. It will be shown that more complex
application value chains correlate to longer insertion times, and a theory of switching
costs will be presented to explain the results.
Approach
This chapter will compare insertion times of historical plastics applications to three
instruments that measure complexity in their value chains. One strictly quantitative
instrument will be used, along with two instruments based on expert assessment.
Historical Data
Through the course of this research, a database of basic facts on 145 key plastics
applications was built from the annual reviews of Modern Plastics. Each of these
applications was commercially important, either as a stepping stone for development of a
plastic or as a major contributor to overall sales. This database includes insertion dates,
stated reasons for adoption, application description, and industry classification
(aerospace, construction, appliances, etc.). It is complimentary to the data presented in
chapter three; it contains less information about a greater number of applications.
In consideration of the schedules of the experts who would be interviewed (see
subsequent section), a representative sample of 58 applications-40% of the original
pool-was selected. Screening of applications for this smaller pool was based on several
criteria:
1. Minimal technical deficiencies-since this research intends to identify value
chain effects, screening was performed to remove applications for which a
major portion of insertion time could obviously be explained by technical
deficiencies. This removal is a possible source of bias, since technical
deficiencies were usually coupled value chain obstacles in the analysis in
chapter four. However, this bias is acceptable, since it would tend to attenuate
the effect of value chain obstacles; if the effect is present with this bias, it will
be stronger without it.
2. Application familiarity-an effort was made to select those applications that
would be reasonably familiar to experts. Some of the applications in the
original database were either highly specialized or short-lived, and would
require significant explanation by the researcher to the experts. In order to
reduce the risk of the interviewer biasing the experts, these applications were
removed from the pool. It should be recognized that reducing this bias came at
the risk of introducing a stronger bias toward successful applications, since
short lived applications were excluded. However, this tradeoff was judged to
be acceptable because the broader pool from which the applications were
selected was comprised only of the successful plastics.
3. Broad representation ofplastic type-while the pool in the previous chapter
was selected from only the largest commodity plastics, this pool was designed
to include both commodity and engineering plastics. At least one application
for each of 15 plastics was included. Included plastics were acrilonitirile
butadeine styrene (ABS), acetal, high density polyethylene (HDPE), low
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density polyethylene (LDPE), polyamide (nylon), polyethylene terephthalate
(PET), polymethyl methacrylate (acrylic/PMMA), polycarbonate (PC),
polyester (thermoset), polypropylene (PP), polystyrene (PS), polyurethane
(PUR), polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE), polyvinyl chloride (PVC), and urea.
Figure 5.1 shows the distribution of the pool by plastic.
Figure 5.1: Distribution of application pool by plastic.
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4. Broad representation of industry-there are seven major application
categories for plastics: 1) transportation, 2) electrical (including appliances),
3) building and construction, 4) consumer and institutional, 5) packaging, 6)
industrial, and 7) furniture5 . Each of these industries was represented in the
pool by several applications. More applications were taken from the
automotive industry and the consumer products industry than the other
industries, reflecting the importance of those industries to plastics, as well as
the preponderance of Modern Plastics to report them. A more balanced
inclusion of industries would most likely create less bias, but the
representation chosen here is acceptable given the constraints of the other
selection criteria. Figure 5.2 shows the distribution of the application pool by
industry.
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Figure 5.2: Distribution of application pool by application industry
5. Broad variation of insertion time-in order to maximize the possibility of
finding meaningful results, applications with a broad distribution of insertion
times were selected. The mean insertion time for the pool of 145 applications
was 14.1 years, with a standard deviation of 13.1 years. The mean time of
insertion for the selected pool was 11.12 years, with a standard deviation of
12.33 years. The shorter mean insertion time is attributable to the removal of
many of the applications with technical deficiencies, but the degree of
variation is similar. Figure 5.3 is a histogram of the insertion time distribution
of the selected applications.
Figure 5.3: Distribution of application pool by insertion time.
Appendix B shows a table of the applications and included data for the pool.
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Value Chain Complexity Measures
This analysis will build on the value chain definitions presented in chapters two and four:
the value chain is the set of activities that occurs in transforming a material into a finished
product that is sold to an end user. It includes product design, material processing, part
assembly, product distribution, marketing, sales, and maintenance. Since these activities
are affected by codes and standards, codes and standards are also considered value chain
factors. Because this analysis attempts to reveal challenges faced by materials
manufacturers in introducing new products, raw materials production and materials
manufacturing are not considered part of the value chain in this analysis. Customers are
not considered as part of the value chain, either, since their acceptance of the product is a
different issue.
A generic materials value chain is shown in figure 5.4.
Raw
materals
Figure 5.4: Generic materials value chain. Everything to right of materials manufacturing is
included in this analysis, with the exception of the customer.
The concept of value chain analysis was established by Porter in 1980 as a tool for
developing sustainable competitive advantage based on cost and differentiation6 . Porter's
approach focused on identifying opportunities in industries, with the specific goal of
assessing industry attractiveness. He presented five measures to consider in this
assessment: industry rivalry, barriers to entry, threat of substitutes, bargaining power of
suppliers, and bargaining power of buyers7 . This method has been widely distributed,
and seems to have proven quite effective at accomplishing its stated task. However, this
type of traditional value chain analysis is less applicable to the assessment the effects of
the value chain in delaying insertion time.
Because this analysis attempts to measure insertion delay instead of industry structure, it
was necessary to create a different approach. The approach taken here was designed to
test the hypothesis that a progressive effect exists between value chain complexity and
insertion times: more complex application value chains correlate with longer insertion
times for new materials into those applications. A positive result would implicitly assert
that there are inherent factors in value chains that extend insertion.
There are many competing approaches to measurement of complexity, most of which
focus on the number of elements and interdependencies of a systems. Some are
quantitative and others are qualitative, based on the opinions of experts. A simple and
valid quantitative approach for measuring complexity in a value chain would be to create
nodes in the chain according to function (i.e. manufacturing, distribution, etc.), and then
to count the number of nodes and the connections between the nodes in the chain.
However, this and several other quantitative types of measurement would be problematic
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in most historical contexts, because technology changes cause changes in value chain
structures. Effective historical quantitative assessment of complexity in value chains
would require contemporaneous accounts of industry structure and value chain flow.
Although clues about industry structure were provided by the sources used for this
research, they are far too incomplete for meaningful quantitative analysis.
Since the limitations of historical data prevent the direct quantitative measurement of
value chain complexity, a triangulation of three value chain complexity measurement
instruments was used. The first instrument is quantitative; the second and third are based
on the assessment of six experts in the field of materials and materials applications.
All of the experts are recognized authorities in the fields of materials engineering and
materials applications. An attempt was made to select a broad variety of experts, with
viewpoints of research, processing, materials design, and application design all
represented. The names and relevant credentials of each expert are shown in appendix C.
Each expert was interviewed by the same researcher (the author), and was asked to rate
each application according to the scales provided. In order to provide a consistent basis
for response, each expert was given the same explanation of the basic facts of each
application, including the year of introduction, the exact application, and a brief
explanation of use (when necessary). Great care was taken to avoid influencing the
responses of the experts, and additional information for each application was given only
if requested. Each interview lasted 2-3 hours9.
Method 1: Total Number of Parts
If it is recognized that a value chain is nothing more than a series of steps that adds value
to a product, a tractable quantitative instrument to measure complexity can be created.
Since each step in the value chain should aim at creating or delivering part or parcel of a
final product, it is reasonable to use complexity of a final application itself as a proxy for
value chain complexity. The most practical (and probably most common) way to assess
complexity in an application is to simply count the number of parts therein 0° . This will
be the first instrument used in this analysis, and will be called the "total number of parts
instrument".
For the total number of parts instrument to work, it is necessary to create a clear
definition of the concept of an application. In this analysis, the concept of application
will refer to the product that was purchased by the consumer at the point of insertion. For
example, if PP tumblers were the first applications of the category "PP housewares", the
number of parts counted would be 1, since a tumbler is a stand alone product that is
purchased by the end consumer. However, if the first application for the application
category "nylon auto parts" were a speedometer gear, the number of parts counted would
be -40,000, the number of parts in an automobile, the product that is purchased by the
end consumer. There are two exceptions to this rule-HDPE and PVC wire coating.
Because they are used in a wide range of applications, and the end product bought by the
consumer is electric power, the appropriate point of parts counting is the wire itself; this
would include the wire and its various shielding components.
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Because of the wide range of applications contained in the sample pool, it was necessary
to use a broad scale with the number of parts method. Otherwise, the large number of
parts in aircraft and automobile applications would heavily skew the numbers, making
statistical analysis all but meaningless. The scale that was used is listed in table 5.1.
Scale Number Number of Parts Examples
1 1 Hula Hoop
2 2-10 Industrial cooking pan
3 11-100 Faucet
4 101-1,000 Scientific calculator
5 1,001-10,000 Washing machine
6 10,001-100,000 Automobile
7 >100,000 Commercial Jet
Table 5.1: Scale of number of parts method
Appendix D shows the application definition for each application, its rating, and the
sources for the ratings.
Method 2: Number of Parts Affected
While the total number of parts instrument may be a reasonable proxy for the complexity
of the value chain of a product, it is arguably a poor measure of the value chain
complexity that is faced by a material when it is being inserted into an application. The
measure is a gross oversimplification, and would tend to overstate the impact of materials
changes in large assemblies: it is unlikely that the entire value chain of an aircraft or
automobile would be impacted by a material switch in a part in a subassembly. For
example, the entire value chain of a car would not be changed because of a switch from
brass to nylon in speedometer gears. However, with simpler applications, such as PP
tumblers, a materials switch could have drastic impact on the entire value chain.
It seems, then, that a more accurate and relevant measure of the degree of value chain
complexity faced by a material at insertion would be a count of the number of other parts
in the final application that would be affected (meaning changed in some way) by such a
switch. Unfortunately, the exact data for these applications is very difficult to obtain,
since it would involve review of design documents for products made by dozens of
companies several decades ago. Another possible approach would be to compare
products before and after a materials switch, but this would also be intractable unless all
of the applications were found in a museum. Otherwise, parts would be extraordinarily
difficult to identify, find, and obtain, and may have degraded.
Because of the difficulty in finding an exact measure for the number of other parts
affected by the introduction of historical materials to their applications, a different
approach was taken. Each of the experts was asked to provide an estimate of this
number, on a scale of 1-7. The scale shown to experts is displayed in table 5.2; because
the number of parts affected was generally much smaller than the number of parts in the
applications themselves, the scale is different from table 5.1. Construction of this scale
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was largely arbitrary--it reflects the judgment of the author and of several other materials
engineers regarding the appropriate degree of resolution for the research question 2 .
Scale Number Number of Other Parts Final Application Example
Affected
1 0 Hula hoop (no supporting parts)
2 -1-5 Milk jug
3 -5-25 (none given)
4 -25-50 Auto instrument panel
5 -50-100 (none given)
6 -100-1000 Auto body
7 >1000 777 carbon fiber tail section
Table 5.2: Scale of number of parts affected method
This method will be called the "number of parts affected instrument".
Method 3: Change Required in Value Chain
While the first two instruments use the end product as an indicator of value chain
complexity, the third instrument uses the value chain itself. For the instrument called
"value chain difficulty of change", experts were asked to estimate, on a scale of 1-7, the
degree of change required in the value chain of the final application to accommodate the
material change. The underlying assumption of this proxy is easy to see: both difficulty
of change and complexity increase in a value chain as the number of value chain
elements increases. That difficulty would increase is obvious-all else equal, it is more
difficult to manage more elements than fewer elements. That complexity would increase
is also obvious, but it is important to recognize that additional complexity results from
more than just an increase in the number of elements-it results from an increase in the
interconnections between the elements. In fact, an increasingly popular method of
measuring complexity in engineering systems is to measure the number of
13interconnections between elements .
In the interview, experts were given an overview of the value chain concept, and were
asked to focus specifically on manufacturing challenges, code and standard obstacles, and
distribution challenges. Members of the expert panel were not expected to be experts in
each of the areas of the value chain, but rather were asked to use judgment, in light of
expertise in some of the areas, to create a ranking of the overall impact that a material
change of part in a final application might have on the value chain of the final
application. Since a variety of expertise was represented by the panel, the responses paint
a composite picture of the difficulty of change.
The measure of difficulty of change in the value chain is itself a composite. It is a
function of both the number of elements that are affected by a materials change and the
degree of change required in each. Experts were instructed to consider both, with explicit
recognition that cost of changing the value chain, of course, is a function of the same
factorsl4.
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It is acknowledged that separating the number of elements changed from the magnitude
of change required in each element would be useful. However, this research attempts
simply to establish whether a progressive relationship exists between value chain
complexity and insertion time. If this relationship is established, future work can focus
on separating the factors. This type research would most likely require many more data
points than are used here.
The experts were given the scale shown in table 5.3 as calibration.
Scale Example
1 Aluminum gym weights
2 Aluminum heat sinks
3 Aluminum wheels
4 Aluminum transmission casings
5 Aluminum engine blocks
6 Aluminum car bodies (Audi A8)
7 CFRP replacement of Aluminum in 777 tail section
Table 53: Scale of difficulty of change in the value chain method.
Because the reader may not be familiar with the applications listed in table 5.3, the
explanation provided to the experts is also provided here.
1. Aluminum weights: (final application: gym weights) aluminum can be used in
barbells for gym weights. There is almost no change required in the value chain
to do this-no redesigns would need to occur, and the aluminum could be cut or
cast in the machines that currently make steel or iron weights. The costs of
change would be minimal.
2. Aluminum heat sinks: (final application: personal computers) extruded
aluminum can be used instead of folded copper in personal computer heat sinks.
Some design cautions need to be taken, such as thermal coupling, but the heat
sink clips directly on to the chip, and nothing else in the computer needs to
change (unless the heat sink is too big). It is relatively inexpensive to switch heat
sink materials.
3. Aluminum wheels: (final application: automobiles) the huge aftermarket for
aluminum wheels shows that they can easily replace steel wheels. However, to
introduce them, automakers had to invest in new fabrication and casting
equipment and performed extensive testing to ensure that they would not fail or
cause adverse effects.
4. Aluminum transmission casings: (final application: automobiles) aluminum
transmission casings are very common, but required significant investment to
introduce. Automakers had to redesign the transmission casing, and probably
many of the valves, fittings, and mounts, in order to introduce them. They also
had to undertake extensive testing and make large investments in specialized
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casting and fabrication infrastructure. However, it is doubtful that entire
transmission redesigns had to occur to incorporate them.
5. Aluminum engine blocks: (final application: automobile) aluminum engine
blocks were considerably more costly to introduce than any of the previous
applications. They interact with many engine parts, and are key components in
the subassembly process. New casting and machining techniques had to be
developed, parts had to be redesigned, subassembly lines had to change, and
vehicle designs had to change to accommodate the weight and vibration
characteristics of aluminum blocks, leading to very heavy costs. Despite these
changes, aluminum blocks did retain a degree of interchangeability with iron
blocks. Vehicle maintenance and final assembly did not need to change much to
accommodate the new material.
6. High volume aluminum bodies in automobiles: (final application: automobiles)
switching to aluminum bodies would require a massive redesign not just of a
vehicle, but of the supply chain and the processes required to manufacture and
assemble the vehicle. Current stamping processes cannot deal with the
springback of aluminum, and would have to be redesigned; the welding processes
would need to be replaced; paint processes would change. Many interface parts
would need to change. Nearly a century of design knowledge in steel bodies
would be largely obsolete, and extensive testing would need to occur.
Extraordinary costs would be incurred in making this switch.
7. Replacement of aluminum in the Boeing 777 tail section: (final application:
commercial aircraft) the 777 design was brand new, but Boeing had to create
entirely new competencies in design, engineering, manufacturing, and
maintenance in order to use carbon fiber instead of aluminum in the tail section of
aircraft. It has been estimated that nearly $1.2 billion was spent developing the
carbon fiber tail' 5. Extensive design, manufacturing, qualification, and
development issues had to be overcome, and thousands of other parts had to be
redesigned to make the tail section work.
Results
In order to provide a measure of the effect of value chain complexity on insertion time,
the results of the number of parts analysis and the expert ratings were compared to the
time delay between the recorded year of commercialization of each material and the year
that the material was first used commercially in each rated application. This delay period
was named "insertion time" in a previous chapter.
Actual scores are displayed in appendix E. In order to shown progression, the results of
each measurement instrument are displayed in several ways. The first display is a bar
graph that compares mean insertion times for four separate categories of each instrument.
Each category is based on the pool mean and standard deviation of the instrument, as
reported in appendix D:
1. Very low: rating greater 1 a below the mean.
2. Low: rating between mean and la below mean
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3. High: rating between mean and 1 a above mean
4. Very high: rating greater than 1 above mean
Because the measurement categories are imperfect, a second bar graph is displayed
comparing mean insertion times for broader categories of each measurement method:
above the mean rating and below the mean rating.
A chart with summary statistics and one sided t-tests is shown to test the integrity of the
categories. The following progression hypotheses were tested (where T=insertion time of
the applications in each category). For the four category model:
Null Progression hypothesis (Ho): Tvery high :T high Tlow :Tvery low
Alternative hypothesis (Ha): Tery high >T high >Tlow>Tverylow
For the two category model:
Null Progression hypothesis (Ho): Tabove mean < Tbelow mean
Alternative progression hypothesis (Ha): Tabove mean>Tbelowmean
In order to provide a measure of inter-rater reliability, the results of the expert rating
instruments were pooled in two ways for the bar graphs. First, a mean of the all of the
expert ratings was found for each application. Second, a mean of expert ratings was
found for each of the applications excluding the high ratings and the low ratings (if the
high and low were unique; if the high or low was duplicated by more than one expert, it
was included).
A scatter plot is also displayed for each method to compare actual ratings to insertion
times. A regression line is shown on each scatter plot, followed by SPSS regression
output.
Number of Parts
Bar graphs showing the relationship of the number of parts value chain complexity
measurement method and the insertion time of plastics applications are shown in figures
5.5 and 5.6, and are followed by a chart of summary statistics in table 5.4.
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Number of parts v. Insertion time
Figure 5.5: Four category display of number of parts v. insertion time.
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Figure 5.6: Broad category display of number of parts v. insertion time.
Summary Statistics and T-Tests for Number of Parts Instrument
T score
Total Number of (compared
Parts with next
Instrument Standard larger p < next larger
Mean Insertion Deviation N category) category
ery low 4.43 6.60 7 1.44 0.0847
Low 9.16 12.08 32 1.06 0.1653
High 13.25 6.47 4 0.96 0.1776
Very high 17.87 13.69 15
Below mean 8.31 11.37 39 2.52 0.0083
Above mean 16.89 12.51 19
Table 5.4: Summary of number of parts method categories.
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Both of these graphs show a rather dramatic (nearly linear) relationship between the
number of parts in an application and insertion time. However, the statistical summary
shows that the null progression hypothesis can be rejected at the 5% confidence level
(p=.008) only in the two category model (Tabo,v mean>Tbelow m). It cannot be rejected for
any of the categories in the four category model, indicating that the higher resolution
categories are not robust.
A scatter plot comparing number of parts and insertion time is shown in figure 5.7. It is
followed by a regression analysis in table 5.5 of the linear equation.
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Figure 5.7: Number of parts scatter plot.
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Table 5.5: Regression analysis of trendline shown in figure 5.7
This analysis shows that the total number of parts instrument renders results that are
statistically significant (p=.002 ) in explaining the insertion time of the examined
applications. However, these results explain only 15.7% of the insertion time variation.
The regression coefficient shows that one additional rating point corresponds to an
additional 2.6 years of insertion time.
Number of Parts Affected
Bar graphs showing the relationship of the number of parts affected value chain
complexity measurement method and the insertion time of plastics applications are
shown in figures 5.8 and 5.9. The graphs for the complete set of ratings and the ratings
excluding high and low measurements are shown together. The graphs are followed by
charts of summary statistics in tables 5.6 and 5.7.
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Model Summary
Adjusted Std. Error of
Model R R Square R Square the Estimate
1 .396a .157 .142 11.4297
a. Predictors: (Constant), TOTALNUM
ANOVAP
Sum of
Model Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 1358.371 1 1358.371 10.398 .002 a
Residual 7315.784 56 130.639
Total 8674.155 57
Coefficients a
Standardi
zed
Unstandardized Coefficien
Coefficients ts
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
1 (Constant) 2.531 3.057 .828 .411
TOTALNUM 2.622 .813 .396 3.225 .002
_~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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Figure 5.8: Number of parts affected v. mean insertion time (four categories).
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Figure 5.9: Number of parts affected v. mean insertion time (two categories).
115
O
E
C0
anE0C
C
co0
z
20
15
15 100
5
0
--?
. . . .
Low
---
-]
t
R R8 I. 
'--I'
-
Summary Statistics and T-Tests for Number of Parts Affected Instrument
T score
Number of (compared with p < next
Parts Standard next larger larger
Affected Deviation N category) category
Very low 3.30 5.35 8 1.84 0.0411
Low 7.22 8.90 22 1.73 0.0477
High 12.82 13.29 18 1.88 0.0435
Very high 25.00 14.23 10
Below mean 5.82 5.93 28 3.42 0.0007
Above mean 16.35 14.47 30
Table 5.6: Summary of number of parts affected instrument categories.
Summary Statistics and T-Tests for Number of Parts Affected Instrument (with
high and low ratings removed)
T score
Number of (compared with p < next
Parts Standard next larger larger
Affected Deviation N category) category
Very low 3.71 6.37 7 1.4818 0.078
Low 8.62 10.41 21 0.063 0.2666
High 10.68 11.06 22 2.547 0.0145
Very high 25.38 14.89 8
Very Low+Low 7.33 9.62 28 2.298 0.0127
Very High+High 14.6 13.63 30
Table 5.7: Summary of number of parts affected method categories with high and low scores
removed.
The graphs of insertion times categorized by the number of parts affected method of
measuring value chain complexity have different shapes than those of the total number of
parts method. The progression of insertion times does not appear linear, but rather
appears to be larger at the tails. This effect is particularly pronounced in the graph with
the high and low ratings removed.
The summary statistics in table 5.6 show that the null progression hypothesis can be
rejected for all four categories, indicating that the categories are robust and that an
upward progression in the number of parts affected by a materials switch in an
application corresponds to an upward progression in the time required to insert a new
material therein. However, the robustness of this categorization is called into question by
the results shown in table 5.7, in which the high and low expert ratings for each
application were removed. These statistics accentuate the patterns in the full ratings.
They show that the null progression hypothesis can be rejected at the .05 level only
between the very high and high categories, although it can be rejected at the .078 level
between the low and very low categories. It is impossible to reject the difference between
the low and high categories.
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The null progression hypothesis can be soundly rejected in the two category classification
scheme in both cases.
A scatter plot comparing the full rating set of the number of parts instrument and
insertion time is shown in figure 5.10, followed a table of regression analysis.
Figure 5.10: Scatterplot of number of parts affected.
Model Summary
Adjusted Std. Error of
Model R R Square R Square the Estimate
1 ,510a .260 .247 10.7052
a. Predictors: (Constant), NUMAFF
ANOVAP
Sum of
Model Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 2256.529 1 2256.529 19.690 .000a
Residual 6417.626 56 114.600
Total 8674.155 57
Coefficientsa
Model
I (Constant)
NUMAFF
Unstandardized
Coefficients
B Std. Error
.i i~dE~
-10.762 5.128
7.143 1.610
Table 5.8: Regression analysis of trendline shown in figure 5.10
Number of parts affected v. Insertion time
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This analysis shows that the number of parts affected instrument renders results that are
statistically significant (p=.000) in explaining the insertion time of the examined
applications. The instrument accounts for 26% of the variation in insertion time.
Difficulty of changing the value chain
Bar graphs showing the relationship of the value chain change difficulty instrument and
the insertion time of plastics applications are shown in figures 5.12 and 5.13. The graphs
for the complete set of ratings and the ratings excluding high and low measurements are
shown together. The graphs are followed by charts of summary statistics in tables 5.10
and 5.11.
Value chain change difficulty v. Insertion time
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Figure 5.11: Number of parts affected v. mean insertion time (four categories).
Value chain change difficulty v. Insertion time (broad
categories)
0 25
E
= 20
10
C 5
0 0O
19.33 is: 37r
5. 79 .. 9..t~~ws 4_'9o3
Below mean Above mean
Value chain difficulty of change expert ratings (broad categories)
0. Value chain
difficulty
IBValue chain
difficulty
(hi-low)
Figure 5.12: Number of parts affected v. mean insertion time (two categories).
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Summary Statistics and T-Tests for Value Chain Change Difficulty Instrument
Value chain T score
difficulty (compared with p < next
category mean Standard next larger larger
insertion time deviation N category) category
Very low 4.57 4.16 7 0.48 0.31910
Low 5.52 6.17 27 2.94 0.00454
High 16.73 14.02 15 1.13 0.13856
ery high 23.67 14.96 9
Below mean 5.79 5.77 34 4.49 0.00005
ove mean 19.33 14.47 24
Table 5.9: Summary of value chain change difficulty measurement method categories.
Summary Statistics and T-Tests for Value Chain Change Difficulty Instrument
(with high and low ratings excluded)
Value chain T score
difficulty (compared with p < next
category mean Standard next larger larger
insertion time deviation N category) category
Very low 4.9 5.5866 10 0.0002 0.499
Low 4.9 5.233 21 3.848 0.0003
High 18.045 15.0917 22 0.1965 0.4245
ery high 19.2 10.986 5
Below Mean 4.903 5.255 31 4.908 3.09E-05
ove Mean 18.259 14.239 27
Table 5.10: Summary of value chain change difficulty method categories with high and low scores
removed.
While the number of parts affected method graphs showed significant disparity at the tail
categories, the value chain change difficulty method shows clear resolution at the middle
categories. The summary statistics and t-tests in table 5.9 show that the null progression
hypothesis can be very safely rejected (p=.004 ) between the low and high categories, but
cannot be rejected between the very low and low categories or between the high and very
high categories. The effect is accentuated when high and low scores are removed. Table
5.10 shows that null progression hypothesis can be rejected at the p=.0003 confidence
level between the low and high categories. As would be expected in this situation, the
null progression hypothesis can be rejected at a very high confidence level between the
two broad categories.
A scatter plot comparing full rating set of the value chain change difficulty instrument
and insertion time is shown in figure 5.13, followed a table of regression analysis.
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Value chain difficulty of change v. Insertion time
Figure 5.13: Scatterplot of value chain change difficulty.
Model R
1 P .491a
a. Prarifnrc Fyn
Model Summary
Adjusted _
RSquare R Square tl
.241 .228
Mtnt \AlIN
ANOVA b
Std. Error of
he Estimate
10.8423
Sum of
Model Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 2091.097 1 2091.097 17.788 .0008
Residual 6583.058 56 117.555
Total 8674.155 57
Coefficients'
Standardi
zed
Unstandardized Coefficien
Coefficients ts
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
1 (Constant) -18.078 7.068 -2.558 .013
VCHAIN 8.517 2.019 .491 4.218 .000
Table 5.11: Regression analysis of trendline shown in figure 5.13
The scatter plot and regression show that the value chain change difficulty instrument
renders results that are statistically significant (p=.000) in explaining the insertion time of
the examined applications. The instrument accounts for 24.1% of the variation in
insertion time.
Triangulating Value Chain Complexity
All three instruments of value chain complexity give results that are statistically
significant in describing the insertion times of plastics. Furthermore, the category
analysis appears to show that each instrument describes different parts of the insertion
variation-number of parts appears to be fairly linear, number of parts affected appears to
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differentiate at the tails, and value chain change difficulty appears to differentiate in the
middle. If these things are true, one would expect a multivariate model to offer
significant insight. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Figure 5.14 is a scatterplot of
these three variables against insertion time. It shows that all three are very similar.
Figure 5.14: Scatterplot of value chain instruments.
Table 5.12 shows bivariate correlation matrices for the three value chain instruments.
Correlations Correlations Correlations
NUMAF Pearson Correli
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
VCHAIb Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
WIUMAFF
1.000
58
.724'
.000
58
VCHAIN
.724'
.000
58
1.000
58
**.Correlation is significant at the 0.01 leve
NUMAF Pearson Correl a
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
TOTALNU Pearson Correla
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
1.000
58
.646'
.000
58
'OTALNUI
.646
.000
58
1.000
58
**.Correlation issignificant at the 0.01 level (2.
VIAIIN rearson Iorreila
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
TOTALNL Pearson Correla
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
.500"
.000
58
1.000
58
-"Correlation issignificant at the 0.01 level (2-
Table 5.12: Bivariate correlation matrices of value chain instruments.
The correlation between the variables is very high, with number of parts affected having
the highest correlation with the other variables. This is logical, since the instruments
were all designed to measure the same thing: value chain complexity. However, variable
correlations at this high level often lead to problems with multicollinearity in regression
models, and the present research is no exception. The results of a trivariate linear
regression using the value chain instruments are shown in table 5.13.
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Value chain measurement instruments v. Insertion time
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Table 5.13: Trivariate regression analysis of insertion times showing multicollinearity.
The F statistic shown in the report above indicates that the model is highly significant,
but the t statistics show that none of the variables are. Given the statistical significance
of the variables when measured alone against insertion time and the correlations of the
variables, multicollinearity is obvious. Multicollinearity cannot be removed from this
model, but future work may separate the variables with a higher number of data points
and more precise instruments for the measurement of value chain complexity.
A model with higher overall significance and individual variable significance can be built
by removing the total number of parts instrument. The results of this model are shown in
table 5.14.
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Model Summary
Adjusted Std. Error of
Model R R Square RSquare the Estimate
1 .5458 .297 .258 10.6255
a. Predictors: (Constant), TOTALNUM, VCHAIN, NUMAFF
ANOVA b
Sum of
Model Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 2577.491 3 859.164 7.610 .000 a
Residual 6096.664 54 112.901
Total 8674.155 57
CoefficientWs
Standardi
zed
Unstandardized Coefficien
Coefficients ts
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
1 (Constant) -17.243 7.028 -2.453 .017
NUMAFF 3.715 2.631 .265 1.412 .164
VCHAIN 4.321 2.872 .249 1.504 .138
TOTALNUM .662 .992 .100 .667 .507
I
3tandardi
zed
oefficien
ts
Beta t Sig.
-2.617 .011
.325 1.975 .053
.256 1.556 .125
Table 5.14: Bivariate regression analysis using number of parts affected instrument and value chain
difficulty instrument.
In this bivariate model, the number of parts affected instrument is significant at the
p=.053 level, and the value chain difficulty instrument is significant at the p=.125 level.
Both scores are better than in the trivariate regression while the R2 is only slightly lower
and the F statistic is much higher; this is a more robust overall model.
Instrumental Variable Regression Analysis
Because most measurements have noise, measurement error is a classic problem in
regression. Measurement noise tends to attenuate the variable coefficients, biasing them
toward zero and understating the effects of the variables. Since the measurement
instruments used here were designed to triangulate the true effects of value chain
complexity, they are clearly imperfect. However, since multiple measures of the same
effect were taken, it was possible to use two-stage least square regression analysis to
filter measurement noise and attain a closer estimation of the coefficients 6 .
Two stage least squares analysis was performed using one measurement instrument as a
regressor and the other as an instrumental variable (IV). Because the value chain
difficulty and number of parts affected instruments were shown to create the most robust
model, two-stage least square regression was performed twice, with each instrument
acting as the regressor (and the other as IV) in each case. Insertion delay (coded
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ANOVA*
Sum of
elSquares df M
Regression 2527.223 2
Residual 6146.932 55
Total 8674.155 57
Coefficients a
Unstandardized C
Coefficients
odel B Std. Error
(Constant) -18.037 6.892
NUMAFF 4.549 2.303
VCHAIN 4.439 2.853
a. Dependent Variable: INTROTIM
lean Square F Sig.
1263.612 11.306 , 000a
111.762
Model Summary
Adjusted Std. Error of
Model R R Square R Square the Estimate
1 I .540a .291 .266 10.5718
a. Pr.iitnr, (C.nnntnntl V.HAIN NI IMAFF
Mc
T
Mod
INTROTIM) was the dependent variable in both models. The results of the models are
shown in tables 5.15 and 5.16.
Dependent variable.. INTROTIM
Multiple R .48872
R Square .23884
Adjusted R Square .22525
Standard Error 10.90867
F = 17.57237 Signif F = .0001
-- Variables in the Equation -----------
B SE B Beta T
9.502510 2.266852 .678559 4.192
-17.991398 7.090953 -2.537
Variable
NUMAFF
(Constant)
Table 5.15: Two stage least squares regression
chain difficulty as IV.
with number of parts affected as regressor and value
Table 5.16: Two stage least squares regression with value chain difficulty as regressor and number of
parts affected as IV.
Both of the models show stronger significance than the least squares model, and the
variable coefficients are higher in both cases, giving further evidence of the strength of
the progressive relationship between value chain complexity and insertion delay.
However, this type of analysis is not perfect. Two stage least squares works best if
measurement errors between regressors and IVs are uncorrelated, and this is probably not
true in the present case since the same experts rated both variables. However, under the
reasonable assumptions that the measurement errors are uncorrelated with the true
complexity of the applications and are uncorrelated with any measurement error in
insertion time, the results of this analysis are superior to conventional linear regression.
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Dependent variable.. INTROTIM
Multiple R .49427
R Square .24431
Adjusted R Square .23081
Standard Error 11.16430
F = 18.10415 Signif F = .0001
-------------- Variables in the Equation ----------------
Variable B SE B Beta T Sig T
VCHAIN 12.226884 2.873603 .704890 4.255 .0001
(Constant) -30.798549 9.960464 -3.092 .0031
--- --
Sig T
.0001
.0140
Discussion
Value Chain Complexity Extends Insertion Times
This model was not designed to predict insertion time for materials of the future. It was
designed to test whether a positive relationship exists between the insertion times of
historical plastics applications and the complexity of the value chains of those
applications. The statistical significance of each instrument in the individual regressions
clearly shows that each of the instruments is significant in explaining insertion time
variation. The multicollinearity of the multivariate regression model and the high
correlations between the instruments indicate that they are different measures of the same
phenomenon: value chain complexity.
Noting the statistical significance shown in the regression of the individual value chain
complexity instruments in explaining the variation in insertion time, it can be asserted
that the tested relationship does exist. The bar graphs for each instrument show that, at
worst, there is a statistically significant difference between the insertion times of
applications rated below and above the instrument rating mean. In all cases, this
relationship is positive: higher value chain complexity corresponds to longer insertion
times.
Because each of the instruments measured an adjacent effect to value chain complexity,
and because the possibility of a bidirectional causal relationship (in which new material
insertion causes increases in value chain complexity) would be captured by the difficulty
of value chain change and number of parts affected instruments, it is rational to assert that
the variation of observed delay in insertion time was caused, in some part, by the
variation of value chain complexity. Furthermore, since end user demand was explicitly
excluded as a factor in value chain complexity, it should be considered a limiting factor
to insertion. This assertion is supported by the experience of other chain-type models
(such as supply chains) in which lags and delays increase significantly as complexity
increases 7.
The three instruments together give only a slightly higher R2 square than either the
number of parts affected instrument or the value chain change difficulty instrument,
indicating that the either of these instruments alone is a reasonable proxy for value chain
complexity. The fact these instruments were rated by experts also shows simply that they
can be rated by experts.
The R2 of the total number of parts instrument is considerably lower (although
significant). The shortcomings of this instrument were acknowledged earlier-it can be a
gross oversimplification of the problem at hand. However, it could probably be used as
very preliminary screening tool for assessing the level of value chain complexity to be
encountered in an industry. For example, one would expect lower value chain
complexity in the toy industry than in the commercial airplane industry based simply on
the number of parts in the final application.
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Switching Costs Help Explain the Effects of Value Chain Complexity
While each of the individual instrument regressions are clearly biased by the other
instruments, the is statistics shown for each variable are worth considering. One rating
point in the value chain change difficulty instrument corresponds to an additional 8.5
years in the insertion time of the historical applications analyzed here; an additional
rating point on the number of parts affected instrument added 7.1 years; an additional
rating point on the total number of parts instrument added 2.6 years. Even if they are not
exact, these are large delays, which cannot be explained by simple logistical issues that
might arise with additional value chain complexity. Much more complex networks than
these value chains are managed everyday by logistics groups and networking systems.
The more plausible explanation is that increases in value chain complexity correspond to
increases in value chain inertia. It was noted in chapter 1 that materials are the first point
of product differentiation in the value chain, and that other nodes in the value chain often
must be adapted to accommodate material choices. Because efficient value chains are
optimized for the jobs they do, they can be difficult to change-inertia is built into them.
There are rational reasons for this inertia to remain in the system, and these reasons are
largely explained by the concept of switching costs.
Switching costs are defined by Porter as "one time costs facing the buyer of switching
from one supplier's product to another's"18 , and are usually associated with consumer
(end user) behavior. Switching costs are recognized as a cause of brand loyalty, in which
customers become "locked-in" to a product they have purchased because it is more
expensive to switch to a new one than to continue purchasing the same brand' 9.
Switching costs can be very beneficial to sellers because they allow quasi-monopoly (or
at least non-cooperative collusive) behavior: consumers will pay higher prices than they
would in an efficient market because they don't want to pay switching costs20.
Klemperer has characterized switching costs into three categories: transaction costs,
learning costs, and artificial/contract costs21. Transaction costs are those costs which are
incurred directly by the transaction of switching, such as purchase costs of the new
product and direct modifications necessary to accommodate the new product. If one were
to switch cell-phone providers, the costs (including labor) incurred in purchasing the cell
phone, notifying friends of a new number, and programming saved numbers into the
phone would be transaction costs. Learning costs are the costs, including lost
productivity, of training and of learning to use a new product. In the cell phone example,
these would be the time costs of learning the features of the phone, and the lost
productivity due to failed calls caused by operator error. Artificial costs are costs
imposed by sellers to prevent customers from switching brands or products-the contract
charges that a cell phone switcher would have to pay.
It is also useful to separate capital equipment costs (from transaction costs) into a fourth
category. Capital equipment costs include complimentary assets (tooling, machinery,
etc.), which are often specific to a certain product. Any changes required to adapt one's
car to a new cell phone would be capital equipment charges, as would the costs of the
phone itself.
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In many cases (including the cell phone example), all of these costs can be quantified
before a purchase. The total switching cost for a product is:
(CT + CL +CA +CC) (4.1)
where CT is the transaction cost, CL is the learning cost, CA is the artificial (contract) cost,
and Cc is the capital equipment cost.
These costs can be compared by a rational consumer to the value provided by the switch.
The value provided by the switch can be defined as the difference in value to the
consumer between the original product and the new product, with value measured as
utility (U [measured in dollars]) divided by price (P) 2:
AV= U2 U (4.2)
2 1i
Therefore, assuming all costs and value changes are quantifiable, a rational consumer will
choose to switch if:
AV > (CT + CL + C + C) (4.3)
When switching costs are high, the seller is free to increase prices to capture near-
monopoly rents. However, when switching costs are very low or non-existent,
purchasing decisions are solely value driven since there is no reason for consumers to
stay with the original product. This leads to a more efficient market, with competition
based on solely on price and utility. If products are differentiable-different features
offer different utility-a stable market may exist with many products, since each product
would offer a unique utility/price ratio that would appeal to a group of consumers.
Multiple equilibria should not exist in markets with undifferentiable products (such as
those faced by many materials). In these markets, purchasing decisions rest solely on
purchase price. If multiple undifferentiated products are freely available, competition is
on a commodity basis, and is often transacted by electronic markets in a hedonistic price
reduction situation, dragging all sellers to the lowest possible margins.
Unknown Switching Costs as Risk
Switching costs are not always required, but neither are they always known a priori.
There are many cases in which buyers are surprised by switching costs that were
unknown to them before a purchase. Thus, making a switch involves some risk, because
there is a probability that costs of unknown magnitude will be discovered
Learning costs seem to be the most common category of unknown switching costs,
because utilizing new products often involves a steep and unpredictable learning curve.
The surprise is often especially strong with unproven technology, because the potential
costs are practically unquantifiable. These costs can extend well beyond lost productivity
and training costs to include search costs (for complimentary assets), contract
renegotiation costs, and high maintenance costs, to name a few. If products are highly
interdependent with other products, significant interaction effects may be discovered,
which can require significant learning costs to solve.
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If learning costs are unknown beforehand, a rational buyer must recognize the risk that
those costs will be substantial, and sometimes extreme. Dell Computer learned this when
it implemented an SAP enterprise resource planning (ERP) system-at a supposed
switching cost of $60 million-and found itself so crippled that it jettisoned the system 6
months later. The learning costs of making the system interact properly with the other
Dell systems proved to be extraordinarily high, and operational performance and
customer satisfaction were also hurt, since workers in the company didn't know how to
make the system work. Overall switching costs were much higher than anyone had
anticipated, due mostly to unknown learning costs2 3.
When products are unproven or interactions are unknown, learning costs can act as a
major (and very rational) disincentive for switching. The other categories of switching
costs can also be unknown, but probably are considerably smaller than unknown learning
costs. A buyer can acknowledge the possible presence of unknown costs by including
them as another term (C?) in the rational purchase inequality, and assigning them a
probability (p?):
AV > (CT + CL + CA + CC + p?C?) (4.4)
Both the probability and magnitude of unknown costs will increase if the switch involves
unproven/undeveloped technology or if the technology has many interactions.
In general, the magnitude of switching costs (known or unknown) will vary with the
magnitude of change that is forced onto a consumer. Small changes may require very
little spending in only one category of switching cost, while major changes may require
heavy spending in all categories. However, it is important that the consumer consider all
potential classes of switching costs so that a rational decision can be made.
Switching Costs in the Value Chain
Up to this point, the discussion of switching costs has been limited to the costs faced by a
single rational consumer. However, materials are rarely sold to single rational
consumers; they are sold to product manufacturers, who must pass them through value
chains in order to sell them to consumers. Because materials come early in the value
chain and interact with most of the nodes, the switching costs faced by materials are not
simple. There are at least three important factors to examine when considering the
effects of switching costs on products with long value chains:
1. Multiple switching costs
2. Handoffs between nodes
3. The distance between the end consumer and early elements of the chain
Multiple switching costs
Although the nodes of most value chains are interrelated, the specificity of their functions
forces them to be largely independent-particularly when the nodes are owned by
different people or companies. This independence is important to recognize because each
node in the value chain has its own interests, and separate switching costs are incurred at
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each node that is affected by a product switch. Thus, switching a product that is
purchased early in the value chain and affects multiple nodes requires multiple switching
costs. These costs are much higher than they would be in a simple consumer switch, and
would be borne in most situations by the product manufacturer (who would have to pass
them to the consumer). A rational product manufacturer would be faced with the
following inequality:
av* > (CT, + C + CA + CC + P?C?) (4.5)
where n is a node a in the value chain, and CT, CLn, CA., Cc,N C," represent the
transaction costs, learning costs, artificial (contract) costs, capital costs, and unknown
costs of switching at each node. AV* indicates a special profit maximizing value case for
rational product manufacturers (or any reseller of a product), and is defined as
AV* = (R2 - C2 )- (R - C) (4.6)
where R is revenue that can be expected from ongoing sales of a product and C is cost
that can be similarly expected.
It is obvious that the number of nodes and the categories of switching costs that are
affected will vary with the magnitude of product change that is required. Most materials
changes are relatively simple changes of grade, and require very little change in the value
chain. However, major materials changes, such as the change from iron pipe to PVC
plumbing pipe, can induce heavy shock to the existing value chain, requiring billions of
dollars and significant time to complete.
Handoff costs
Unfortunately for materials (and for other parts that are deep in the value chain), the
compounding effects of long value chains aren't limited to switching costs within the
nodes. The close working relationship and inter-relatedness of the nodes leads to high
handoff costs between them. Handoff costs can be defined as the costs which are
incurred when a product moves from one node on the value chain to the next; handoffs
themselves are the interactions between nodes and are represented by arrows in the value
chain diagrams shown earlier.
The field of Transaction Cost Analysis (TCA) has been developing since the mid 1970s
as a method of determining optimal firm structure in light of handoff costs. Multiple
sources of handoff costs have been identified, and most can be traced to two sources:
environmental uncertainty and opportunism24 .
TCA asserts that the rationality of decision makers is limited, and that the costs of
handoffs in an uncertain environment-one in which challenges and difficulties cannot
be predicted before writing a contract-can be extraordinarily high. This is because
communication between nodes of the value chain can be very difficult, and adaptation
requires communication. Furthermore, it is very difficult to assign credit (or rents) for
successes or failures when nodes must work together, and constant renegotiations must
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be undertaken. Negotiations, adaptation, and communication can be very expensive, and
can significantly extend the time required to make a switch25.
To a large degree, handoff costs due to uncertain environments are captured in the costs
of learning within the nodes. Like learning costs, the effects of uncertain environments
are most likely to be present when switching to products or technologies for which full
knowledge has not yet been developed, or which are changing rapidly. However, handoff
costs focus specifically on the knowledge required for integration across nodes, and
integration is a major task26. Handoff costs due to uncertain environments can be
expected to be very high if a technology is not well defined27 .
TCA also asserts that handoff costs can be very high in situations in which the quality
and performance of the activities of a node on the value chain are difficult to monitor.
This is not because of limited ability to communicate, but because of the temptation for
actors within the nodes to exploit the situation by cheating on contracts or otherwise
taking advantage of the chain. Oliver Williamson has called this behavior
"opportunism", which he defined as "self-interest with guile"28 . It is particularly acute
when nodes of the value chain are not owned by the same company, and when assets are
highly proprietary to one side. Very tight controls must be installed to prevent the other
side from using the proprietary technology against the first firm, and these controls can
be expensive.
Although the effects of opportunism are most potent when applied across firms, a similar
effect occurs within firms which can be called "suboptimization". In suboptimization,
one node of the value chain optimizes its process or design without regard for the other
nodes. This can add large rework and redesign costs to a product switch. It can also
extend the time required to make such a switch by a large margin.
Although handoff costs have proven very difficult to quantify, it is clear that they exist
and can be very substantial. The costs of handoffs in which adaptation is required can be
expected to be very high if the adaptation is difficult to specify, and the costs of
opportunism and suboptimization can be very high if quality of node activities is difficult
to measure and spoils must be divided. When handoff costs are included, the switching
inequality faced by a rational product manufacturer grows:
AV* > (C +CL + CA + Cc +p?C? ) + H, (4.7)
a a
where H.n the handoff cost required by the interface of each node, n, with the node that
immediately precedes it.
Additional Value Chain Risk
Learning costs have a higher probability of occurring in value chain switches than they
do in single buyer situations since interactions between nodes are guaranteed to occur.
They are also higher, since learning has to occur as several nodes. Handoff costs are also
probable, and are likely to be expensive. Strategies must be taken to minimize the risk of
underestimating these costs.
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The unknown cost category is also much larger in value chain switches than single buyer
switches. All of the same potential costs exist (search costs, high maintenance costs, etc.)
but several others must be added. Two important sources of unknown costs which would
be very expensive and whose probability would increase with unfamiliar suppliers or
products are supply disruptions and product failure.
Supply disruptions early in the chain can be very expensive. A "bullwhip" effect has
been demonstrated in value chains, in which small supply variations early in a chain can
lead to major disruptions at the end29. This can leave production and distribution nodes
idle, and can starve the customer of supply, causing missed sales, weakened credibility,
and a loss of customer loyalty.
Product failure can also be very expensive, particularly if it is caused by a product used
early in the value chain, such as a material. Since each step in a value chain makes a
product more specialized, products bought early in the chain are usually bought in very
large batches. This means that defective batches have the potential to ruin large lots of
products. Furthermore, if defects in an early value chain activity are discovered after
other steps have been executed, all of the steps must be repeated. This can lead to very
expensive rework, or worse, recalls.
Unexpected learning and handoff costs, as well as other unknown costs, become both
more probable and more costly if the switched technology is new or unproven. They are
also more probable when the switched product interacts with many of the nodes, like
materials do. Learning delays can cause lags and inefficiencies in the chain and can lead
to unexpected product failure rates and major recalls.
Both switching costs and handoff costs increase as value chain complexity increases.
The first order effects are obvious, and are probably fairly linear: a larger number of
nodes corresponds to a larger number of potential switching costs. The second order
costs are also substantial: a larger number of interactions between the nodes leads to a
higher number of handoff costs. It is likely that handoff costs are nonlinear, since many
value chains require a high degree of intercommunication, which can stretch well beyond
the nodes immediately before and after each node. Furthermore, overall coordination
required to manage such a change is probably nonlinear with respect to the number of
nodes. This would be an interesting area of future research, and could build on network
and supply chain theory.
Conclusion
A significant portion of the variation in insertion time of plastics when entering
historically important applications can be explained by variation in complexity of the
value chain of those applications. The relationship between value chain complexity and
insertion time is progressive: additional value chain complexity leads to additional
insertion time. Although the concept of value chain complexity seems nebulous, it can be
estimated by proxy: expert ratings of the number of parts affected in a final application
by a materials switch and expert ratings of the difficulty of change in a value chain are
excellent predictors.
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Additional Resolution to the Materials Commercialization Pattern
It was shown in chapter three that new materials follow a clear pattern of
commercialization, displayed graphically in figure 5.15. The recognition of a positive
progressive relationship between value chain complexity and insertion time gives insight
into the pattern.
Enablers P:lao " m-
(0-2 yrs) (2-7 yrs)
Figure 5.15: Historical pattern of materials commercialization.
Enabler applications were found to have three common elements: the materials let people
do things they couldn't do before, the applications were relatively simple, and the
applications were relatively new. The value proposition of the materials was clear (since
they let people do new things), and their speed of insertion indicates that few limiting
factors existed.
Examining the common factors of enablers in light of the value chain instruments shows
that value chain complexity-and therefore delay--would be expected to be low. In
simple applications, the ratings of total number of parts instrument and the number of
parts affected instrument converge-they are both low. Furthermore, Utterback has
shown that new products are generally built with flexible value chains so that features can
be changed quickly30 . This corresponds to a low degree of value chain change difficulty.
Value chain complexity was low by all three instruments in enablers, so limiting value
chain effects were minimal.
Chapter four showed that value proposition alone could not explain the variation in
insertion time of the biggest applications of the major plastics into the platform and
widespread substitution applications. Technical factors and value chain effects were
shown to be the major limits. It was noted earlier in this chapter that insertion delay due
to technical factors is known in to vary with difficulty of the technical challenge. This
chapter has shown that the delay due to value chain factors varies with value chain
complexity. Thus, additional resolution is given to the materials commercialization
pattern: enablers can enter quickly because they have no technical challenges and very
low value chain complexity. Variation in insertion delay into platform and widespread
substitution applications corresponds to variations in technical challenges and value chain
complexity.
The relationship between value chain complexity and insertion delay is largely explained
by the presence of switching costs in the value chain. The additional profit or
competitive advantage gained by a rational application producer because of a material
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switch must exceed the sum of the switching costs and handoff costs in the value chain.
When all of the costs are known a priori, this sets a very high hurdle. However, when
the costs are unknown beforehand, it presents a very high degree of risk. This is
especially acute if the processes and techniques necessary to form a material are poorly
understood, since learning costs can be extraordinarily high. Because of the risk and
switching costs inherent in complex value chains, it is far more rational in most cases for
application producers to continue use of incumbent materials or switch only between
grades that are compatible with existing value chains than to switch to new materials.
Understanding the nature of the relationship between value chain complexity and
insertion delay provides a basis for further work. Chapter six will explore options that
producers of new materials can take to minimize the effects of value chain complexity on
insertion.
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Chapter 6: Toward Faster Commercialization of New
Materials
"Forcing a new product into the market is like pushing a string"
-Popular adage in innovation
Introduction
The materials commercialization pattern has now been described, and some of its
underlying factors have been identified. It has been shown that traditional materials
marketing wisdom does not hold for new materials, even if they offer a superior value
proposition to existing materials. Cost and serendipity have been debunked as the major
drivers of insertion delay in new materials-technical challenges and value chain
obstacles are much more important barriers. Furthermore, the earliest application
insertions of new materials are not based on incremental property improvements over
existing materials-they are based on fundamentally different properties. The earliest
applications of new materials let people do new things: they are enablers.
This is not meant to imply that traditional materials marketing wisdom is useless.
Competition based on incremental price and property advantages between incumbents
and entrants is clearly an important part of the later stages of commercialization of a new
material. The platform application, in which a new material replaces an incumbent in a
major application because of superior properties is also important-it is a hybrid of the
enabler applications and traditional materials marketing wisdom.
The fact that the typical applications for each phase of the commercialization pattern
have unique characteristics reveals that the traditional "one size fits all" approach is
insufficient. The traditional approach has its place, but the proper introduction and market
selection strategy for new materials is conditional: limiting insertion factors depend on
the relationship between the market and the material. When this relationship is
understood, insertion factors can be managed.
New materials are different from established materials in two important ways. First, they
have no track record of success. Their properties and failure modes are not as well
understood as those of the established materials. These are technical challenges that must
be overcome for the entrant to be viable. Second, new materials do not have an installed
base from which to work. Players in the application value chain rarely have the
equipment or knowledge necessary to fully utilize their potential. Value chain issues
must be solved for the material to become a reasonable alternative to existing materials.
This chapter will show that the concept of compound switching costs, introduced in
chapter five, is a useful tool for understanding the conditions of insertion. It will show
that the most important conditions driving switching costs are the degree of
understanding of a material (both by producers and application manufacturers) and the
value chain complexity faced by that material. Once the effects of these conditions are
established, strategic tools will be presented which can help mitigate the effect of
insertion factors so that new materials can enter markets more quickly.
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Assumption of Rationality
The discipline of economics has been described as the study of choice and tradeoffs1.
One of the important tenets of much of the field is the assumption of rational actors2 .
This assumption states that people (and groups of people such as companies) will take the
best option that is available to them in a given situation. Clearly this assumption is not
always true-there are a variety of reasons for which poor decisions are made. Many
sources of bad decisions are particularly acute in large organizations, where systems and
controls can be in place that are optimized for overarching goals, leading to
suboptimization of individual decisions.
The presence of irrationality must be recognized, but the following analysis will be based
on a general assumption of rational and benevolent action on the part of individual
adopters of new materials. This assumption has important implications for this analysis.
First, it asserts that people will change if a better option is presented to them. Second, it
implies that decision makers will act on the best information that they have, and will
decide based on many criteria in order to reach an overarching goal. In most businesses,
the overarching goal can be assumed to be profitability.
Switching Costs Create Rational Barriers
Many new materials have offered a clear value proposition to many applications, without
being immediately inserted into them. It has been shown that the applicability of the
materials was well known, yet the decision makers within the application manufacturers
delayed their move to adopt them. If the decision makers are assumed to be rational,
there must be reasons for this delay. The research reported in earlier chapters suggests
that insertion factors-particularly technical deficiencies and value chain obstacles-
were the reasons.
Both technical deficiencies and value chain obstacles can be very expensive to overcome,
and can significantly extend the period required to earn an acceptable return on
investment. It is easy to see that value chain obstacles and technical deficiencies translate
into switching costs, and that these costs prevent rational application manufacturers from
adopting new products. New materials will only be adopted by rational application
manufacturers if the potential value of the switch is greater than the costs of the switch.
There is an amusing adage in the dry cleaning, construction and engineering fields that
says "you can have two of the three: cheap, fast, or good". This is a practical recognition
of a fact that the field of managerial psychology has long recognized: a tradeoff exists
between time delay and coordination. Uncoordinated efforts increase the time necessary
to accomplish a task3 . On complex projects such as product engineering or construction
of buildings, coordination can be very expensive since many layers of management and
control systems are required. Less coordinated efforts are generally less expensive than
highly coordinated efforts, but require much more time4.
Since the willingness of application manufacturers to invest in switching costs is capped
by the potential value of the material in an application, the tradeoff between capital
investment in adopting the new material and coordination required to adopt the new
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material is often made. It is more rational for application manufacturers to delay
introduction until switching costs are reduced or to allow the material to pass through
acceptance and design-in procedures slowly (with less coordination) than to invest the
money necessary for quick qualification and insertion.
Because materials are the first point of differentiation in the value chain, they are
followed by many nodes. If a new material is chosen, many of these nodes must change
to adapt to the properties of the new material. The adopters of the new material generally
bear the costs of making this switch. The materials switching cost equation shown in
chapter five can help explain the potential costs that adopters of a new material might
face. The equation is shown below.
tl n
AV*> (CmT + CLn + CA + CCn +p?C?n) + EH
a a
Where, for nodes a through n:
CT=transaction costs
CL=learning costs
CA=artificial (contract) costs
Cc=capital equipment costs
C?=unknown costs
H=handoff (coordination) costs between nodes
and V*=difference in value perceived by application manufacturer between incumbent
material and entrant material.
At first glance, the materials switching cost equation shows that switching costs in a
value chain are much higher than those faced by a simple consumer, and they act as
powerful deterrents to change. This is an important insight, since it directly refutes claims
by academics and materials producers that application manufacturers are "dinosaurs"-
irrational actors in their slow pace of adoption of new materials.
However, inspection of the materials switching cost equation also gives much deeper
insight into conditions required for change. The variables in the equation can be rolled
into two important conditions. The first condition can be called "value chain complexity"
which a material faces when it is introduced. As explained in chapter five, value chain
complexity includes the number of nodes that might be affected (n), the degree of change
required in those nodes (CT, CA, Cc), and the interaction between the nodes (the
coordination portion of H). The second condition can be called "understanding of
material" possessed by both a material producer and an application manufacturer at the
time of insertion. This condition includes the learning costs (CL) of each node, the
probability and degree of potential unknown costs (C?), and the opportunism portion of
handoff costs (H).
Because it contains several of the switching cost elements, higher value chain complexity
equates to higher switching costs. The relationship is positive. In contrast, the
relationship between understanding of a material and switching costs is negative. Higher
understanding equates to lower switching costs. A baseline of understanding must be in
place for a material to be useful in an application, that understanding must be developed
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in the form of learning costs. Opportunism is more likely in situations of asymmetric
understanding between parties, and unknown costs are also more likely if a material is
not well understood.
The highest and lowest potential switching costs situations are easily seen by mapping
the conditions against each other, as shown in figure 6.1. The severity of the intermediate
situations varies between applications, with value complexity being a more powerful
driver of switching costs in most situations.
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Figure 6.1: Switching cost severity matrix
While the effects of switching costs are formidable, there are ways to minimize them. If
the effects of each of the conditions are understood and minimized, so too will be
switching costs, and materials can be expected to be adopted more readily. The next
section will discuss ways to reduce the value chain complexity faced by a material, and
the following section will discuss ways to increase understanding of a material.
Reducing Value Chain Complexity
The first way to reduce the switching costs required to insert a material is to reduce the
complexity of the application value chain faced by that material. It may seem that a
materials producer has little control over the complexity of the application value chain
that a material faces. However, consideration of the topic reveals that there are many
levers that a materials producer can pull to change to simplify the value chains into which
its materials must integrate. The first lever is market selection: materials producers can
launch their wares into applications with simple value chains. The second lever is
integration: materials producers can integrate forward to control any potential problems
in the value chain. The third lever is technical development: materials producers can
develop materials and processes that maximize the compatibility of new materials with
existing products and processes.
Each of these levers will now be discussed.
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Market Selection: Reducing Nodes
The easiest way to eliminate challenges from value chain complexity is to dodge complex
applications. The unique versatility of materials makes them candidates for use in many
different applications, and materials producers must decide into which of those
applications a new material will be pushed. Value chains are designed to produce
products, and vary in complexity just as their products do. A spectrum of value chain
complexity exists, and the requirements and specifications imposed on a material vary
accordingly. Materials producers can reduce the value chain complexity faced by their
materials by choosing to launch their products in application markets that have simple
value chains and low materials requirements.
Consider the case of carbon fiber reinforced plastic (CFRP). Developed in the late 1960s
for military and space applications, CFRP offers the highest specific strength and specific
stiffness of any material. It is also very expensive, cannot be formed using conventional
processes, and is virtually impossible to recycle 5. The strength and stiffness of CFRP
make it very attractive for applications that must retain structural integrity at high speeds,
but its cost, recyclability, and incompatibility with existing processes limit its
applicability to high value, low volume applications.
The most obvious applications for CFRP are as replacements for lightweight structural
metals such as aluminum and titanium alloys. Most of these are in aerospace, which
values a pound of weight saved at around $200 and requires very strong, stiff materials6 .
Sporting goods, such as tennis rackets, bicycle frames, skis, or golf shafts, are other
possible applications, since consumers are often willing to pay premium prices for
performance increases7 . Since producers of CFRP can choose where to launch their
products, comparing the value chain of golf shafts to the value chain of aircraft skins
gives an excellent illustration of the effectiveness of market selection in reducing value
chain complexity. A snapshot of the steps that the new material would face in the (post
qualification, post design-in) value chain for each application is shown in figures 6.2 and
6.38.
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Figure 6.2: Simplified CFRP aircraft skin value chain.
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Figure 6.3: Simplified CFRP aircraft skin value chain.
This figure shows that the aircraft value chain is much more complex than the golf shaft
chain. To insert CFRP in golf shafts, the golf club manufacturer would have to change
(at most) three nodes. In contrast, the aircraft manufacturer would have to change dozens
of processes at more than 10 nodes. The extensive change required by the aircraft
manufacturer would equate to heavy switching costs, while the golf shaft switching costs
would be relatively small. Furthermore, the safety and reliability requirements of the
aircraft market would induce long and expensive qualification cycles-the golf shaft
would require minimal certification. A materials producer could expect to face less
resistance from the value chain of the golf shaft than from the value chain of the aircraft
skin.
The net effect of choosing simple applications on the materials switching cost equation is
clear: it reduces the number of nodes (n in the equation), along with their corresponding
switching costs. Since there are fewer nodes in simpler value chains, handoff costs are
also reduced. Choosing applications with simple value chains is the surest way to
eliminate complexity and potential switching costs.
While choosing applications with simple value chains is powerful, it is only practical if
the properties of a material lend themselves to those applications. There are many
attractive established application markets that do not have simple value chains, such as
aerospace, automobiles, and medical devices. The levers discussed in the next sections
are applicable to applications with both simple and complex value chains.
Value Chain Integration: Reducing Unmanaged Nodes
The field of transaction cost analysis has shown that additional coordination can reduce
inefficiencies and significantly improve the profitability and effectiveness of a value
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chain9. While coordination does not necessarily reduce the number of nodes in a value
chain, it can significantly reduce complexity by eliminating handoff challenges,
increasing communication between nodes, and focusing the nodes on a single target.
Strong coordination can also squelch challenges from resistant nodes.
There are many organizational structures for managing complex value chains, but direct
management of the nodes offers the highest potential for coordination. In the case of a
new material, assuming direct management of the value chain requires that a material
producer integrate forward, acquiring the nodes of the value chain that must be
coordinated for a material to be inserted. Christensen et. al. have suggested that
producers should integrate forward to the activity before the "decoupling point" of the
value chainS°. The decoupling point is the node in the chain in which no further change is
required to use the product. In the golf shaft example shown above, the decoupling point
would be "assembly", when completed shafts would join with clubheads and grips. A
materials producer following this strategy would need to acquire or develop capabilities
in the roll wrap stage in order to deliver products to the decoupling point (see figure 6.4).
In the aircraft example, the decoupling point would most likely be the "attach to aircraft"
node, in which a completed component could be interchanged with another similar
component. A materials producer would need to own all of the nodes in the value chain
through the assembly stage in order to maximize the necessary coordination.
Golf Shaft Value Chain
Decoupling
point
I
Prepreg Roll-wrap
production (existing
Iprocess)
Prepreg producer could
integrate forward to absorb
switching costs
Figure 6.4: Golf shaft value chain, showing decoupling point, forward integration necessary to
minimize switching costs
The goal of value chain integration is to reduce unmanaged nodes and produce a product
that can be easily substituted into a decoupled value chain activity. However, value chain
integration has some rather obvious capital implications: it can be very expensive to
develop or acquire the capacities and capabilities necessary to manage all of the nodes up
to the decoupling point. Although it reduces insertion time, forward value chain
integration fundamentally shifts the switching costs from the application manufacturer to
the materials producer. For this reason, it is only feasible in markets that offer potential
sales large enough to offset the necessary investment.
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Technical Decoupling: The Mimic
Insertion at the decoupling point does not always require a complete organizational
transformation, as value chain integration dictates. It is also possible to launch a material
in a form such that it mimics the relevant properties of existing materials, and effectively
decouples the value chain because of technical compatibility with existing nodes. Of
course, this option is not always available-it depends on the properties of the entrant
material and on the level of understanding that is possessed about it. Revolutionary new
materials often require completely new forming processes and offer completely different
properties compared to existing materials. These materials could require an extreme
amount of technical development to mimic existing materials and streamline with
existing processes. Furthermore, undertaking to mimic the properties of existing
materials could compromise the unique and novel properties of new materials, making
them less appealing. Since materials are difficult to change, this process could be also be
quite slow.
The technical compatibility of an entrant material with existing products and processes is
dependent on the target application. Materials producers can choose to launch into
applications that are naturally more compatible, or can try to alter the properties of a
material to make it mimic existing materials in some attractive market. In either case, a
high degree of cooperation and coordination between the application manufacturer and
the materials producer is required-both groups need a clear understanding of both the
material and the application. If this understanding does not exist, the ability of this
approach to reduce switching costs is severely impaired.
Understanding of a material by both the materials producer and an application
manufacturer is gained by experience with the material. Thus, the approach of
technically decoupling a value chain by mimicking the properties of existing materials is
most feasible with incremental improvements to existing materials.
The Injection Principle
Innovation theorists have taught that pushing a product into the market is like pushing on
a string: the value chain bends in whichever ways suit it best. This analogy seems
particularly applicable to materials, since they are the earliest point of competitive
differentiation, and switches can require significant change throughout the value chain.
However, the analogy is also applicable to the reduction of value chain complexity. If a
thin fiber is short enough, it becomes infinitely stiff (the strongest materials known to
man are metal and carbon fiber whiskers), and is able to be injected into any surface. So
goes the value chain-a shorter, stiffer value chain allows easy injection of materials into
their markets. Materials producers can reduce potential switching costs by choosing
applications with simple, short value chains. They can integrate forward to minimize
flexibility in unmanaged, resistant nodes, thus allowing easy insertion into decoupled
nodes. They can also reduce the resistance of nodes by integrating perfectly into them.
In each case, the ability of the chain to bend is reduced.
In any technology push situation, and particularly with new materials, innovators should
strive to reduce value chain complexity. Reducing complexity creates a more rigid chain
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that can inject a product into the market, where it can compete with other materials on the
basis of its value proposition.
If a material encounters too much resistance from the value chain of its application, it will
either not be adopted or the high value chain switching costs will conceal its true value
proposition.
Increasing Understanding of a Material
The second way to reduce the switching costs required to insert a new material into an
application is to increase the understanding of the material. It has been acknowledged
that learning costs, unknown costs, and the opportunism portion of handoff costs can be
significant contributors to switching costs. Knowledge is the antidote to these costs-if
the behavior, properties, and processing methods of a material are known and teachable
by both the materials producer and the application manufacturer, then these costs are
easily controlled. Learning and liability are minimized with a well-understood material.
Just as a spectrum of value chain complexity exists, a spectrum of knowledge of a
material exists. Mature materials are well understood. Their properties are published,
they can be accurately modeled, and their limitations are known l . New materials are
understood only to the extent that they have been tested and proven in use. There are
many mechanisms for dissemination of understanding of materials, and all are most
effective when extensive knowledge of a material has been developed. They include:
· Material qualification
· Codes and standards
· Industry publications
· Listing in engineering manuals/engineering databases
· Product/material warranties
UIL/insurance listings
Inclusion of a material in any of these mechanisms is an explicit recognition of fitness for
use, and is an implicit recognition of understanding of its behavior and properties within
a range of contingent situations. However, it should be noted that several of these
mechanisms are very specialized, and may not translate across industries. Different
industries value different properties, have different risk profiles, and may have much
different potential learning costs. Furthermore, products in different industries may face
vastly different operating conditions.
The Knowledge Gap
At its core, technical development is a knowledge creation activity. During the early
stages of technical development, knowledge is created in laboratories about the
properties, behaviors, and interactions of a new material. As technical development
progresses, knowledge about processing methods, maintenance, and recyclability is also
developed. At some point in this process, a material is judged to be understood well
enough to be: released into the market.
Unfortunately, materials are rarely completely understood when they are released as
products, and much of the knowledge created during laboratory development is
inapplicable when translated into practical application knowledge. There are at least two
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reasons for this. First, it is practically impossible for a lab to generate the knowledge
necessary to cover every application manufacturing process, every environmental
interaction, and every contingent liability. Second, technical development happens
within the scientific community of the materials producer, while production development
occurs within the technical community of the application manufacturer. It is difficult to
transfer knowledge between firms, and even more difficult to transfer knowledge
between the scientific and application communities.
Knowledge Generation
Lab development alone cannot generate the knowledge necessary for actual production
and application of a material. In a landmark 1995 paper, von Hippel and Tyre asserted
that field learning "was sometimes the only practical way to succeed" 12. They showed
that many problems cannot be identified in the lab. Lab development does not
necessarily deal with all of the complexities and challenges of volume production, nor
can it possibly encompass all the contingencies that are faced in the variety of
applications for which a material is destined. Ancillary activities, impurities, and
environmental conditions in a production process are difficult to consider at lab scale, and
they can have adverse interactions with a material. Field trials are crucial in order to
identify unanticipated problems.
The use of bismuth solder was stopped because of an interaction that was undiscovered at
lab scale. Working under government mandates to reduce the use of lead in automobiles,
auto manufacturers turned to the use of low-melting bismuth solders, which made
excellent joints. However, it was later found that even very low concentrations of
bismuth severely weakened recycled steel (bismuth attacked the grain boundaries in steel,
causing embrittlement). Since bismuth could not be removed from recyclate, it was
completely removed from use by the automakers'3 .
Lab development is also unlikely to uncover all of the possible failure mechanisms for
new materials. While there is a standard battery of tests that are performed on new
materials, it would be almost impossible for these tests to predict every condition or
interaction that a material might face. These conditions can cause failure, and can lead to
very high unknown liability costs. DuPont learned this lesson with a very expensive
settlement for the application of its Delrin acetal engineering resin in toilet valves.
One of the first listed applications for Delrin was in toilet valves, where it offered
superior economics to brass: a Delrin valve could be made with four machines, compared
to the 40 required for a brass valve14 . Toilet valves (see figure 6.5) seemed to be a
perfect application for Delrin-the material had excellent mechanical properties, had
been shown to be far superior to other engineering thermoplastics in water absorption,
and offered excellent corrosion resistance 5. Furthermore, DuPont had released
laboratory studies showing that the material was resistant to almost all solvents 6 .
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Figure 6.5: 1959 Delrin and brass toilet valves.
Delrin toilet valves enjoyed immense popularity throughout the 1960s and 1970s, despite
some signs that they degraded over time. As the installed base of the valves grew, the
failure process became more clear. The valves, which were under constant pressure from
the water supply, would degrade and flake in water containing chlorine. The degradation
led to cracking and separation of the valve. At the point of separation, the unattached
portion of the valve was launched through the top of the toilet tank, leaving a fountain of
water to flood the bathroom in which the toilet was installed.
Although the basic failure mechanism of acetal was described in 196017, a series of
scientific investigations in the 1990s showed that acetal is severely attacked by
hypochlorous acid, which is the acid formed by chlorine and water s'1 9' 20 . This attack
occurred at extremely low chlorine concentrations: <.5 ppm. Since chlorine is a popular
chemical in water purification, the concentrations in municipal water supplies (to which
toilets were connected) were well above the threshold of attack . While this appears to
have been an honest mistake by DuPont, the company was required to participate in a
$900 million settlement in 1995 to repair the damages caused by misapplication of
plastics in plumbing22 .
There are many other stories like this one in the materials world, but the message is the
same: laboratory testing is very important, but is insufficient to cover all of the potential
challenges that a material will face. Although it had extensively tested the chemical
resistance of Delrin in the laboratory, the knowledge from these tests was insufficient to
cover the actual service conditions of the toilet valves2 3.
In addition to their work on identification of unanticipated field problems, Von Hippel
and Tyre noted a second advantage of field testing in knowledge generation: the
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identification of uses for a product that couldn't be anticipated in the lab. The researchers
noted that the controlled environment of the laboratory couldn't identify all of the ways
that people might use a product, and that field testing would reveal potential new markets
or features for product manufacturers 2 4 . This knowledge may also be important to
materials manufacturers.
Knowledge Transfer
Even if materials producers could generate the knowledge necessary to process a material
into a final application and to cover liabilities, it is unlikely that they could easily transfer
this knowledge directly to application manufacturers. While materials producers have
developed tools such as materials-specific engineering manuals and technical support
centers, they are incomplete: the versatility of materials makes their application base very
broad, and it is extremely difficult to cover all potential scenarios. There is a gap
between technical development and application manufacturing.
The gap between application manufacturing and technical development is similar to the
well-documented gap between the science and engineering communities. The two groups
rarely communicate unless an engineering problem is so difficult that its solution must be
developed by basic science25. It was noted in chapter four that this situation does occur
with new materials-materials producers often have to solve difficult problems
themselves and then disseminate them back to the markets. However, it is more common
for application manufacturers to solve application-specific problems without the help of
materials producers.
There also exists suspicion among application manufacturers that materials producers
misrepresent their products in order to gain sales. As one manager stated, "a salesman's
job is to sell products" (regardless of the actual applicability) 2 6. There are numerous
examples of misapplication, and even some applications of deliberate misinformation.
Given the enormous pressure that materials producers face to generate sales early in the
life of a new material, it is easy to slip to unethical behavior. Known failure mechanisms
have been concealed, leading to very expensive and embarrassing recalls and warranty
costs for application manufacturers. One example of deliberate concealment of failure
mechanisms is the relatively unknown static fatigue property of glass fibers. While most
materials fatigue only in cyclic loading, fiberglass composites also fatigue in static
loading. Misunderstanding of this property has caused many misapplications of the
material, such as in leaf springs and pultruded signposts, both of which face both cyclic
and static loading27.
Network Effects and Real World Applications
The problems of the knowledge gap can be overcome by testing and demonstrating the
properties of a material in actual-"real world"--product applications. One executive
noted that when a new material is introduced "people will line up to be second but no one
wants to be first" to adopt it28. Product applications create a track record for new
materials, but also allow knowledge to be generated about them in more realistic (and
demanding) conditions.
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The concept of network effects, so prevalent in information technology, is useful in
explaining the importance of actual product applications for new materials. Network
effects can be defined as "a change in benefit, or surplus, that an agent derives from a
good when the number of other agents consuming the same kind of good changes"2 9.
With materials, the network effects are positive: there are advantages to an application
manufacturer if other application manufacturers use the same material.
Systems-scale economies of materials are relatively straightforward and well-known30 .
As more users adopt a material, producers can profitably install larger-scale (and more
efficient) production processes, leading to lower cost materials for users31 . These effects
contribute to commoditization of popular materials. However, although the systems-
scale production advantages are well-known, the knowledge advantages stemming from
network effects are at least as important. Knowledge advantages produce reductions in
learning costs, unknown (liability) costs, and handoff costs.
Network Knowledge Reduces Learning Costs
The first type of learning that is accelerated by product applications is material
production learning. As a new material is sold for use in product applications, and as the
performance requirements imposed on the material increase, producers are forced to
develop learning about production processes to improve yield and reduce defects. This is
a natural outcome of scaling up. As a material finds more applications, a multiplicative
network effect is generated, since all application manufacturers can take advantage of
improved quality and lower costs.
Processing of materials also benefits from the network effects of product applications. It
has been noted that laboratory development cannot cover all of the potential processes
and application uses of most new materials. In fact, most application-specific process
development is executed by someone in the value chain outside of the materials producer,
such as the application manufacturer or a contract manufacturer. As this process
development occurs, it can be transferred by the application manufacturer to other
application manufacturers through patents, suppliers, labor flow, or even reverse-
engineering of products, to name a few of the paths.
The learning network effects of product applications are not limited to production and
processing. As the installed base of users grows, markets are created to fulfill the needs
of those users. New areas of research and development often emerge, and systems are
designed to accommodate the unique properties of the materials. These systems can
range from specialized handling systems (such as vacuum conveyors) to enhanced
engineering tools (such as finite element systems) to automated purchasing systems to
financial instruments designed to hedge inherent risks. These types of derivative
products embody much of the specialized knowledge necessary to adopt a material, and
significantly reduce the overall learning costs. The presence of these markets can also
reduce the capital and transaction costs inherent in a materials switch.
Network effects of learning are accelerated by the common practice by materials
producers of employing technical representatives as problem solvers for application
manufacturers. Since these technical representatives are exposed to the knowledge
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generated by the application manufacturers, they can transfer this knowledge to the
materials producer and to other application manufacturers. Two-way communication
between materials producers and application manufacturers presents a clear opportunity
for materials producers to become clearinghouses of knowledge, new knowledge
acquired from product manufacturers can be added to knowledge developed in-house.
This can significantly reduce future learning costs.
In addition to being broader and deeper than knowledge generated in a laboratory,
product application knowledge is more credible. Claims can be supported or refuted with
product data: product applications can be seen by other application manufacturers, and
achievements and shortcomings of a material are quite visible. This credibility can
increase the rate of acceptance of new knowledge.
It must be acknowledged application manufacturers may consider much of their learning
proprietary (as it can generate competitive advantage) and may restrict accessibility to it.
This practice can significantly reduce the effectiveness of network learning.
Network Knowledge Reduces Liability Costs
Network effects also reduce potential liability costs for future adopters of a new material.
As product applications of a new material are subjected to conditions of actual use,
failure modes often appear that were invisible in lab testing. As more application
manufacturers adopt a new material, the material is exposed to more conditions, and
more failure modes are identified. As failure modes are identified, the true applicability
of the material is exposed. This allows designers and engineers to design it into
applications that are not susceptible to its shortcomings, thus minimizing the probability
of failure to a higher degree than either laboratory testing or qualification could.
Network Knowledge Reduces Handoff Costs
The opportunism portion of handoff costs is a direct consequence of asymmetric
knowledge between different nodes of the value chain. If one node has more knowledge
than another, a temptation exists to take advantage of the situation by charging higher
prices. The product application knowledge can minimize this by forcing nodes of the
value chain to develop knowledge together. The challenges of knowledge transfer
between materials producers and application manufacturers have been discussed, and it is
unlikely that materials producers would have much better luck with other nodes of the
chain. Furthermore, depending on the level of coordination, a similar problem may exist
between nodes of the chain.
As materials are adopted in more applications, they become more familiar to processors
and other nodes of the chain, and chances for opportunism are reduced. Players are more
able to find alternate suppliers, reducing the chances that they will be gouged.
Furthermore, players will be more able to ascertain the true economic price of goods or
services, and can discern the presence of opportunism.
148
The Challenge of Building a Network (or how to reduce learning, liability, and handoff
costs)
It is clear that practical product applications are necessary for growth of a new material,
because these applications create network effects that reduce switching costs for future
adopters. However, materials networks are rarely sui-generous-they must begin with a
kernel of application manufacturers. This kernel becomes a validation tool for the
materials producers, but the application manufacturers must be convinced to use the new
material before validation can begin. The ensuing problem is easy to see: How can
producers get validation customers to absorb large learning, liability, and handoff costs
for unproven materials so that networks can begin?
The answer is simple: materials producers should carefully choose application markets
that are minimally sensitive to these costs, and should integrate forward when those
markets are not available.
Enablers as Validation Applications
Because materials are versatile, materials producers can select markets into which
materials are launched. Early market choices are crucial, since they determine the speed
at which learning can be generated. While launch of a material into an application
market is by no means an assurance of adoption into that market (since application
manufacturers and consumers have the final say), selecting the proper validation markets
will help. There are two important criteria for selecting validation applications as
network kernels. First, applications must be capable of adopting the new material
quickly. Second, the application should be visible and relevant to other potential
markets.
Application manufacturers are most likely to quickly adopt a new material in applications
that offer them solid profitability with minimal risk. The best case for solid profitability
is made by a very compelling value proposition coupled to low switching costs and low
liability costs. The validation markets for the major plastics all met these criteria, and
created enough awareness of their materials to spark network creation. They were
described in chapter three as "enablers". Four important characteristics of enabler
applications were described:
1. The material allows users of the applications to do new things
2. The application solves a relatively new problem
3. The application is relatively simple
4. The market may be small
Each of these characteristics is important to validation.
The value proposition of a material must be compelling in a validation application, and
consumers are often compelled to buy products that allow them to do new things. If they
are scrambling to solve a new problem, the material can be doubly compelling.
However, value proposition is only part of the equation-insertion factors and potential
liability must also be minimized.
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Avoiding technical difficulties is relatively straightforward: applications should be
selected that do not have obvious technical incompatibilities with the new material.
While technical difficulties may arise, they are often predictable and avoidable. Further
assurance can be gained by selecting very simple applications that have few interactions
with other parts.
Value chain challenges can be minimized by selecting applications with very simple
value chains. Eliminating nodes and handoffs maximizes potential compatibility. They
can also be minimized by selecting relatively new applications. Abernathy and Utterback
showed that new products (in the fluid stage) are likely to have very flexible value chains,
which can accommodate change easily3 2. The ability to accommodate change is an
implicit recognition of low learning costs, and value chains in the fluid stage are often
optimized to minimize learning costs so that the correct set of product features can be
identified and introduced.
All of the characteristics of enablers reduce potential liability. Consumers are more
likely to be tolerant of faults in products that are solving new problems, since they have
no other choice. Collateral damage from product failure is likely to be minimal in simple
applications-at worst limited to warranty replacement of the failed product. Small
application market size can also limit liability-if fewer products are sold, there are fewer
opportunities for failure. Furthermore, failure in a small market can allow easy recalls
and damage control (in a public relations sense) in the event of failure.
In order to be useful as validation applications, enablers must be visible to adjacent
application markets. Since enablers are generally introduced into relatively small
markets, it is difficult for them to generate the profits necessary to justify investment.
These profits come from the network of applications in which a material is inserted. For
this reason, it is extremely important that visibility to other markets be considered when
determining potential enabler applications into which a material will be launched.
It is also important to recognize that network effects are only as strong as the links
between groups in the network. While materials producers can act as clearinghouses of
knowledge, their credibility is limited if they cannot convince manufacturers of the
applicability of previous applications to new ones. This challenge can be especially
strong if a material is appealing in incompatible industries. For example, it could be
difficult to convince an aerospace manufacturer of the applicability of shape memory
alloys to a jet engine based on experience in biomedical heart stents. Thus, enabler-type
validation applications may be necessary in each disparate industry into which a material
is targeted.
From an operational standpoint, enabler application opportunities can be quite difficult to
identify. The work of Eric Von Hippel may be quite useful in this regard. Von Hippel
has shown that groups of "lead users"--users who face needs that will be general in the
marketplace months or years ahead of the rest of the market and who "expect to benefit
significantly by obtaining a solution to those needs"-can be useful in identifying and
developing ideas3 3. These lead users can provide feedback before any firm has entered a
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market and can provide new ideas in addition to early feedback. The emerging idea of
user innovation toolkits, in which producers transfer the task of idea creation to users,
also seems promising 34' 35,36.
Integrating Forward: A Second Option
There are industries in which enabler-type applications are not feasible, and there are old,
complex applications markets that are so attractive that they are irresistible. In these
cases, another option is available to initiate an application network: forward integration to
the node before the decoupling point. By integrating forward in the value chain,
producers can insert new materials into large, highly visible, complex, and profitable
markets that would not otherwise accept them because of switching and liability costs.
The benefits of this strategy in value chain management have already been discussed, but
reductions in future learning costs, liability costs, and handoff costs have not, and they
are very important.
Integrating forward allows materials producers to internally capture knowledge about
every step in the value chain. This knowledge can then be disseminated back to
application manufacturers with the confidence and credibility of proven experience.
However, the dissemination can be selective, since this type of integration can expose
potential competitive advantage for the materials producer. It also fundamentally shifts
learning costs from adopters (application manufacturers) to materials producers, making
future adoption easier.
Potential liability costs are not necessarily lower in a forward integration situation, but
they are completely shifted to the materials producer. While the prospect of absorbing
liability is never tantalizing, it can eliminate costs for other nodes in the value chain so
that an application network can begin.
Forward integration offers clear benefits in reducing handoff costs. If every relevant
node in the value chain is owned by the same company, all the profits in the chain are
absorbed by that company. The only opportunity for opportunistic behavior is internal
transfer pricing, and the incentives for such behavior are low.
Forward integration also minimizes the knowledge gap between laboratory work and
field production. By managing the value chain, a single materials producer can provide
the coordination necessary to force communication between production and lab groups.
The Importance of Understanding
The degree of understanding held by materials producers and application manufacturers
is a major difference between new materials and old ones. Understanding is an important
factor in determining insertion strategies because of its effects on learning, liability, and
handoff costs.
If both producers and application manufacturers understand a material well, the
probability is high that it will adopted or rejected based on incremental cost and
performance differences with other materials-traditional wisdom applies. When
understanding is high, simple substitution can occur between materials in applications
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with simple value chains. High understanding also facilitates technological development
to the point of mimicking other materials, so that entrant materials can be substituted into
complex value chains with minimal impact.
Mapping Insertion Strategies
Having established the conditions of insertion, and having examined their effects and
ways of mitigating the effects, it is possible to create an insertion strategy matrix. The
goal of this matrix is to identify the strategies that are likely to be most successful at
minimizing switching costs, and therefore insertion resistance, under different conditions.
The matrix is constructed by comparing the condition of value chain complexity faced by
a material to the condition of understanding of the material (by both producers and
application manufacturers). It is shown in figure 6.6.
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Figure 6.6: Insertion Strategy Matrix for materials
These strategies are designed to minimize switching costs for entrant materials, thus
maximizing their insertion potential. For any of these strategies to work, the entrant
material must meet two conditions. First, it must be technically compatible with the
application; if major technical barriers exist, they will prevent quick insertion no matter
how low the switching costs. Second, the material must offer a clear value proposition.
If a value proposition is not present, adoption would be an irrational act on the part of
application manufacturers, thus violating an underlying tenet of this analysis.
Each of these strategies will be briefly discussed, and will be illustrated with examples
from the commercialization of high density polyethylene and other materials.
Enablers
In situations where understanding of a material is very low, either by the materials
producer or by applications manufacturers in a market segment, enabler applications are
the quickest, least expensive points of insertion. If networks need to be built, markets
should be selected for enabler applications. Enablers have been discussed several times
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in this document, but their defining characteristics are worth repeating: enablers are
simple applications that let people do things they couldn't do before. They usually have
small markets, and are not simple improvements on existing ideas-they often create new
value networks.
Enablers have a different role than other types of applications. They generate knowledge,
credibility, and visibility--not large profits. Enablers are the best tools for validation
applications, and are crucial for creating a market kernel for future application
development.
Despite their importance in application development, enablers are counterintuitive
undertakings for materials producers because they generate small (if any) profits. These
profits are woefully insufficient to justify materials development investments. However,
a small shift in the mindset of materials producers can help overcome this problem. If
enablers are recognized for what they are-knowledge and market development
activities-then they will not be expected to generate huge returns. Identification and
placement of enabler applications should be the capstone activity of the research and
development phase for new materials. By doing this, the research group can identify
potential pitfalls in value chain activities and failure modes of the material, and build
credibility with markets. A more complete material can then be passed to marketing
organizations for launch into platform applications.
In order to quickly fulfill their goals of generating knowledge, market credibility, and
visibility, enabler applications must be carefully selected. If the following five criteria
are fulfilled, enabler applications are remarkably sound investments for materials
producers, even if they don't earn profits. First, enablers must be applications in which
the properties of a material offer unique value-users must be able to do something new.
Second, both the applications themselves and their corresponding value chains must be
simple, so that insertion factors are minimized. Third, enabler applications should
develop value chain capability. Fourth, enabler applications should be relatively fault-
tolerant. Otherwise, failure can be exorbitantly expensive or highly visible, and the
ability of the material to move into adjacent markets will be severely retarded. Finally,
they should be visible to adjacent, attractive markets. If enabler applications are not
visible to attractive markets, they cannot fulfill the role of application network creators,
and are a poor allocation of resources for materials producers. The only exception to this
rule is if an enabler application might generate important insights or value chain
capability that can't be gained otherwise.
One more important criteria of enabler applications should be mentioned: enablers must
be profitable for application manufacturers. Otherwise, they will not be attempted. This
criteria gives some insight into the type of application manufacturer that materials
producers might target as enabler customers. The application manufacturer must be
willing to undertake a low volume, high risk project and capable of making a profit at it.
This probably indicates a small manufacturer with a flexible cost structure. It may also
indicate a relatively new manufacturer, which is less protective of its reputation, has less
to lose in case of failure, and is hungry enough to take the risk.
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Several examples of enablers were given in chapter three, but the most famous example
is presented here: the hula hoop, enabler application for high density polyethylene
(HDPE). HDPE was the product of one of the most significant research efforts in the
history of plastics. Developed simultaneously by Phillips Petroleum and the German
chemist Dr. Karl Ziegler, HDPE was "spread eagled to the public with a fanfare that
would have done credit to a Mike Todd extravaganza"37 . It was hailed as a superior
version of conventional low density polyethylene-it offered greater stiffness, a higher
heat distortion point, and potentially lower cost38. Based on these properties, Phillips
committed $50 million to build the first large-scale production plant, and other
competitors followed suit39.
Phillips expected the material to sell itself, claiming that it was "a higher quality item and
molders (would) require less material because they (could) design for thinner walls"4 0.
However, the sales did not come as quickly as Phillips and other producers might have
hoped for two reasons. First, scaling the product from lab scale to mass production was
very difficult: "you had to have everything exactly right"41. Second, Phillips' prediction
that molders would have to redesign their products to fit HDPE was correct-both
molders and application manufacturers quickly learned "all over again that a new plastic
doesn't blossom overnight'42. Modern Plastics reported in early 1958 that the material
could not be "dumped into an old mold and produced forthwith"4 3. Furthermore, there
were problems with "creep, stress cracking, odor, catalyst removal, and many others"4 4.
Learning costs were high, potential liability costs were high, and existing value chains
could not handle the material. In fact, every early order that Phillips had received for
HDPE was cancelled4 5!
In late 1957, inventors Richard Knerr and Arthur "Spud" Merlin of the Wham-O
company began work on project that would become the white knight application for
HDPE: the hula hoop (see figure 6.7) 46,47,48.
Figure 6.7: Wham-O Hula Hoops and world champion hula hooper.
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The hula hoop fit all of the characteristics of an enabler application. It offered a very
unique value proposition and allowed people to do new things-it spurred a completely
new fad. There was also no other material that was suitable for the application. HDPE
was "just right for hoops. It ma(de) hoops that are not too flexible, not too rigid, and are
safe for children. Because it floats, it (wa)s just right when hoops are used for water
games" 9. HDPE hoops were also "handsome, two color products"5 0. Wood was
probably explored as an alternative, but would have been easily broken, could not be
machined quickly into hoops, and could not be colored s . Nylon also may have been
suitable, but was much more expensive than HDPE and was difficult to color.
The hula hoop was an extremely simple application: a standalone product made from a
tube of plastic, a wooden dowel, and two staples, with a simple value chain. It was made
by contract manufacturers, then sold by Wham-O to retailers, who sold it directly to
children for $1.98. No adjacent products had to be redesigned, very little assembly was
required, and no maintenance was needed. The hula hoop was also very fault tolerant: if
a $2 hoop broke, children could simply buy another one. In fact, the hoop was so fault
tolerant that application manufacturers would purchase warehouse loads of off-grade
material 52
It has been argued that the hula hoop was the most important fad of the 1950s53. Whether
this was true or not, it is clear that hula hoops gained wide visibility for HDPE--more
than 100 million hoops were sold in 1958! The fact that so many hoops were sold seems
to undermine the enabler characteristic of a small market, but Modern Plastics reported
that total 1958 requirements were 12-15 million lb. at a price of $.43/lb.-definitely not
enough to justify even Phillip's $50 million investment, let alone the investments of the
other producers' 4.
In addition to gaining visibility for HDPE, the most important benefits to HDPE
producers of the hula hoop were knowledge and capability development, both in
materials production and application value chains. Phillips reports that the hoop fad
allowed it develop its process so that it could minimize defects and create much more
consistent resin--"the kinks (were) ironed out"55 . Modern Plastics reported that "scores
of extruders had been educated in the use of high density polyethylene and were running
it on a routine basis"5 6. This was important, given the disenchantment that molders had
previously shown toward the material57 .
When the hula hoop craze had died down, Wham-O had earned $45 million, a substantial
sum for a small company58. While the HDPE producers had earned far less, the
knowledge and credibility gained by the hula hoop played a large part in allowing
producers to launch HDPE into its platform application: blow molded bottles.
Value Chain Integration
There are cases in which the technical properties of material make the possibility of
enabler applications impractical, or in which existing markets with complex value chains
are so compatible with the properties of a new material that they are irresistible to
producers. If a material is poorly understood by a producer or application manufacturers
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in a particular market, and that market is attractive enough to justify enormous capital
investment, then value chain integration is the more effective strategy for insertion of the
material.
Like enabler applications, value chain integration generates credibility and visbility.
Whether integration creates superior knowledge is questionable-choosing to integrate a
value chain locks a company into a product, and a high degree of specialized knowledge
is generated about that product. In contrast, a company can launch many enablers, and
can develop a much broader view of the properties of a material. However, it must be
noted that the two strategies do not have to be mutually exclusive; large materials
producers may have sufficient resources that they can undertake both strategies
simultaneously, thus generating both broad and deep knowledge about application value
chains and materials production.
In choosing to integrate a value chain, a materials producer is placing a bet on the
viability of its material in an application market. This bet is substantial, since integration
requires development or acquisition of new competencies and equipment. Because of
this, it is worthwhile to invest the resources necessary to understand the application
market before integrating, so that unanticipated obstacles can be minimized.
Perhaps the most popular example of forward integration in the plastics industry was
DuPont's introduction of nylon stockings in the late 1930s. The first nylon fiber was
developed by Carothers in 193559. The enabler application for nylon was Dr. West's
Miracle Tuft Toothbrush, but DuPont wanted to force widespread awareness of the
material with an application that was "something innovative, something distinctive,
something superior"60. The chosen application was as a tough, handsome replacement
for high end silk stockings. The silk stocking market was very attractive-worth $70
million, with each American woman buying eight pair/year61 . Nylon offered a clear
value proposition: it would be less expensive and much more resistant to runs than silk.
In order to introduce its fiber in stockings, DuPont had "to go beyond the state of the art
in several areas", and invested over $4 million developing processes in many "discrete
operations"6 2' 6 3. The company systematically sent teams of engineers to solve problems
in melt spinning, pretwisting, uptwisting, sizing, and spooling, so that it could produce a
yarn that would be compatible with existing technology at the decoupling point:
weaving64'65. Since DuPont's fiber was sold as a yam, weavers could drop it directly into
their machines, and were able to sell it through existing channels (see package infigure
6.8). The unmanaged nodes of the value chain were easily influenced and did not resist
change.
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Figure 6.8: Early nylon stocking package.
Nylon yarn earned handsome returns for DuPont. The entire research investment was
recouped in the first year of production, and nylon stockings owned 30% of the entire
stocking market within two years66 . More interesting for this analysis is the fact that
integrating forward allowed DuPont to establish a dominant platform application within
five years of the discovery of nylon.
It should be noted that there are also examples of backward integration, in which end
users provide the coordination necessary to force development of a new material. One of
the best examples of backward integration is the role of the US military in the
development of titanium alloys. Although the military could not acquire the necessary
nodes in the value chain, it kept very tight control and management of the titanium
development program.
The first commercially pure titanium was made in the United States by William Kroll in
194667. Titanium was a strong as steel, but 45% lighter, and was very corrosion resistant,
so it was promising in aircraft applications6 8 . The cold war pressures of the early 1950s
were driving extensive military development of aircraft, and titanium offered solutions to
many of the challenges that designers were facing. However, neither the material nor its
processing methods were well understood, so the United States formed the Metal
Advisory Board on Titanium, and gave full control of the project, including budget
authority, to Watertown Arsenal69.
Watertown systematically took control of the necessary nodes in the value chain by
carefully allocating its resources to suppliers that could build the capabilities needed by
the military. It not only granted contracts, but also monitored progress very tightly, and
controlled the flow of government funds in order to reach its goal of finding a viable
titanium alloy for aircraft use7 0 . The contracts granted ranged from alloy development to
casting process development to coating and extrusion development. The coordination
provided by Watertown facilitated communication, and allowed the contractors to
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overcome extraordinarily challenging technical obstacles (such as hydrogen
embrittlement that would cause titanium to flake in the hands of workers) while
developing sufficient production capacity to supply the needs of the military71 .
The end result of the Watertown project was the development of the most important
titanium aircraft alloy: Ti-6A1-4V. Furthermore, the Watertown project left a legacy of
profitable production capacity that has supplied the United States military and industrial
complex with titanium for nearly 50 years. Perhaps most interesting is the fact that the
first titanium applications were used in aircraft within seven years of Kroll's development
of pure, stable titanium72 . The coordination provided by Watertown Arsenal was as close
to backward integration as was possible by a government agency, and it significantly
improved the insertion time of titanium.
Simple Substitution
Simple substitution, in which materials are switched based on incremental price or
performance differences, is probably the most common strategy for insertion. It is the
strategy recommended by traditional materials marketing wisdom, and many tools, such
as cost models and utility analysis, have been built to facilitate it. It is most effective for
established materials, where properties are well known by both materials producers and
application manufacturers, and value chain elements are in place that can handle the
entrant materials.
The principles discussed here are applicable to simple substitution, and can be useful to
materials marketers when choosing target markets for established materials. Simple
substitution is most likely to result in quick insertion when value chain barriers are small,
a condition most likely in products with short value chains. This does not mean that
quick substitution cannot happen in products with complex value chains. It can happen,
and is most likely if the value chain is in a state of flux, such as at the time of a model
change.
Although simple substitution is easiest in applications with simple value chains, it is also
less defensible. A value chain that is amenable to quick substitution by one material is
most likely susceptible to quick substitution by another. While artificial switching costs
(contracts, etc.) can be constructed to prevent substitution, the safest position for a
material is to be the least expensive product that fits the exact demands of the
application-the lowest cost perfect match. This concept will be considered in more
detail in chapter seven.
Simple substitution can be much less simple than it appears. There are several examples
in the plastics world of in which seemingly simple substitutions went awry because of
incomplete understanding (or outright neglect of) the full set of requirements of the
application. The most famous is probably the substitution of polystyrene (PS) for other
materials in toys.
Because of its shininess, low cost, and ease of molding, PS seemed to be the perfect
material for inexpensive toys for baby boom children7 3. However, the producers of these
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toys seemed to have taken little care for quality-untoughened polystyrene was
extremely brittle, and many of these toys quickly failed. These failures had tremendous
reverberations for the polystyrene business (and for plastics in general). Toys contributed
to a general public perception of"cheap plastics", which would haunt the industry for
decades. Materials producers began trying to combat this perception as early as 1948
with certification programs to assure the public that some plastic applications were
soundly designed . Had the application manufacturers been more careful when
planning their substitution, it is likely that the reputation of plastics would have been
much better.
Mimic Existing Materials
There are many applications with complex value chains that are in steady state
production and rarely have model changes. Insertion of a different material into one of
these applications can be a formidable challenge, since the switching costs could be very
high. If the material is well-understood by both the producer and the application
manufacturer, then the best strategy to minimize switching costs is to find a way to mimic
the properties of the incumbent.
The mimic strategy is not easy to do, because it requires both a thorough understanding
of the application and a material that can be altered enough to fit in that chain. It must be
applied with extreme caution, because failed attempts at mimicking other materials can
be very damaging to the reputation of a material, and can delay its insertion into other
applications. In fact, some observers of materials commercialization believe that
misapplied mimics ("overpromises") are the most important factors in commercialization
delay . The most common problem with mimicking is premature (or even catastrophic)
failure of the mimicked application. This occurs because of an incomplete understanding
of both the entrant material and the design of the application into which it is placed. It is
much easier to match only the outward appearance of a material than to match the
complete set of design criteria that is being replaced.
The United States military learned the shortcomings of the mimicking strategy in World
War II. Shortly after the attacks at Pearl Harbor, "it was found necessary to restrict the
use of many metals required in defense industries", and plastics were required to assume
a new role as war materiel7 6. Applications were classified into two categories: those that
replaced metal, which was in short supply, and those that were based on the unique
properties of plastics7 7. The applications that were based on the unique properties of
plastics, and were originally designed as plastics parts met spectacular success. These
included both common applications, such as vinyl gas masks, phenolic mortar fuzes, and
acrylic airplane canopies and exotic applications, such as high temperature silicones in
motor windings and polyethylene wire coating in radar7 87 9,8° 81 .
In contrast to the success of the applications that were designed to be plastic, the mimic
applications often met complete failure. Modern Plastics lamented that "some of the
master planners in Washington thought that plastics would be a panacea for all materials
shortages", and "threw" jobs that used too much metal "into the lap of the plastics
industry" 82 . "The result of this muddle-headed policy was almost fatal to the industry.
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Plastics got a bad name", and decision makers who had seen these failures were
unwilling to use plastics even in applications that would benefit from them83. The
damage incurred "by one job poorly done counteract(ed) twenty jobs well done", driving
Modern Plastics and others to declare that "Rule No. 1 for the plastics industry in getting
more of its products used in materiel (was) to know the function of the parts to be
manufactured before it proceeds"84 .
Most of the successful examples of the mimic strategy occurred between relatively
similar materials, but still required extensive development of the material. These include
the replacement of LDPE by LLDPE/HDPE in trash bags, the replacement of HDPE by
PP in battery cases, and the replacement of PP by HDPE in appliance parts. Because the
mimic strategy is most applicable between established, understood materials, the value
proposition can be less compelling than in enablers or forward integration situations-it
can be a lowest cost perfect match situation. However, if a material is adopted based on
the mimic strategy, it remains open to attacks from displaced materials if those materials
drop in price or increase performance. Once a mimic entry has occurred, a more
defensible position can be created by incrementally altering application designs to take
advantage of any unique properties a material might have.
The invasion of ABS into the refrigerator liner market of the 1960s was a good
application of the mimic strategy, followed by design changes to employ the unique
properties of a material.
Refrigerator parts were arguably the platform application for polystyrene (PS), with the
first use of PS in refrigerators reported in 1940 . The shiny appearance, relatively good
resistance to food oils, and dimensional stability at low temperatures of PS made it a
natural fit for refrigerators, and it was used in many parts. The complex value chain of
appliance manufacturing helped lock in its use, and the advent of high impact PS (HIPS)
and thermoforming helped PS conquer the pinnacle of refrigerator parts, the inner door
liner, in 195686. HIPS dominated this market for several years, but while it was good for
this application, it was not perfect. In the late 1950s, consumers began to recognize that
HIPS was not resistant to butterfat, and was fairly brittle, even in refrigerator liner
gauges,87 . It was also difficult to thermoform, making it less attractive to application
manufacturers88 (see figure 6.9 for the shape of liners).
The industry also recognized that ABS would make a superior appliance part, since it was
more resistant to chemicals and significantly tougher, but did not adopt it because it cost
more than twice as much as HIPS . However, from the perspective of the refrigerator
door liner value chain, ABS effectively mimicked HIPS (both were modified styrene
resins). The thermoforming process was very forgiving, so price was really the only
barrier that prevented replacement. By 1963, the price of ABS had come down
significantly (because of volume achieved in auto instrument panels and by replacing
cellulose acetate in telephone handsets), and was within $.05/lb of HIPS9 0. At this point,
the price gap was low enough to allow substitution of ABS into higher-end refrigerators.
Since ABS mimicked HIPS, refrigerator manufacturers were able to profitably change
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materials based on a small price difference. This indicates that the mimic position of
ABS had been successful-switching costs were low.
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Figure 6.9: ABS refrigerator door liner.
Having finally entered the market, ABS struggled to achieve deep penetration because
refrigerator manufacturers could easily switch between it and HIPS. It position did not
become dominant until refrigerator manufacturers adopted a design that took advantage
of a unique property of ABS: its resistance to polyurethane, a new insulation that attacked
HIPS91. By 1969, ABS had "finally become the more accepted material for..
.refrigerator inner door liners". Because it was the lowest cost material that fit all the
needs of refrigerator materials, it held this position until the 1990s, when it again came
under attack by HIPS, which had been developed to mimic its chemical resistance and
toughness. The battle continues today.
While the mimic strategy is a viable option for attacking applications with complex value
chains, it should be attempted very judiciously. Materials and applications must be well
understood, and a strategy to create unique value is necessary for a mimic insertion to be
defensible in the long term.
Conclusion
It is the assertion of this thesis that materials producers can insert new materials into the
market much more quickly than they have in the past by wisely planning their entry
strategy. Switching costs are rational reasons for application manufacturers to resist
adoption of new materials, and materials producers must strive to minimize them.
Switching costs are conditional on the complexity of the value chain faced by a material
and on the degree of knowledge possessed by both materials producers and application
manufacturers about that material. The effects of each of the conditions can be
minimized if they are understood.
The versatility of materials is both a virtue and a curse for producers. It is a virtue
because producers can selectively choose the application markets into which a material
will be launched. It is a curse because the range of application markets can be very
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confusing. If the wrong applications or partners are chosen, the commercialization time
of a new material will be significantly extended.
Because materials can be used in many applications, applications can be strategically
selected to minimize switching costs. This selection seems most important early in the
lives of new materials, when enabler applications must be found to build credibility,
knowledge, and visibility. Enablers are counterintuitive-they are not designed to make
money, but rather to create a kernel for a network of applications that will generate the
profits that materials producers seek. Since they are counterintuitive, it is important that
producers organize to produce them. One way to do this is to make identification of
enablers the capstone activity of the research and development effort, so that more
complete materials can be handed to marketers.
Market selection is useful beyond the enabler stage. Given the same value proposition,
markets with lower switching costs will always be more willing to adopt a material.
However, these markets are also more susceptible to attack from competitive materials.
Not all markets have simple value chains, but there are still ways to reduce switching
costs. In these cases, materials producers can force quicker insertion by transferring
switching costs from application manufacturers to themselves. There are many ways to
do this, but the decoupling point of the value chain offers an excellent entry point. The
decoupling point is the node of the value chain at which a material can be inserted with
minimal further change.
Entry at the decoupling point can be technical or organizational. A technical entry
mimics the properties of existing materials so that the entrant is highly compatible with
all remaining elements of the chain. The mimic strategy can be easily misapplied if
insufficient understanding is possessed about either the material or the application, and
can result in fleeting competitive advantage unless moves are quickly made to take
advantage of the unique properties of a material. Organizational entry requires
acquisition or development of all the nodes ahead of the decoupling point. It provides
excellent coordination and knowledge development, and shifts the burden of risk
completely off of value chain elements. However, it is very expensive, and is therefore
practical only in very appealing application markets.
Resolution to the Pattern of Materials Commercialization
The concepts of switching costs and network development presented in this chapter add
significant resolution to the pattern of materials commercialization. Their contribution is
quite simple. The progression of the major plastics from enablers to platforms to
widespread substitution was a progression of knowledge, switching costs, and network
development. The early, poorly understood versions of all the plastics first found
applications with very low switching costs, in which they could build knowledge, gain
credibility, and become visible to adjacent application markets. They then captured one
of those markets-a large one-that had higher switching costs and higher visibility in
other markets. Using the cash, credibility, and visibility generated by this platform
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application, they were able to attack other major application markets, many of which had
significant switching costs. Conquering these markets ensured their long term viability.
Resolution to New Market Disruptions
The bulk of Christensen's work on disruptive technologies has focused on strategies to
help new entrants beat existing competitors. While this work has been beneficial and
insightful, most of it has been directed toward services and assembled products, both of
which can be changed quite easily to adapt to market needs. Christensen suggests that
disruption can come in two forms: new market disruption and low-end disruption92 . New
market disruptions are "so affordable to own and simpler to use that they enable a whole
new population of people to begin owning and using (a) product"93. The markets are
different enough from mainstream markets that mainstream competitors ignore them, but
the entrant products quickly improve and conquer the mainstream products. Low-end
disruptions are innovations that "take root at the low end of the mainstream market" and
then get better until they are superior to mainstream competitors94.
Launching new materials is quite different from both of the disruptive situations, but
gives resolution to the mechanism of new market disruptions. Both entry strategies of
disruptive technology model are designed to help innovators beat competitors. The
insertion challenge for new materials is not to beat competing materials-it is to beat
value chain obstacles. Materials are difficult to change compared to service operations or
assembled products, and it is rare that incumbent materials can match the exact properties
of entrants. Given the presence of a value proposition and the absence of technical
difficulties, new materials will be adopted if value chain obstacles are overcome.
Christensen has always suggested that innovators should launch their wares as simple
products that let people do new things, but the reason given was to avoid competitive
response from incumbents95 . The suggestions given in the present research are similar,
but for fundamentally different reasons. The strategies presented here are not designed to
minimize competitive response, they are designed to minimize switching costs, and
therefore value chain resistance.
Because this analysis arrives at similar recommendations for different reasons than
disruptive innovation theory, it provides insight into the mechanics of disruption.
Distilled of competitive pressures, materials insertion reveals that switching costs within
the value chain are minimized with simple, new products. Every product has a value
chain. Although few products face the degree of value chain challenge that new
materials do, it is likely that a portion of the success in disruptive technologies can be
attributed to the low value chain resistance that results from inherently low switching
costs in simple, new applications.
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Chapter 7: Lessons in Competition (Penetration Factors)
"Imagination is essential to visualize and to realize the potentialities of new materials-
to treat them on their own terms, to recognize, in a word, the autonomy of new media"
--Paul T. Frankl, 1930
Introduction
Chapter three has shown that for a material to become commercially important, it must be
inserted into many applications and must penetrate deeply into some of them. This
research has shown that the factors that lead to quick insertion are different from the
factors that lead to deep penetration of markets. The important limiting insertion factors
are technical deficiencies and value chain obstacles-but what are the penetration
factors?
Traditional materials marketing wisdom asserts that the two most important factors for
large growth of a material in a given market are technical applicability and low cost.
While the experience of the major plastics has shown that these factors don't necessarily
lead to quick insertion, they are clearly important for competition and overall penetration.
But they don't guarantee market success and certainly don't guarantee profitability,
particularly if taken at face value.
Insertion of materials is rarely a competitive game, unless technical challenges and
application value chains are considered competitors. Growth, on the other hand, is
competitive-particularly if an entrant material is attacking an existing market. While
the present research has focused on accelerating insertion of new materials into markets,
some insights into competition have been gained from the histories of the major plastics.
The versatility of materials creates tremendous pressure for them to become
commodities. However, the skills required for commodity competition are different from
those required for materials innovation, and price pressures can quickly force the two to
become mutually exclusive. The best model for sustained materials innovation will
sustain materials profits, as well. The histories of the biggest plastics show at least three
important lessons for profitable materials competition. First, technical compatibility
alone does not create a defensible position. The properties of a material must create a
unique value proposition for a material to be widely accepted. Second, value chain
elements can be formidable obstacles, but can also be manipulated into powerful
defensive tools. Third, the concept of lowest cost is deceiving-it only tells part of the
story. The safest (and most promising) competitive position is to be the lowest cost
material that fits the exact needs of an application market: the lowest common
denominator.
Each of these lessons will now be discussed.
Lesson 1: Advantage from Asymmetric Properties and Capabilities
The concept of asymmetric motivation is an important underlying tenet in the emerging
theory of disruptive innovation. It asserts that the tendency of incumbents to flee from
low-end innovations is both rational and logical. Existing businesses have a finite
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amount of resources, and must constantly choose how to allocate them. At any given
point, incumbents can choose to move upmarket (towards higher margin products) or
downmarket (toward lower margin products). However, this choice presents an
"asymmetric motivation": incumbents naturally want to gravitate toward providing
higher margin products to their best customers, and are motivated to allocate resources to
fulfill that goal. They are not motivated to defend low-end, low-margin markets or to try
to enter unattractive (meaning lower margin) new markets. In fact, they will often flee
from competition in those markets.
Disruptive innovation theory says that entrants can beat powerful incumbents by
deploying their innovations in such a way that it provokes incumbents to flee from
competition. This is accomplished by launching into markets that are at the low-end of
the existing product offering or by entering in low-margin markets that are foreign to
incumbents because they are so different from existing ones2 .
The theory also asserts that the converse is true: existing companies will always defend
themselves against overt attacks on attractive, high-margin markets, and will usually win.
When taken as a whole, plastics seem to have followed the theory of disruption. One
could say that they started out as shoddy materials that captured low-end markets such as
shower curtains, costume jewelry, and hula hoops and then progressed to become
important mainstays of construction, packaging, medicine, and transportation. However,
if one were to stop the description there (and some authors have), the rest of the story
would be missed . Asymmetric motivations may have been a factor, but asymmetric
properties and capabilities were at least as important. The early history of plastic pipe,
now the single largest application for plastics, reveals that a competitive position can be
created from the top down by offering a product that simply cannot be matched by the
properties of existing materials. Asymmetric properties can be as defensible as
asymmetric motivations.
Although it was used in prewar Europe, the use of plastic pipe did not begin in the United
States until the early 1940s, when polyvinylidene chloride (saran) was used as a liner in
steel pipes in industrial plants because of its chemical resistance4 . By 1950, Saran had
been joined by butyrate and polyethylene as a standalone pipe for use in highly corrosive
environments, such as soft-drink plants, caustic pharmaceutical plants, and breweriess.
While these were relatively small markets, they foreshadowed the attack of plastics on
one of the most profitable sectors of the pipe industry-corrosion resistant applications.
Replacement of corroded parts was big business in the 1950s just as it is now-damaged
underground pipes were estimated to exact a $600 million toll in 1952, according to the
National Bureau of Standards6 .
Almost every material will degrade under the right conditions, but certain plastics were
found to be much more resistant to corrosion than metals, and they began to selectively
replace metals in many high-value applications such as sour crude lines, pickle factories,
and wineries7 . They were valued for the exact same reasons as the specialty metals that
were previously used-corrosion resistance, burst pressures, and service endurance.
However, the properties of the plastics simply made them superior in endurance and
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corrosion resistance (and good enough in burst pressure); there was no way for metals to
match them. Figure 7.1 shows an ABS pipe and a stainless steel pipe that had been
placed in sulfuric acid demineralization for the same period of time8.
Figure 7.1: ABS vs. stainless steel in corrosion. ABS is shown on the left.
8,484,000 tons of steel and 1,964,000 tons of cast iron were used in pipes in 1952, and
only around 12,000 tons of plastic pipe were sold9. It is likely that most of the early
individual applications of plastics piping were too small to be noticed by metals
producers. However, the fact remained: plastic pipes were attacking the most attractive
pipe markets because of their superior properties. Plastics producers were earning very
attractive returns, since their products were priced higher than competitive metal
productsl °. It would be very difficult to call them low end disruptions-they were
moving from the top down. An argument could be made that pipe was the lowest end
product that metals producers made, but this too would be an error. The metals used in
the pipes that were being replaced were very high quality. They were expensive and
profitable. Any asymmetric motivation would derive from the size of the markets being
attacked.
It became clear to the plastics industry that acceptance in the largest markets could only
come if standards were established to maintain consistency in pipes, and it established the
Society of the Plastics Industry Thermoplastic Pipe Division in 1951 to begin the largest,
most overt, and most coordinated attack on an industry that plastics have ever
undertaken. The Thermoplastic Pipe Division funded research with established materials
testing organizations (who were in very close contact with the metals industry) to create
data on bursting pressures, acceptable wall thicknesses, gas and fluid permeation, and
health hazards ' 2. With the help of this new knowledge, plastic pipe makers cooperated
to create voluntary standards for their products.
The plastics industry sold over $60 million of pipe product into corrosion resistance
applications in 1961, equating to around 70 million lb of resin 3 . While this was a small
portion of the absolute pipe tonnage sold that year, it becomes significant when the
relative density of plastics is recognized-one pound of plastics makes approximately
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eight times as much pipe as a pound of steel. Furthermore, 60% of that total was used in
water distribution, a very important market for metal pipe. The oil field piping market
had been conquered, and plastics were beginning to see use in the drain, waste, vent
(DWV) market-the most important of all.
At this point, everyone could see "the writing on the wall": plastic pipes were growing,
and would continue to displace metals 4 . Processors and distributors of metal pipe
(including some subsidiaries of metals producers) had begun to sell plastic pipe.
Disruptive theory would predict that the metals producers would respond to this overt
threat to an important business. However, the direct competitive response by metals
producers was minimal (the indirect competitive response will be discussed in the next
section). In fact, the only direct response cited by Modern Plastics was a small amount
of pricing pressure. The properties of plastics simply could not be matched by metals,
and the capabilities required to make plastics were vastly different from those possessed
by metals manufacturers.
High-end corrosion resistant applications allowed plastic pipe to develop. The quality of
plastic pipe increased and prices dropped, creating an even more compelling value
proposition. This value proposition was very important as ABS plastic pipe entered use
in DWV applications. ABS had several appealing properties which could not be matched
by metal: not only was it inexpensive and resistant to chemicals, it was light weight,
tough, and could be preassembled at a factory for installation in the field. Between 1960
and 1970, ABS DWV was installed in 4 million homes15 .
PVC saw similar growth in water delivery, conduit, and even hot water applications. By
1970, PVC accounted for slightly more than half of the 692 million lb of plastics pipe
that was sold16 . At this point, plastics had achieved unqualified success in pipe by
replacing metals in almost every small diameter pipe market. This success still did not
provoke a direct response from metals producers-no metals producers were listed as
producers of the plastics used in pipes in 1970, and the technical shortcomings of metal
pipes remain even today 7.
The growth of plastic pipe has continued, and pipe is now one of the biggest outlets for
plastics, accounting for 7 billion lb of PVC, ABS, and HDPE in the United States in
199718. Steel pipe has been almost completely replaced for residential DWV
applications, and usage of HDPE municipal pipe is well ahead of cast iron, despite its
higher costs (though installed costs are lower in HDPE).
Although metal pipes are still used extensively, they have been replaced in many of the
most attractive markets by plastics. Plastics attacked high-end niche markets first,
conquered them, and used the skills learned in these markets to overtly attack mainstream
markets. They were more expensive than metals at first, and earned attractive profits.
Furthermore, they were initially valued for the same reasons that metals were. It was not
until entry into irrigation and DWV markets that lightweight, easy assembly, and low
cost of plastics became important penetration factors.
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Disruptive theory would predict that metals producers would have created a product to
counter the attack, or would have developed the capability to make the plastic
themselves. Yet they did not. Materials are not easy to change, and are confined to a
relatively small range of properties. The properties of plastics were (and still are)
superior to those metals for many piping applications, and no amount of research
performed by metals producers could change that fact. It can be said that the plastics had
asymmetric properties with respect to metals in these applications, giving them an
insurmountable competitive edge.
Pipe was not the only area in which plastics attacked and replaced metals. Plastics also
grew in auto parts (including auto bodies), construction, cans (packaging), aerospace, and
medical products-many of the most attractive metals markets 92 0' 2 l22. Furthermore, the
plastics industry grew much faster than the metals industry in the 1950s and 1960s, and
plastics were big enough that they could have provided the growth necessary to sustain
the trajectory of metals profits-they certainly sustained the profits of the oil and
chemical companies that invested in them.
Since the properties of metals could not match those of plastics, the most practical direct
response from metals producers would have been to make their own plastics. This did
not occur. The underlying reason is simple: the gap in capabilities between metals
production and plastics production was so large that metals companies would have been
unprofitable in plastics. Although they were both process industries, the competencies
required to make metals (mining, refining, smelting, rolling, etc.) were very different
from the competencies required to make plastics (chemistry, catalysis, etc.). Most of the
entrants in the plastics industry were companies with competencies in either basic
chemicals or petroleum-competencies which were easily transferable to plastics2 3.
These companies had an asymmetric advantage in capabilities, which would have made it
very difficult for metals companies to compete profitably.
While asymmetric motivations are powerful, competitive advantage can also be achieved
by materials in applications where they offer asymmetric properties--superior properties
that cannot be matched by existing materials. This advantage is sustainable if the
capabilities required to make the material are sufficiently different from those required
for incumbent materials.
Lesson 2: Value Chain Elements as Strategic Tools
From the account in the previous section, one might lead one to draw the false conclusion
that plastics faced no challenges in their conquest of pipe markets. Moving from
specialty corrosion resistance applications to mainstream plumbing applications was
wrought with challenge. Although plastic pipe saw little direct competition from metals
producers, it faced tremendous obstacles from the value chains of mainstream plumbing
applications. These obstacles were not serendipitous results of a new entrant-they were
deliberately placed by elements of the value chain that were threatened by the onset of
plastic pipe. These obstacles show the power of value chain elements as strategic tools.
Because of the damage that can be done by faulty plumbing pipes, the value chain for
pipe is highly interdependent. There was (and remains) no decoupling point at which no
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further change would be required to adopt a new type of pipe. Any new pipe would be
required to interconnect with other types of pipe at some point, and every node in the
chain would need to change in order for this to happen. However, pipe distributors were
a stable integration point-the nodes before the distributor could be completely different
for a new product, but the nodes after the distributor would need to adapt to it. A
simplified mainstream plumbing value chain, showing the relevant nodes, is shown in
figure 7.2.
Figure 7.2: Value chain of mainstream plumbing applications.
By the time it began its attack on mainstream markets, there were three main points in the
plastic pipe value proposition, all of which were appealing to municipalities, residences,
and businesses 24 :
1. Most plastic pipe was less expensive than metal pipe
2. Plastic pipe was more corrosion resistant than metal pipe, so it would last
longer and require less maintenance
3. Plastic pipe was much easier to install than metal pipe.
Inspection of the value chain shown above reveals that two nodes were extremely
threatened by the onset of plastic pipe. Metals producers and iron pipe casters came
before the integration point; they would be completely replaced by plastics producers and
extrusion houses if plastic pipe were adopted. Although they were on the right sie of the
intergration point, the threat to plumbers was similar. Plumbers were paid by the hour to
install and maintain pipe; simpler installations and more reliable pipe infrasturctures
meant fewer hours. Even worse, plumbers feared that piping might become so simple
that they would be replaced altogether by the common handyman2 5!
Although metals producers showed minimal competitive response at the nodes of the
value chain they directly controlled, they joined with plumbers to create a significant
indirect response through a node they did not control but could influence: building codes.
The Challenge: Building Codes, Trade Adoption
Plastics coveted entry in several mainstream plumbing markets. Water delivery and
drain, waste, vent (DWV) were the most desirable of these markets, but entry could only
be achieved if building codes were adapted to allow the entrant materials. Previous
corrosion resistant applications had not required code approval, since they were installed
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in controlled environments that were closely monitored such as irrigation channels, gas
pipes, and industrial factories. However, water delivery and DWV applications were not
monitored nearly as closely after installation; plastics pipe had to be shown to be very
reliable to be installed in them. In this case (as in all cases), national, state, and local
codes were the mechanism for ensuring that the standards of reliability had been met2 6.
Codes are official acknowledgements of fitness for use.
The stakes were very high on both sides for the approval of plastic pipe. If code approval
was given in error, it could result in heavy damages to the buildings that used the new
pipe. However, if approval was not given, use of plastic pipe would be constrained to the
same corrosion resistant applications it had already conquered. This result would be
damaging to consumers but very appealing to metals producers and plumbing unions.
While code approval would seem to be a scientific undertaking, it was highly political.
Approval boards were convened, and representatives were sent from both the plastics
industry (coordinated by the SPI Thermoplastic Pipe Division) and from the opposition-
plumbers unions and the Cast Iron Soil Pipe Institute, as well as other trade
associations2 7' 28. Plastic pipe was an entrant, so the plastics industry focused its efforts
on presenting defensible scientific knowledge, including case studies and test results2 9.
While the most flattering data was obviously presented, it was very difficult to overcome
the propaganda that had been prepared by opposition. Since ABS was the most pressing
threat in DWV applications, it was portrayed as "a defective material" that "constitutes a
danger to health and life". There were seven specific charges presented at an FHA
hearing in 1966, each of which (if true) could have been a major deterrent to adoption3 0:
1. ABS pipe will bum
2. ABS pipe sets off lethal quantities of hydrogen cyanide gas when burning
3. Rats can bite through it
4. Solvents used to join ABS can explode upon jarring
5. Chemicals will eat through it
6. Human waste can bum through it
7. It doesn't have durability
While there was an element of truth to the charges on flammability and toxicity, they
were not health threats. The other claims were patently false.
The opposition also performed false testing in order to influence the outcome of code
decisions. One incident was reported in which a test was conducted at the Local No. l's
(journeymen plumbers) Apprentice Training School in Brooklyn to prevent the New
York City code board from approving ABS-DWV pipe. The results of the test (which
was "rigged, and did not provide an even remotely accurate simulation of actual
installation", according to an ABS representative) caused a review of the code and
significant delay in approval31.
The offensive by plumbers and metals producers stands as a brilliant example of using
the value chain as a strategic tool. The adoption of plastic pipe was clearly hindered.
Code approvals came very slowly: the first approvals (for ABS in DWV) were in place
by 1962, and the final code battle ended in 1992 (for CPVC in hot water applications in
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California) 32,33. This allowed the metals industry and plumbers to maintain the status
quo, generating profits for them that would otherwise have been taken by plastics.
There is evidence that the plastics manufacturers learned a great deal from this attack. At
the time of this writing, the PVC industry is using code propaganda to defend itself
against entrants in wire coating markets3 4 .
The Solution (part 1): Standards and Design
The code offensive placed by unions and cast iron producers delayed the acceptance of
plastics, but did not stop it. The acceptance was not a natural outgrowth of the simple
superiority of plastic pipe-it was the result of strategic action and concerted
perseverance.
The establishment of voluntary standards was probably the single most important action
taken by the plastics industry--the importance of the role of the Thermoplastic Pipe
Division of the Society of the Plastics Industry (discussed in the previous section) is hard
to understate. In addition to coordinating research activities, the Pipe Division created
design standards which would guarantee quality, consistency, and interchangeability of
plastic pipes. Since the properties of plastics were quite foreign to both end users and
value chain nodes, growth could not occur unless shoddy, nonstandard pipes were
eliminated. All standards created by the Pipe Division were strictly voluntary, but
producers understood the need and followed them. Voluntary cooperation brought
success: in its first 10 years, the Pipe Division had established eight standards with the
National Bureau of Standards, seven testing standards with ASTM, and six military
standards3 5. These standards covered ABS, PVC, polyethylene, and butyrate pipe-all of
the commercially important varieties.
Standards were particularly important with plastic pipe because plastic required new
joining techniques. Early plastic pipe papers revealed many methods of joining plastics,
including threading with conventional threads, clamp-on joints, and even TIG
welding 37. These processes were carryovers from metal joining processes, and were
not suitable for plastics. None are widely used today; plastics are generally joined with
solvent adhesives and fittings, which work without tight tolerances on the composition
and size of the pipes.
If standards had not been established early in the commercial life of plastic pipe, its
invasion of mainstream markets would have been severely stymied. As stated in Modern
Plastics in 1962, "without acceptable voluntary standards, there could be no workable
engineering specifications; without engineering specifications, there could be no code
approvals by the various regulatory agencies; and without any of these, marketing would
be reduced to a dangerous hit and miss basis"3 8. The establishment of standards also
allowed research to be done in a controlled manner, so that performance guarantees could
be established. In short, standards allowed the plastics industry to present hard data to
refute propaganda.
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The Solution (part 2): Building a Track Record
The track record established by plastic pipe in applications that were not covered by
codes also played an important role in persuading code committees of its fitness for use.
The corrosion resistance applications mentioned in the previous section provided a great
deal of this data, but corrosion resistance applications were usually tightly controlled, so
they were not directly applicable. The most convincing data was supplied by the use of
ABS in mobile homes.
ABS piping was first used in mobile homes in 195739. It offered particular appeal to
mobile home manufacturers because it could be preassembled into "trees" offsite,
allowing plumbing systems to be installed in much less time (see figure 7.3). It was also
light in weight, a major consideration with mobile homes. By 1965, it was used in 95%
of all mobile homes and trailers (a 100,000 unit/ year market)40 . Because mobile homes
were often transported between climates and were subjected to harsh shaking and bumps
during transportation, the toughness and fitness for use of ABS was thoroughly proven.
The experience of ABS in mobile homes was cited as a key factor for the inclusion of
ABS in DWV applications in the Basic Building Code and Abridged Building Code in
1964. This was an important inclusion--it was a national code and facilitated inclusion
in many local codes41 . Over the next 10 years, ABS was included as a DWV material in
most building codes. While mobile homes are still a market for ABS today, their biggest
contribution was in gaining credibility for other markets4 2.
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Codes are not the only node of the value chain that can be manipulated. In the case of
plastic pipe, they were a bottleneck in the value chain through which all growth had to
pass, so they were natural candidates for manipulation. There are other examples of
similar manipulation through government lobbying (PAN in soda bottles4 3), public
awareness campaigns (PVC in packaging4 4), and distribution channels (HDPE in
beverage bottle holders45). The stories all yield the same message: value chain elements
can be important strategic tools. They can be used to quash new entrants or to facilitate
entry into difficult markets. No matter what the end goal, value chains should always be
considered in materials competition.
Lesson 3: The Lowest Cost Perfect Match
The growth of plastics has been marked by spectacular new applications and dramatic
replacements of incumbent materials in existing applications. However, there are also
examples of very slow replacement of incumbent materials, and of complete
misapplications of plastics. All of the biggest, most enduring applications of plastics
share a common trait: they are the least expensive materials whose properties coincide
with all of the requirements of a material. They can be called the lowest cost perfect
match for their respective applications.
For this argument to proceed, the concept of lowest cost perfect match must be clearly
defined. Lowest cost perfect matches are the least expensive materials that meet the
exact needs of an application-their properties correspond perfectly to the application
requirements. In the parlance of multiattribute utility analysis, the marginal benefit for
additional property features is much lower than the marginal penalty for increased cost.
Likewise, the marginal penalty for removal of features is much greater than the maginal
benefit for reduced cost 6 . As such, the lowest cost perfect match concept does not
include the lowest cost material that almost meets the needs of an application, nor does it
include the least expensive material that exceeds the needs of an application. There are
many applications that are either underserved or overserved by their materials, and
incumbent materials in these applications are subject to attack. Being the lowest cost
perfect match is the safest position for a material.
Although being a lowest cost perfect match is the safest competitive position for a
material in an application, its safety is not absolute. Lowest cost perfect matches are in a
quasi-equilibrium state, which is generally stable but can be upset by shifts in technology
or consumer tastes. These shifts can come in the form of lower cost materials or
processes that offer equivalent properties along important dimensions, or as changes in
the requirements of the application. Retaining the position of lowest cost perfect match
requires constant vigilance.
A material that has not achieved lowest cost perfect match status is a stopgap, which fills
some of the needs of an application until a better material is found. When the properties
of incumbent materials are at disequilibrium with the requirements of applications, a
tremendous opportunity exists for competitors. If competitors can match the incumbent's
properties at a lower cost, they offer a compelling value proposition. If they exactly
match their material to the requirements of the application at a similar cost, they also
offer a compelling value proposition.
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If a material is a lowest cost perfect match in an application and the needs of an
application are met, its position can be taken only by a lower cost material that offers the
same properties. The cost must be coupled to properties-a lower cost material that
requires application compromises will not be adopted (unless the application itself
exceeds the needs of its customers4 7).
Another important implication of the lowest cost perfect match concept is the fact that,
since price and properties are coupled, incumbents can be attacked from the top or
bottom. Inherently lower cost materials (per in3 or per lb) can attack incumbents if their
properties are improved to offer similar properties at lower cost. Inherently higher cost
materials can also attack. If they offer superior properties to incumbents, it may be
possible to reduce the amount of material necessary to meet the needs of an application,
effectively offering lower cost. Since different materials require different processing
techniques, the material cost in an application often includes processing charges. For this
reason, improvements in processing techniques can also create opportunities for both
lower and higher cost materials to upset incumbents.
Because the lowest cost perfect match concept is described so well in terms of marginal
utility, the principles of multiattribute utility analysis are very well suited to identifying
opportunities for attack. By identifying applications in which a lowest cost perfect match
has not been found, substitution opportunities can be recognized. This tool has been
widely applied in identifying substitution opportunities by comparing the multiattribute
utility of two materials for an application48 . In this type of comparison application,
the tool is most valuable if both materials are well-established. However, if the tool is
simply used for identification of applications in which lowest cost perfect matches have
not been met, it is not required to compare two materials. Instead, it could be used to find
the necessary properties that an attacker would need.
An examination of some of the major applications of ABS chronicles a sustained pursuit
of the lowest cost perfect match.
ABS in Pipe
The entry of ABS in pipe has already been discussed. ABS pipes were (and remain) a
perfect fit in mobile homes-they were lightweight, tough, climate resistant, corrosion
resistant, and could be pre-assembled. They also became the least expensive way to
plumb mobile homes, and have held that market since the 1950s. They are the dominant
DWV pipe in mobile homes today 1.
The story in fixed foundation residential DWV applications is different. Despite its early
entry in fixed residential DWV, ABS has been displaced by PVC pipe. The toughness of
ABS is less important in houses that don't move-it overserves the needs of fixed
foundation residential applications. On the other hand, PVC can match the corrosion
resistance, ease of use, and lightweight of ABS-the important dimensions for fixed
foundation applications-without matching its toughness. PVC is also priced 20-30%
lower than ABS52. Since its properties are perfectly coupled with the requirements of the
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application, and since it is priced much lower than ABS, PVC is the lowest cost perfect
match in fixed foundation DWV applications.
PVC is, by far, the most prolific DWV material53. More than 50 times more PVC pipe
was sold in 2001 than ABS pipe5
ABS in Automobiles
ABS was the dominant plastic in automobiles from the early 1960s through the mid
1990s. The earliest use of ABS in autos was as interior trim, where it was selected over
stamped metal because ABS trim pieces were "not marred by frequent foot
scuffing.. .comfortable to the touch in either hot or cold weather... (and had) a desirable
sound deadening quality"55. These properties could not be matched by metal, and ABS
offered the further advantage of cosmetic quality that "would have been impossible to
duplicate in metal without costly fabricating and finishing operations". ABS was more
expensive than steel on a volume basis, but was less expensive overall because of its
cosmetic properties. The properties of ABS were able to perfectly match the
requirements of auto interiors at a lower cost than other alternatives, so ABS was the
lowest cost perfect match in auto interiors.
ABS' dominant position in auto interiors was retained until the mid 1990s, when it began
to succumb to a concerted attack from PP. PP had improved to the point where its
properties could match ABS in the most important dimensions, but it was considerably
less expensive56 . Because its properties matched the needs of automotive parts at a lower
cost than ABS, PP became the lowest cost perfect match, and has been capturing the
associated spoils: European auto makers used nearly three times as much PP as ABS in
the 2000 model year 7.
ABS in Refrigerators
The attack of ABS on HIPS was recounted in chapter six as an example of the mimic
strategy, but deserves treatment here as an example of lowest cost perfect match
domination. Despite repeated attempts by ABS to enter the refrigerator market, it was
unsuccessful until a technological advancement ushered it in. Consumer demand for
more energy efficient and smaller sized refrigerators led to the use of polyurethane as
insulation, instantly matching the properties of ABS to the application. HIPS had been
used as a refrigerator liner, but was dissolved by polyurethane precursors. ABS was
resistant to these precursors, and was adopted because it became the least expensive
material that matched the necessary properties58 . ABS gained and maintained its
dominant position until the mid 1990s, when new formulations of HIPS and PVC offered
the same properties at lower cost, and began to capture some of the market5 9.
Other ABS Examples
There are many other examples of ABS displacing other materials or being displaced, due
mostly to changes in lowest cost perfect match positions. Higher performance
engineering thermoplastics such as polycarbonate (PC) and polyphenylene oxide (PPO)
began to dominate the power tool housing market in the early 1960s because they were
tougher, lighter, and more colorable than the metals they replaced60 . Fire resistant grades
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of ABS attacked this market in the late 1980s and early 1990s, but were quickly found to
lack the strength properties necessary to compete. However, it was found that material
costs could be significantly reduced by substituting ABS for part of the higher
performance resins, creating an ABS blend61 . The most popular of these blends was PC-
ABS, which displaced straight PC in many applications (including power tools) by
offering lower costs with very similar properties6 2.
When 3.5" floppy discs and video tapes were introduced, ABS was selected as the
material of choice because of its strength, toughness, and the moldability. It was the
lowest cost material that met all of the needs of those markets63. However, both markets
were very attractive to other materials, since they were growing and consumed a
significant amount of material. High impact PS grades were introduced in 1990 which
were able to match the properties of ABS at lower cost and were drop-in replacements.
The new HIPS grades became the lowest cost perfect matches, and dominated both
markets by 199464,65
Conclusion
When faced with a difficult design question, skilled engineers seek to understand unique
properties of the problem that might facilitate a solution. Once initial insertion is
achieved, competition in materials can be approached the same way. Winning a
dominant position in an application is not a trivial pursuit-it requires sustained effort
and strategic action. Advantage is best gained by understanding the unique properties of
materials, applications, and value chains.
Because materials are difficult to change and have limited ranges of properties,
competitive advantage can be gained by introducing materials into applications where
their unique properties are asymmetric to existing materials: they are superior and cannot
be matched. This is especially effective if the new materials require completely different
manufacturing capabilities than incumbents.
Traditional wisdom suggests that entrant materials may find these types of applications
by seeking materials with similar (but worse) properties and then trying to take their
markets6 6. This is sometimes a practical approach, but is generally foolish. The question
is better approached from the other end-by seeking applications that might benefit from
superior properties and then trying to fill their needs. By doing this, a materials producer
recognizes that the value proposition of materials is visible only in the context of an
application. Materials are components of the applications in which they dwell, and offer
little use otherwise.
The lowest cost perfect match concept presents another problem to the approach of
copying existing materials: the bar is too high. In a lowest cost perfect match situation,
the properties of a material are perfectly matched to the requirements of an application.
This is a safe position for incumbents because materials in the lowest cost perfect match
situation are only overthrown by lower priced materials with the same properties or by
shifts in the needs of their application. Superior properties of an entrant material do not
gain competitive advantage over an incumbent lowest cost perfect match unless those
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properties can be deployed to reduce costs. While the cost reduction strategy can be
appealing, it inevitably reduces margins and can lead to a downward spiral.
A superior value position can be found if applications are selected in which needs are
overserved, underserved, or unserved. These applications can take advantage of the
unique value provided by the new material. And if an application can benefit from the
unique value offered by a material, it is unlikely that it is being served by a similar
material. In the early stages of commercialization, it is better to dodge applications that
are served by similar materials (because the similar materials may be in the lowest cost
perfect match position), and to focus instead on identifying applications that can take
advantage of unique properties.
Applications in the platform and enabler phase of materials commercialization tend to
follow the model of offering a unique value proposition. Markets that value a unique
material property are more likely to earn healthy profits. While there are individual
companies (such as GE Plastics, DuPont, and Eastman Chemical) that have followed a
strategy of targeting only applications that value unique properties, there are few
important material families that have done this. Most of the biggest markets already
exist, and must be attacked.
When the biggest markets are attacked, the lowest cost perfect match concept becomes
very important. Materials do not win simply because they are less expensive than other
materials. They win because they are less expensive and meet the exact needs of the
application. Incumbents must be vigilant to maintain their positions, because lower cost
materials can attack with improved properties, and higher cost materials can attack by de-
spec-ing (removing features) or by reducing the amount of material necessary for a job.
There may be situations in which materials find that they are no longer in the lowest cost
perfect match position but still desire to retain a market. In these situations, value chain
manipulation can be employed to strategically increase artificial costs for entrants. Value
chain obstacles can become formidable competitive tools when properly employed-they
are the major source of switching costs!
Resolution to the Insertion Strategy Map
There are two major differences between new materials and established materials. The
first difference is the degree of understanding possessed by materials producers and
application manufacturers. The second difference is the installed base of complimentary
assets to the material. If complimentary assets are assumed to be part of value chain
complexity (a reasonable assumption, since complexity increases if complimentary assets
must be developed), then the important factor in insertion strategy is knowledge. New
materials have a low degree of understanding, while understanding is higher in
established materials.
The basis of competition for new materials should be the unique properties that they
offer, because unique properties create compelling value propositions to the applications
that need them. Adoption based on truly unique properties actually facilitates the
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creation of a lowest cost perfect match position, because unique properties cannot, by
definition, be duplicated.
Ideally, established materials would also compete on the basis of unique properties, but
this type of competition does not always facilitate the type of growth necessary for high
volume materials and is undermined by the general versatility of materials. Because of
this, the lowest cost perfect match position is the basis for the majority of competition
among established materials.
When these facts are recognized, it is possible to overlay them onto the insertion strategy
map, adding resolution to the type of value proposition that is most appropriate for each
insertion strategy. The end product is shown in figure 7.4:
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Figure 7.4: Insertion strategy map with added resolution of appropriate value proposition.
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Chapter 8: Walking Through the Shadow of the Valley of
Death
Introduction
Through this point, this thesis has focused on materials commercialization from the
viewpoint of materials producers. It has exposed the most important challenges of
commercializing new materials, and has shown some powerful tools to manage those
challenges. The most important tool is market selection, by which materials producers
can avoid technical and value chain barriers. When these barriers cannot be avoided,
other strategies such as forward integration, mimicking, and simple substitution can be
employed. The goal of all of the insertion strategies presented here is to minimize the
switching costs faced by application manufacturers who are potential adopters of a
material.
The commercialization path of all of the major plastics began with enabler applications,
which had simple value chains, solved new problems, and let customers and
manufacturers do new things. The markets for enabler applications were generally small,
but they performed the crucial tasks of generating capability, credibility, and visibility.
Capability was created among the materials producers and processors to achieve the
quality necessary for mainstream applications. As failure mechanisms were discovered
and track records established, credibility was built to reassure applications manufacturers
of fitness for use. Consumers and application manufacturers alike were also made aware
of the new materials, giving them the visibility necessary to succeed.
Despite the crucial role that was played by enablers in the many of the most successful
materials, launching enablers remains a counterintuitive move to most materials
businesses. This is because most enabler applications are too small to generate the profits
necessary to justify the investments made in materials development. However, history
shows that enablers are the fastest path to profitability, and are the bridge that moves a
material from development to commercialization.
The implications of the findings of this research extend beyond private enterprise into the
domain of United States public policy. There is a high rate of development failure with
government sponsored research- the research lab creates promising materials that fail to
achieve commercialization. In fact, the failure rate is so high that the transition period
between emergence of government research from the lab and commercialization has been
named "the valley of death"'. This chapter will show that by encouraging the early
development of enabler applications, governments can largely sidestep the valley of
death. This will improve the commercialization potential of basic materials research,
thus earning a more effective return on public investment.
In order to build a case for the development of enabler applications from basic materials
research, the role of the United States government in materials development will be
discussed, with a special focus on the causes of the valley of death. This discussion will
be followed by three specific policy suggestions to increase development of enablers:
1) Focus current commercialization programs on enabler applications
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2) Create a materials clearing house to connect buyers and sellers
3) Establish a market for materials ideas
Each of these policies will be presented in the context of potential effectiveness, cost
efficiency, and benefit allocation.
Government, Materials, and the Valley of Death
There are three phases through which new technologies (including materials) must pass
before achieving commercialization. First, basic research must be performed to establish
the underlying ideas, theories, and principles of the technology. Basic research is
primarily a knowledge generation activity. Because of this, it may or may not produce
results that are useful, and it is performed on a very long timeframe--sometimes
spanning decades. Both of these factors make it a very risky undertaking in the private
sector 2 3 .
If basic research meets technical objectives, it can pass to the second phase: applied
research. Applied research is a mid-term activity in which basic research is developed
into technology that can be used to solve specific problems. Applied research rarely
yields end products and is also quite expensive. The general timeframe from applied
research to profitability is 3-6 years, which is shorter than the timeframe of basic
research, but often still too long for the private sector4.
The third pre-commercial phase is product development, which is the realm of private
enterprise. In this phase, companies transform applied research into useful products that
generate profits. The general timeframe from this activity is <3 years, making it
attractive for private investment.
The valley of death concept was coined to describe the most common phase of failure:
applied research. The applicability of applied research is often too narrow to be
interesting to the government and the timeframe to commercialization is often too long to
be interesting to private enterprise5 . This leaves promising basic research without
interest, and allows it fade into oblivion.
In addition to the normal roles that government plays in facilitating commerce (patents,
tariffs, interstate regulation, etc.), it plays at least three important direct roles in the
development and commercialization of materials technology. Each of these roles affects
the valley of death.
Government Funds Research
The most obvious role of the US government in materials development is the funding of
research. In 2001, the federal government committed $44.7 billion to research activities,
including over $1 billion for materials research6. Research funding is justified because of
its potential impact-research is the basis of technological advancements which can
elevate societies.
Federal research is divided into basic and applied research, with a fairly even split
between the two. In 2001, $1.08 billion in federal funds were spent on materials
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research, with 56% going to basic research7 . This accounted for the vast majority of US
basic research in materials8 .
Because it is a steward of taxpayer funds, the government exercises its right to set
research criteria, and in so doing effectively establishes the direction of the bulk of basic
research that is performed at a given time. For the purposes of commercialization, the
direction set by government funding is at least as important as the actual funding.
Congressional reports and commentators on the state of US research tend to blame the
balance of research and development for the valley of death phenomenon, saying that
failure to cross from basic research to commercialization is due to a lack of development
funds9. However, federal budget data show otherwise. In addition to spending nearly
half of the total government research budget on applied research in 2001, $35 billion was
spent on development programs, comprising "design, development, and improvement of
prototypes and new processes to meet specific requirements"10° . Thus, 73.8% of the total
federal R&D budget of $84 billion was spent on applied research and development.
Although detailed figures for the development of materials are not available, the
proportions are likely similar.
It is difficult to believe that the valley of death is caused by lack of federal funding. A
more plausible explanation is that the that the technology being developed is so
specialized that it offers little use to commercial markets, or that it is so complex and
expensive that it would be prohibitively difficult to commercialize.
Government Provides Coordination and Marketsfor Strategic New Materials
Some of the funding agencies of basic research such as the Department of Defense, the
Department of Energy, and NASA are also consumers of advanced technology. All have
branches with similar missions: to ensure that their constituents have the best technology
available for solving problems. This mandate extends to materials.
The development budget mentioned in the section above is used to fund these
technologies. However, funding is only part of the equation. By funding various
programs with specific goals, government agencies effectively coordinate development of
knowledge technology, and processes so that the technology (including materials) can be
used more quickly. The example of titanium presented in chapter six shows the degree of
coordination that is possible in times of national need.
Government coordination can engulf both research and development. There are at least
two current examples of this situation: nanotechnology and hydrogen infrastructure. The
Executive Office of the President is providing a high degree of coordination to
nanotechnology research through its National Nanotechnology Initiative, which "offers
great promise broadly across many scientific fields and most sectors of the economy" '' .
The Hydrogen Fuel Initiative is focused on developing the technologies and
infrastructure necessary to meet the country's fuel needs as oil and gas supplies dwindle.
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By coordinating research and applications activities, government is able to accelerate the
pace of technical development, and can accelerate the implementation of new technology
in government programs. However, coordination of development does not necessarily
equate to faster creation of"spillover" effects, by which society as a whole is improved.
The most effective path to spillovers is the most effective diffusion technology diffusion
mechanism: commercialization.
This is not to say that the materials that are developed under coordinated programs do not
find niche markets-they often do. The agencies that fund and coordinate technology
development also act as markets for exotic advanced materials once they are created.
The marginal benefit for exotic materials is higher in weapons, energy systems, and
spacecraft than in most other sectors, and the government agencies are willing to pay
premium prices for those materials. The presence of this market creates pull for
commercialization of nascent but promising materials, and forces producers to learn
about interactions and failure mechanisms of those materials.
While government use of exotic materials creates incentives for technology development,
technologies are often highly specialized and have limited commercial applicability.
Furthermore, exotic government applications offer limited visibility to potential
customers. These and other factors create incentives for producers of exotic materials to
attempt to launch them into highly complex and exotic commercial applications akin to
the government applications.
Exotic commercial applications (such as satellite antennae for carbon fiber, turbine blades
for AlSiC, or supercomputer coolers for linear metallic foam) are generally highly
complex and offer little visibility to mainstream markets. Furthermore, they carry
extreme performance requirements, extending the transition time from government
applications to commercialization.
Moving from exotic government applications to exotic civilian applications seems to a
natural path, and is the traditional model for technology transfer. Companies plan to
enter the most profitable top end of the market and then climb down into mainstream
markets. While the prospect of cherry picking the best markets sounds compelling, this
path is destined for failure with new materials unless the commercializing company has
very large reserves of cash. Value chain obstacles and technical deficiencies inevitably
appear, and require time, money, and effort to overcome.
In fact, the traditional model for technology transfer is a contributor to the valley of
death. The most successful materials transitions from exotic government applications
into civilian use have come through much simpler applications. Examples include glass
fiber reinforced composites (civilian use: pleasure boats), polyethylene (civilian use:
Tupperware), carbon fiber composites (civilian use: sporting goods), and teflon (civilian
use: pot coating).
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Government Shares Risk
In recognition that the commercial market is the most effective mechanism for the
diffusion of technology, the US government has developed programs to share the risk of
development of promising technologies with private companies. The most popular of
these programs are the Advanced Technology Program (ATP), funded through the
National Institute of Standards and Technology, and the Small Business Innovation
Research Program (SBIR), funded through several agencies.
The mission of ATP is "to accelerate the development of innovative technologies for
broad national benefit through partnerships with the private sector"12. It has provided
$447 million of co-funding with the materials industry since its inception in 1990, and is
a true risk-share program: participants must pay 60% of the total project cost. In keeping
with the goals of government research funding, participants are selected based on
scientific merit and "broad-based economic benefits"' . Because the ATP has been a
lightning rod for political criticism (as corporate welfare), it is focused only on mid-term
technology development which would be too risky for private enterprise to carry alone.
ATP does not fund basic research or end product development14 . Although ATP grants
are ostensibly biased toward small business, the cost share requirement keeps most
entrepreneurs out.
The SBIR program does not require cost sharing-it is designed to lift risk from small
businesses, with the goal of harnessing the "entrepreneurial spirit" to develop products to
meet specific national needs. SBIR grants generally have a shorter timeframe than ATP,
are administered by 10 federal agencies, require no cost sharing, and are limited to
companies with fewer than 500 employees. SBIR grants are executed in two phases.
Phase 1 is a pure research stage, in which up to $100,000 may be granted. If Phase I
shows potential, Phase II technology development grants are available for up to
$750,00015. Phase II award winners can develop technology into marketable products.
In 1994, an outgrowth of SBIR was created called the Small Business Technology
Transfer Program (STTR). STTR is similar to SBIR in structure, but has a slightly
different mission. It is designed to draw small businesses and universities together to
commercialize federally funded research. The SBIR and STTR programs have
substantial grant authority--$1.3 billion in 200216.
Both the ATP and SBIR programs were designed to share the risk of developing new
technologies and both seem very well suited to development of new materials. They
appear to reduce the valley of death by encouraging commercialization. However, a
quick survey of 1998 SBIR recipients shows that the materials technologies that are
funded target highly complex applications. Titles of 1998 SBIR grants include
"Synthesis of Negative Birefringence Liquid Crystals", "Fabrication of ZrC, HfC, TaC-
based Firbous Monolithic Ceramics for Rocket Propulsion Systems", and "Improved
Performance Double Heterostructure InGaP Heterojunction Bipolar Transistors" 7 .
While not all materials grants were targeted at such complex applications (liquid crystal
displays, rocket motors, and wireless microwave amplifiers18 ), these titles are
representative of the group. The current research would predict that these materials
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developed under these contracts will find their way to the valley of death, particularly if
executed by small companies that lack resources to overcome inevitable value chain
obstacles.
The Case for Enablers in Materials Policy
If the goal of government funding of materials research and development is to elevate the
economy and the state of society as a whole, then the valley of death must be overcome.
Commercial markets have proven to be the best path to widespread diffusion of materials
technologies, and government can gain greater return on its materials research investment
by improving the chances that materials succeed in commercialization.
While government has been criticized for overinvesting in basic research but leaving
applied research and development destitute, the data show otherwise. The applied
research and development budgets are much larger than the basic research budgets. It
appears that the valley of death has deep causes which cannot be overcome by simply
throwing money at them; the fundamental problem with the valley of death is not lack of
development funds.
The current research suggests that the traditional technology transfer model is a cause of
the valley of death. At its core, the traditional technology transfer model seeks to move
complex technology from complex government applications into complex commercial
applications. While this natural, logical path may work for some types of technologies, it
is destined for failure with new materials. The pattern of commercialization of the major
plastics shows a progression from simple, new applications to complex, existing ones.
This progression is supported by value chain theory which explains that application
manufacturers (adopters of new materials) have very strong disincentives to switch to
new materials. These disincentives stem from value chain obstacles, existing product
redesigns, and risk, and are therefore scale with the complexity of an application. In the
best cases, manufacturers of complex applications will adopt new materials slowly, while
in the worst cases, they won't adopt them at all. Slow adoption of new materials can be a
sentence to the valley of death.
The commercialization of plastics showed that value chain obstacles and technical
deficiencies can be sidestepped by choosing the right applications: simple ones, with few
parts and short value chains. These simple applications were able to take advantage of
some of the unique properties offered by the plastics, but also allowed material
complexity could be decoupled from application complexity, resulting in much faster
commercialization. By any account, plastics are complex materials-their properties and
structure are highly interdependent with feedstocks, production techniques, and
secondary manufacturing techniques. Yet despite this complexity, all of the major
plastics were deployed into very simple applications that solved new problems. These
applications were called enablers.
If the traditional technology transfer model were modified to include incentives for
launching new materials into enabler applications, the commercialization potential of
government-funded research and development in materials would increase significantly.
This would not be a natural path. It is counterintuitive to deploy exotic materials in
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simple applications. However, the experience of the plastics industry suggests that it
would accelerate initial commercialization and would build the capability, credibility, and
visibility needed to succeed in the commercial world. If past is prologue, a concerted
focus on enabler applications will significantly diminish the valley of death.
Enabler applications have three common characteristics:
1. They solve new problems that can't be solved in other ways.
2. The applications are simple-they have few parts and short value chains.
3. The application markets are generally fairly small.
When taken together, it is obvious that these characteristics lead to quick adoption of a
new material.
Enabler applications play important roles in market development. First, they develop
production and processing capability for materials producers and application
manufacturers. Second, they develop knowledge about the strengths and weaknesses of
new materials. Third, they gain visibility for new materials to both potential markets and
consumers. These three roles combine to reduce value chain switching costs while
building credibility, thus reducing the risk borne by application manufacturers in utilizing
new materials.
Arguably, if a government development project is carried through to production (in
which case it would become a supply contract), then all of the enabler roles would be
filled. This would essentially be a government version of value chain integration in the
private sector. However, most research programs stop far short of becoming supply
contracts, leaving would-be producers with the same credibility challenges and
knowledge gaps that are faced with all new materials. This effectively aims their
commercialization trajectory into the valley of death-but these challenges can be
overcome by focusing on enabler applications.
Three Options to Encourage Enablers
Option 1: Focus Existing Risk Share Programs on Enablers
The most obvious and direct way to encourage enablers is to force existing government
materials technology risk share programs such as SBIR, STTR, and ATP to seek enabler
applications. This could be done by creating a mandate that new materials technology
proposals be presented with a set of potential enabler applications, and that at least one of
the enabler applications be developed. Exclusions would have to be made for SBIR and
ATP solicitations targeted for specific solutions, but the mandate would still be fairly
broad. In addition to changing development behavior, this type of mandate would have a
strong effect on the mindsets of developers. Requiring applicants to consider potential
enablers would push them to consider different types of applications, and would most
likely lead to a higher degree of interdisciplinary thinking.
There are several potential drawbacks to such a mandate. First, the enabler requirement
could stifle the creativity of proposals with respect to exotic and complex applications.
However, the experience of the plastics industry showed that the most promising long-
term ideas were in place well ahead of the enabler ideas-they were bluntly obvious to
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researchers. Second, there is a possibility that the enabler concept would not work with
these types of grants, although there are few reasons why it would not.
The enabler track would seem to be very dangerous for small businesses, since a specific
characteristic of enablers is that they enter small markets. This point requires
clarification in the present context. Many enabler applications are too small to be
profitable for major materials producers, but are more than sufficient for the small
businesses that are funded by ATP and SBIR. The Hula Hoop application was too small
to support the huge investment Phillip made in HDPE, but it earned $45 million for tiny
Wham-O, making the two owners very rich'9! By focusing investment on enabler
applications, ATP and SBIR would increase the chances of success of awardees. The
current practice of funding new materials for complex applications puts awardees in
precarious commercialization positions since there is no requirement to build the
credibility necessary to compete in such applications.
Efficiency and Allocation
Modifying the risk share programs would be an easy first step toward eliminating the
valley of death. It would be a highly efficient use of resources, since it would require
very little change in the current system. The most significant change would be the
education of proposal writers and funding agencies on the purpose and characteristics of
enabler applications for new materials. The allocation of benefits from the policy would
be similar to allocation of current materials technology risk share programs. However, it
would most likely amplify the effects by leading to more successful commercialization.
Effectiveness
While the efficiency and allocation of this policy would be good, its effectiveness at
reducing the valley of death is questionable. An enabler mandate would increase the
commercialization potential of materials technologies that find their way to the risk share
programs, but only a small percentage of government-funded research does this. The
combined budget of ATP and SBIR was -$1.5 billion in 2002, compared to a total R&D
budget of $92 billion201 ' 22. The impact made by the enabler requirement would be
significant for the recipients of share grants, but would offer minimal reductions in the
overall valley of death.
Option 2: Create a National New Materials Clearing House
Traditional materials marketing wisdom suggests that applications be identified by
surveying the markets of existing materials with similar properties and attacking the most
attractive ones. The materials commercialization pattern and the insertion strategy matrix
both show that this is not a good strategy at the beginning, because it does not lead to
insertion in applications that take advantage of the unique properties of materials. In fact,
finding applications that take advantage of unique properties is one of the most difficult
challenges in launching enablers. The history of plastics has shown that the biggest
applications were obvious to materials producers, but that enablers were not.
Since enabler applications are often new, a challenge also exists for application
manufacturers to find the right material. This suggests a chicken-and-egg situation:
enabler applications often can't be made without new materials, and new materials can't
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find enabler applications unless those applications are visible to them (read: already being
made). Thus, a search problem exists, and a high degree of visibility is necessary
between materials producers and application manufacturers in order for enablers to come
to life. If materials producers don't see new technologies, and new technologies don't
see new materials, then both may be destined for the valley of death.
There are market-based mechanisms for connecting new materials with potential buyers.
Perhaps the most popular of these mechanisms are late-stage technology transfer
programs (incubators) and venture capital. Both venture capitalists and incubators have a
strong economic incentive to actively seek buyers-they only make money if a product is
commercialized or a company sold. This incentive can lead to very aggressive
solicitation of buyers, but can actually be a disincentive for commercialization of
enablers. The returns necessary for venture capital are difficult to generate with small
market applications, and would more likely be associated with platform-type
applications. While an enabler application launch strategy has been shown to be the
safest and fastest path to return on investment, it cannot promise high returns on the same
timescale as a (much more risky) direct launch strategy would, if that strategy were
successful. For this reason, enabler applications can be unpalatable to venture capitalists.
There are two other drawbacks to venture capital and technology transfer with respect to
materials. First, materials must be in the "right" price range with respect to enabler
applications-they can be more expensive but not exorbitantly so. The agent fees paid to
venture capitalists and incubators could limit the applicability of new materials by forcing
them out of that price range23. The second, more serious, problem is that incubators and
venture capitalists have limited networks. In order for new materials to find enabler
applications, very broad visibility into applications markets is necessary. While venture
capitalists and incubators often have larger networks than materials producers themselves
(network strength is a competitive advantage in the venture world), they are still fairly
small when compared to the scope of all potential product applications. These market-
based introduction mechanisms offer only slight improvement over serendipity.
Because of the shortcomings of the market-based mechanisms in solving search
challenges, direct government intervention could help. One policy solution to the enabler
search problem would be the creation of a national materials clearing house. This
clearing house would act as a "market maker"--neutral party that connects buyers and
sellers of new materials. It would be given a specific charge to disseminate information
about the properties of all of the government-funded materials development projects.
The national materials clearing house would consist of two major parts: a materials center
and an extensive database. The materials center would be staffed with materials
scientists and engineers who could help application manufacturers specify materials and
could help materials producers to correctly describe and characterize properties of new
materials. It would offer neutral testing and technical assistance with application
development. By doing this, it would be a very strong support structure for users of the
database.
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The database would be a mechanism by which application manufacturers could browse
properties of new materials in order to select materials that might fit their needs. An
effectively implemented database with the proper support structure would play three
important roles:
1) It would disclose unique properties of new materials to application markets
without disclosing the intellectual property necessary to make the materials
2) It would facilitate interaction between materials producers and application
manufacturers
3) It would help solve technical problems.
The current US patent system plays these roles at some level. However, the patent
system is designed to entice inventors to reveal underlying principles and processes of
inventions so that they can be copied and built upon. In contrast, the materials database
would be designed to reveal properties so that new materials could be used. In contrast
to the patent system, it would reveal the appealing properties of new materials without
revealing the underlying intellectual property, so that technology could be more quickly
diffused.
The database would work best if it extended beyond new materials to include as many
existing materials as possible. This would make it a central point which US application
manufacturers could use as a resource in design and materials selection. Network effects
with this type of database would be very important-it would attract users in proportion
to the number of materials contained therein. Inclusion of existing materials would not
diminish the position of new materials on the database, but rather would improve it. The
properties of new materials could be compared with those of existing materials, and
application manufacturers could find the optimal materials for their wares.
The database might create ancillary research benefits, as well. Materials producers could
use it as an authoritative survey of available materials, and could focus efforts on creating
materials with unique properties that are missing from existing materials.
In short, a national materials clearing house would provide an economically efficient
forum to disseminate information about the properties of materials. However, in order to
function properly, a mechanism to protect the intellectual property of both materials
producers and application manufacturers would have to be created. The materials
clearing house would miss a large portion of its potential value if it did not include some
way to facilitate discussion between buyers and sellers in a way that would not damage
the integrity and potential profitability of the ideas of either side (this would be more of a
problem for smaller companies, who often cannot afford to defend their intellectual
property)24. While the database would be a forum with the breadth and anonymity
required for applications manufacturers to browse potential enabler materials without
disclosing their ideas, it would not be able to provide all of the technical data necessary
for efficient development of those materials. It is likely that a contractual relationship
would be required at some point; standardized rules for these relationships would
facilitate generation of creative applications.
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As a public entity, the national materials clearing house would not only be an impartial
referee, it would offer great insight into new materials because of its links to government-
funded materials research projects. Its value is easily seen if it is viewed as an
infrastructure project. The US government has historically been willing to invest in
projects that facilitate widespread economic benefit but for which value would be too
difficult to capture by a private entity (examples include highways, water systems, and
power grids). The value generated by a broad and impartial national materials database
would be significant, because new materials could find enabler applications and existing
applications could find optimal materials for use. A national materials clearing house
would be a valuable investment for society to make, but would probably be an
unprofitable investment if done in the private sector.
The materials clearinghouse could be managed by a single existing organization. It
seems that a national materials laboratory such as Oak Ridge or Sandia, or a university
with a strong materials and IT infrastructure such as University of Illinois or Berkeley
might have expertise in the necessary areas--database development, materials support,
and intellectual property. They would be well suited to manage such a project.
There are several drawbacks to a national materials center. First, it would initially
compete with businesses that have developed materials databases (some private databases
exist, but are limited in scope to established materials)25. While it is likely that these
businesses eventually would leverage their technology to create very advanced databases
for specific sectors, they would be in direct competition with the national materials
database for a time. The blow might be softened if these businesses were awarded
contracts to develop the national database. The second disadvantage is strategic: it would
not always be in the best interest of the security of the United States to allow all new
materials to be freely viewed in a national clearing house. This effect could be mitigated
by restricting access to the database, but this would undermine the effectiveness of the
database by limiting the number of potential buyers. A better way to handle the problem
would be to create an exemption mechanism by which new materials could opt out of the
program.
Efficiency
The database portion of the national materials clearing house would be deployable on
commercial software for less than $30 million2 6. Its annual maintenance costs, including
support personnel, are estimated be slightly more than 35% of that number. The
materials center could be supported with around $10 million/year (assuming a staff of 15
scientists and engineers). Given the total materials development budget of the federal
government, this seems to be a reasonable amount to spend to reduce the number of
materials in the valley of death.
If correctly deployed, the national materials clearing house would generate efficient
returns by improving commercialization. It would generate direct returns in tax dollars as
new materials are released into the economy. It would also generate indirect returns by
increasing the return on investment in government-funded research-more research
would reach society. Other indirect returns include jobs in new industries as innovative
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new products are developed based on materials commercialized through the clearing
house.
Allocation
The fairness of allocation of benefits from the national materials clearing house depends
on the viewpoint of the observer. On one hand, the obvious direct beneficiaries would be
materials producers and application manufacturers. This could be problematic, because it
could be seen as corporate welfare. However, the allocation of benefits is very equitable
if spillover effects are considered. The ancillary effects on society of commercialization
of new materials are tremendous. Jobs and taxes would be created which would be clear
benefits for common citizens, but the more important effects would be improvements in
the standard of living of society. While this may seem idealistic, one need only look at
the impact that heat treated metals, plastics, and silicon have made on life in the 2 0th
century to understand the basis of such a statement.
Effectiveness
If deployed with proper support structures and effectively promoted, a national materials
clearing house would be a powerful tool to reduce the valley of death. It would
encourage the creation of enabler applications by connecting materials producers with
application manufacturers, thus launching new materials onto the path of
commercialization. It would promote new ideas and interdisciplinary thinking by
exposing properties of materials that were previously unexposed, leading to previously
unthinkable products. Its scope and scale would be much larger than the risk-sharing
projects.
Option 3: Develop a Market for Ideas
Another option to encourage creation of enablers is to provide incentives to develop a
market for ideas in materials. The concept is quite simple-a market for ideas provides a
profit strategy for R&D entrepreneurs in which they earn returns by selling intellectual
property to larger players instead of by selling products directly to markets. Markets for
ideas are valuable to both entrants and incumbents. Entrants are often small companies
which lack some of the specialized assets necessary for growth, such as distribution
channels, credible reputations, and manufacturing capacity2 7. On the other hand,
incumbents are often large companies with organizational structures and core capabilities
that are streamlined to produce materials with very consistent quality and to respond to
the incremental needs of their customers; these structures rarely lend themselves toward
creativity28' 29. If entrants and incumbents in these situations come together, the entrant
can take advantage of the existing assets of the incumbent, and the incumbent can gain
competitive edge by leveraging the creative potential of the entrant. The end result is a
situation that makes more money for both entities than could be earned if they compete30.
Markets for ideas have emerged in many industries where a spectrum of product maturity
exists. For example, the pharmaceutical industry has many products which are fully
mature and compete based on low-cost and overall quality. Incumbent pharmaceutical
manufacturers have developed specialized assets to distribute, promote, and manufacture
their products. However, new products are the lifeblood of the pharmaceutical industry.
In addition to in-house research activities, pharmaceutical companies have established a
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reputation that encourages development of drugs by startup firms. If these startup firms
produce novel drug technologies that offer commercial promise, there is an excellent
chance that the companies will be purchased by incumbent pharmaceutical giants31 .
Because of the specialized assets owned by the incumbent pharmaceutical firms, the new
drugs are actually worth more to them than they would be to the start-ups if they were
placed directly into the product market32.
Another advantage of the market for ideas is that it increases the effectiveness of
development expenditures. Effective users of the market for ideas can purchase
intellectual property that has been proven to be useful instead of embarking on myriad
internal research projects (many of which are destined to fail)33. In this situation, it is
economically more rational for incumbents to pay a premium price for one proven
technology than to undertake several risky projects on their own. This means that
startups with proven technology can earn premiums well above their expenditures. If
incumbents have specialized assets which increase the value of the technology, these
premiums can far exceed the expected value of direct entry to the product market by
startups. Thus, there are very strong incentives for entrepreneurs to prove their
technology in a market for ideas.
These incentives for proving technology would encourage development of enabler
applications for materials if a market for ideas were created. Researchers and developers
would be driven to quickly find small applications to prove the usefulness of new
materials in order to gain top dollar for their ideas. Enabler applications are designed to
prove the usefulness of materials, and would be the best path to doing so in a market for
ideas.
Unfortunately, a market for ideas has not been developed in the materials industry.
While one might speculate on the reasons for this (the development of the in-house
research lab, the high expense of developing materials, the quick path to commoditization
of materials), experience in other industries suggests that it is correctable. Industries that
have developed successful markets for ideas have several common attributes. First, new
ideas tend to reinforce existing specialized assets and competencies in industries with
markets for ideas. In general, the materials industries fit this description. To the extent
that manufacturing technology, distribution channels, and corporate credibility are
existing assets and competencies, most materials innovations can be seen as
reinforcements to incumbents34. While plastics appear to be an obvious exception since
they did not reinforce the existing assets and competencies of incumbent materials
producers, they did reinforce the existing complimentary assets of chemical and
petroleum producers. They would have been strong candidates in the market for ideas.
In fact, the basic technology of polypropylene and high density polyethylene emerged
from the sale of intellectual property by Ziegler, Natta, and Phillips to incumbent
chemical companies3 ' 3 .
Industries with successful markets for ideas have also developed disclosure mechanisms,
by which entrants can disclose technology to potential buyers without fear of the buyers
copying the technology without paying for it 37. Disclosure mechanisms are already in
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place in the materials industry. Since the properties of materials are so intimately tied to
synthesis, materials whose synthesis is not obvious are inherently protected from copying
by potential buyers. Patents for materials can be very strong, and provide plenty of
disclosure protection to novel materials whose synthesis is more obvious.
Perhaps the most important factor in industries with successful markets for ideas is the
one that materials industries most lack: a reputation of willingness to buy ideas38. In the
late 1990s, incumbent software, networking, and computer hardware companies created a
very strong market for ideas by purchasing promising companies with equity capital.
This behavior built a reputation in these industries that attracted billions of dollars in
venture capital to fund thousands of startup companies, allowing incumbents to select the
best technologies from a wide range of options. Unfortunately, the materials industry
does not enjoy such a reputation, and is unable to reap the benefits39.
Public policy could encourage the creation of a market for ideas in materials. Since most
materials innovations can be deployed as reinforcements of the competencies of
incumbents, and since disclosure mechanisms already exist, policy should focus on
creating the activation energy necessary to help materials industries create a reputation as
buyers of innovative materials ideas, particularly if those ideas have been proven in
enabler applications. The best way to do this would be to create financial incentives for
incumbent companies that participate in developing the market for ideas. These
incentives could include tax credits for purchases of small companies that have produced
enablers based on government-funded materials research. This type of tax credit has
been shown to be an effective influence on behavior in behavior of individual
consumers4 0. An alternative incentive might be increasing access to government
contracts based on commercialization of new materials purchased in the market for ideas.
The risk sharing programs could also be altered to favor companies that purchase
materials technology in the market for ideas. A portion of the later phase ATP and SBIR
program funds could be allocated to large companies for use in purchase of smaller
companies. This would shift the selection criteria from government control to private
control, allowing incumbents to select from a wide variety of materials proven in enabler
applications.
The national materials database could work in concert with the market for ideas. The
database would facilitate the connection of buyers with sellers, and policy incentives
would facilitate transactions.
Efficiency
Incentives for a market for ideas would be risky-there is no guarantee that they would
work. If they did work, the effect would most likely be quite small at first, since
incentives would be given to incumbents and the market would initially be supply
constrained. There are not enough enabler applications of new materials to fill the
pipeline for the current stock of incumbent materials producers, so efficiency would be
poor. However, as the reputation of the industry improved, the industry would provide
incentives for startups and entrepreneurs to begin in earnest to create enabler
applications. If this end were achieved, the government investment would become very
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efficient. It would jumpstart a market for ideas that could become self-sustaining without
incentives as incumbents gain the earnings that players in other markets for ideas have
found.
Allocation
Allocation of benefits in a market for ideas is highly problematic. Any incentives would
be given directly to industry, and would be designed to use small players to make large
players bigger. It is likely that opponents would fail to mention the fact that small
players would become richer in this scenario than they would otherwise. The only way
that the allocation would be equitable is if spillover effects from increased innovation and
a higher flow of new materials were explicitly recognized. These effects would be
substantial.
Effectiveness
If the market for ideas were successfully jumpstarted in materials industries, it would
harness the power of the market to draw new materials into society. Since government
research is the main source of research and development for new materials, these
materials could be expected to benefit. A much higher number of enabler applications
would be created (since they would be the best path to large valuations in the market for
ideas), and these enablers would help government-funded materials research to dodge the
valley of death.
Jumpstarting the market for ideas would be more expensive than altering current risk
share programs or instituting a national materials database. In fact, the market for ideas
would work best if combined with the other two options. Adapting the risk share
programs to incentivize enabler applications in early-stage SBIR and ATP grants would
increase the supply of new materials. The national materials database would connect
buyers and sellers of materials, both in the application markets and the market for ideas.
It would facilitate efficient transactions, and would allow the market for ideas to assume
its intended role as a capstone driver of materials innovation in the United States.
Conclusion
The early history of man has been classified by archaeologists into three chronological
ages: the Stone Age, the Bronze Age, and the Iron Age41. It is significant to note that
each of the Ages is named according to the materials technology that was possessed by
each society. This is recognition of the impact of materials on the welfare, economies,
and technologies of societies. Materials are the basis of manufactured goods, the basis of
construction, and the basis of most technological advancements.
The importance of materials technology is easily observed in our society today. Casual
observers have called the mid 20th century the Plastics Age, and the late 20 th century the
Silicon Age. Materials developments have been at the heart of many advancements in
technology, and have had a huge impact on the quality of life of citizens in the developed
world.
The impact of materials is not limited to advancements in technology. Materials are also
key drivers of modern economy. The 1997 US Economic Census (the latest census for
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which data are available) shows the plastics and primary metals industries together
generated $203 billion in sales, and employed 660,000 people with a $27 billion payroll.
This accounted for 2.4% of the US GDP that year42. However, if the direct downstream
products that are manufactured from plastics and primary metals are included, those
numbers grow to $600 billion in sales, 3.25 million people employed, and a $108 billion
payroll, and account for 7.2% of the US GDP43. This indicates that each materials dollar
generates about 2 more dollars in direct downstream revenue. Since materials are the
base products for almost all manufacturing, it is useful also to see the impact of that
sector on the economy: $3.8 trillion in sales (about 46% of US GDP), 16.8 million
employees, and $569 billion payroll".44
In recognition of the impact of materials on its economy and the quality of life of its
citizens, it behooves the US government to improve the commercialization potential of
materials research. The first step to doing this is to explicitly recognize that investments
in materials are also investments in spillover effects (which can have strong ripple effects
through the economy), and to make materials commercialization a national priority.
Once the priority is set, then another explicit decision should be made: to focus
commercialization efforts on creating enabler applications for government funded
materials research. Enabler applications have been the bridge between privately funded
materials research and commercialization, and can do the same for government-funded
materials.
Enabler applications should not be created by the government--they can be profitable for
small companies and can improve the competitive position of large companies.
Unfortunately, they are counterintuitive to the traditional tenets of technology transfer, so
policy must be developed to encourage private investment in enablers. There are many
potential policies for doing this, including modified risk share programs, a national
materials clearing house, and a market for ideas. Each of these suggestions would work
on its own, but the three together would jumpstart the entrepreneurial spirit of the
materials community. An integrated national materials commercialization policy would
be very compelling to potential commercializers of new materials.
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Chapter 9: Changing Mindsets
Commercializing New Materials
If materials are to be commercialized faster, several mindsets must be changed.
Traditional materials marketing wisdom has been developed to deal with the vast
majority of materials switches, which occur between established materials in existing
applications. In this situation, materials producers can easily identify potential barriers
and can win business by offering a superior value proposition: lower cost or better
properties than incumbents. This works because application manufacturers know exactly
what to expect with established materials. Risk is relatively low since failure
mechanisms and switching costs can be fully assessed prior to the switch. Application
manufacturers can design around failure modes, and can calculate switching costs using
common tools such as cost models. Furthermore, having full knowledge of the properties
of established materials allows application manufacturers to perform utility analysis so
that incremental added value can be assessed.
In this situation, the primary challenge faced by materials producers is to create a value
proposition that is sufficiently superior to competitors that it overcomes the switching
costs that application manufacturers face. Since supply bases are in place to deal with
established materials, the material with the best value proposition will win the
competition.
Traditional materials marketing wisdom would suggest that a superior value proposition
also leads to quick adoption of new materials. This is not the case. New materials are
different from established materials because the total costs of adoption and complete set
of properties are unproven-they aren't necessarily known beforehand. Application
manufacturers who adopt new materials must be willing to risk field failures and
exorbitant warranty costs since the failure mechanisms of new materials are less
understood than those of established materials. Because of the depth of materials in the
product value chain, adoption of new materials requires application manufacturers to face
potential learning and adaptation costs that can be extremely expensive. To make matters
worse, supply bases are unfamiliar with new materials, and processing machinery and
labor can be much more expensive than with established materials. Application
manufacturers have reputations and commitments to customers, and blindly adopting an
unproven material could destroy both. They would be foolish to do it without a
significant qualification period.
Thus, the factors that lead to quick insertion of new materials are different from the
factors that lead to large growth of established ones. A new material must provide an
excellent value proposition to have any chance at adoption, but the value proposition
alone is not enough. The real challenge faced by materials innovators is posed by
insertion factors: the technical difficulties and value chain obstacles that limit the ability
of application manufacturers to adopt new materials. Insertion factors are powerful and
real; they set the bar for adoption very high, and often preclude the insertion of materials
with extraordinarily compelling value propositions. If they are to succeed with new
197
materials, innovators must change their mindsets away from traditional materials
marketing wisdom. Instead of focusing efforts on low cost production or beating
competitors, they should focus on overcoming insertion factors.
The key to shortening commercialization times of new materials (and to winning with
materials innovation) is to develop capabilities to manage insertion factors so that
compelling value propositions can take hold. The concept behind insertion factor
management is simple: if materials are to be adopted quickly by application
manufacturers, switching costs must be reduced. Chapter five showed that switching
costs are driven by application value chain complexity and understanding of a material.
More complex value chains are more expensive to change and require more coordination;
a higher degree of understanding of a material (by both producers and application
manufacturers) leads to lower learning costs, lower handoff costs between value chain
nodes, and lower risk of failure. Thus, the goal is to reduce application value chain
complexity and to increase understanding of a material.
There are three levers that can be pulled to increase knowledge and reduce value chain
complexity. The most obvious is to make a material similar to existing materials so that
it is immediately compatible with existing value chains and products'. While this can be
a reasonable strategy for established materials, it is not good for new ones. The
complexity of materials limits both the pace and range of change that is possible, so
reconfiguration of a material to match the properties of incumbents is rarely an option
(and is very slow when it does work). There can also be problems with value
proposition-why introduce a material that is largely the same as existing ones?
The second lever is value chain integration, in which the materials producer acquires all
of the nodes in the value chain up to the point that no further change is necessary to adopt
a material. This strategy shifts the burdens of value chain risk and adaptation costs to the
materials producer from the application manufacturer, so that adoption is much less
expensive. It also allows the materials producer to control the pace of development, and
can generate huge amounts of knowledge about the properties of the material. However,
the enormous capital implications of forward integration limit its applicability to only the
most attractive markets.
Since most materials are quite versatile-they have properties that make them useful in a
wide range of applications-and are difficult to reconfigure, market selection is the best
lever in most situations. Market selection allows materials producers to maximize the
potential of new materials: producers can choose to deploy new materials into
applications that value their unique properties, have low adoption risk, and have simple
value chains. These applications are called enablers, for two reasons: they usually enable
customers to do new things, and they enable materials to move forward. By selectively
choosing enablers, materials producers can accelerate adoption of new materials while
generating the knowledge necessary to move them other applications.
Choosing to launch new materials into enabler applications creates a conundrum for
materials producers that can only be solved by changing mindsets. Because of the upfront
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cash required to develop a material, materials producers want big returns, fast. However,
dominant design theory teaches that low risk applications with simple value chains are
rarely very big-customers have established expectations for big applications, and
manufacturers have usually begun to optimize the value chain to produce them. Most
enabler applications are far too small to produce the returns necessary for investment in
new materials. Yet enablers are crucial for growth, because they create the credibility,
capability, and visibility necessary for success in major markets with much higher
insertion factors. Without them, new materials flounder in a state of interminable testing
while application manufacturers determine fitness for use. If materials producers jettison
the idea that initial applications must generate fast, big profits, they can recognize
enablers for what they are-stepping stones to growth. They can then selectively choose
enabler applications to reduce the insertion factors faced by major market adopters. This
will generate profits faster than would a direct attack on those major markets.
Enabler applications were the first step in the pattern of commercialization that was
followed by all major plastics. Enablers allowed quick recognition of fitness for use, and
expose failure mechanisms while creating supplier and producer capability. They also
exposed the public to the materials. After a few years of enabler applications, each
plastic gained a foothold in an existing application for which everyone knew (from the
time of invention) it would be perfect-a platform application. In their platform
applications, plastics offered very compelling value propositions based on unique
material properties (all of these applications are still dominated by the same plastic
today); the plastics were rarely less expensive than incumbents. Adoption of plastics in
platform applications was always delayed by insertion factors, which enabler applications
helped solve. Platforms were the first applications that were big enough to justify the
materials development investment: they generated tremendous capability and visibility,
and served as springboards for further growth.
Only after materials had been established in platforms did traditional materials marketing
wisdom begin to apply, although it proved to be incomplete. From the platform
applications, the major plastics attacked a wide range of existing applications. Their
attacks were based on lower costs and better properties than incumbents, and their
insertion time varied according to the value chain challenges and technical difficulties
that they faced. The biggest applications of the biggest plastics all had a common
attribute that helped them establish and maintain their competitive position: they were the
lowest cost materials whose properties were aligned perfectly to the needs of the
application. This position is called the "lowest cost perfect match", and builds on
traditional materials marketing wisdom.
Being the lowest cost perfect match is the safest position a material can occupy; if a
material overserves or underserves the needs of an application it is a stopgap which will
lose its position. Whereas traditional wisdom would say that value proposition can stem
from low cost or good properties, the lowest cost perfect match concept asserts that the
two must be coupled. This means that simply offering a lower cost material is not
enough. Simply offering a higher performance material is not enough. Successful
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attacks must change the lowest cost perfect match position-they must lower the overall
material cost while matching the necessary properties.
Both the enabler and the lowest cost perfect match concepts require that mindsets toward
deployment of materials into applications be changed. Traditional wisdom suggests that
the best way to identify applications is to identify materials with similar properties and
try to take their markets with lower costs or superior properties. This strategy violates the
definition of an enabler-if a problem is already being solved, why use a new material to
solve it again? There are cases of severely underserved applications in which
improvement can be dramatic enough to meet enabler criteria, but they seem relatively
rare. Chasing materials with similar properties can also lead to competition with
incumbent materials in the lowest cost perfect match position; it seems common for
materials innovators to frame their product in terms of existing products which already
meet the needs of customers. Yes, the new material may work better in some aspects, but
consumers may not care at all.
By changing mindsets, a better way to frame the problem of market selection emerges:
selection based on the unique properties of materials. If the unique properties of
materials are examined, companies are far more likely to identify enabler opportunities,
and are far more likely to avoid competition with incumbent materials in the lowest cost
perfect match position. In fact, they are far more likely to identify their own lowest cost
perfect match opportunities.
Contributions to Innovation Theory
This research was built on a foundation of innovation theory. Materials exhibit
anomalous behavior to some tenets of existing theory, and understanding the conditions
causing the anomalies gives insight into theory. Simply understanding the unique aspects
of the materials business gives other insights.
Because of their position in the value chain, new materials must be treated very
differently than established ones. Traditional materials marketing wisdom does not
apply. By separating the limiting insertion factors from the growth and penetration
factors, it is possible to create a useful framework. There are few other products that face
the same degree of challenge from insertion factors, but it is useful nonetheless to
separate insertion and penetration factors, because it allows a systematic constraint
analysis to overcome barriers.
A stream of thought is emerging in innovation around the integration and decentralization
of value chains, and some interesting recommendations have been made2' 3. A paper was
recently published which suggested that forward integration to the decoupling point is the
best way to introduce products4 . While this is an important insight, the experience of the
plastics industry shows that it is incomplete-it fails to recognize the conditions in which
forward integration is best. Since materials are so deep in the value chain and are
difficult to reconfigure, they make a very pure case study for this type of strategy and
reveal the relevant conditions: value chain complexity and product understanding (by
both producer and consumer). Using these conditions, the insertion strategy matrix
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shows that forward integration is not always the best way, but can be useful. The
insertion strategy matrix is the next logical step in this stream of innovation theory.
Materials also display an anomaly to disruptive innovation theory. Disruptive theory
would predict that existing materials manufacturers would have responded to the threat of
plastics and that they would have ultimately have dominated the plastics business.
Neither of these things occurred. The plastics industry showed that there are gaps in
capability are too wide for existing manufacturers to cross, even in the face of obvious
attacks on important markets. Petroleum and chemical producers, whose capabilities
more closely match the capabilities necessary to make plastics, are the dominant
producers of plastics. Other materials companies play only a small role, usually in
distribution.
Perhaps the most obvious and important anomaly displayed by materials is their
wholesale exclusion from the dominant design model: they don't follow the pattern. The
reason for this is straightforward: materials are very difficult to change, and cannot be
easily reconfigured to conform to the needs or desires of markets. The one material that
has been shown to follow the pattern is oriented strand board (OSB), which is comprised
of wood chips that can be molded into different shapes with dramatically different
properties. OSB is one of the most reconfigurable materials5 .
Although materials don't fit the dominant design model themselves, the applications into
which materials are inserted follow a similar pattern. The materials commercialization
pattern is an analog to the dominant design model. The enabler phase is similar to the
fluid phase, in which materials are inserted into many applications, with the goal of
generating knowledge and discovering the best potential applications. The emergence of
a platform application is similar to the emergence of the dominant design, in which an
application that utilizes the most desirable set of properties of a material comes to life.
The widespread substitution phase of materials commercialization is similar to the
specific phase of the dominant design model, since process capabilities become very
important and the industry generates long term profits.
The versatility of materials and their lack of reconfigurability makes them unique among
manufactured products, and these two factors combine to give great insight into
innovation theory. The concept of architectural modularity in innovation theory, in
which products are designed to be easily reconfigurable, has its roots in the automotive
supplier and the photolithography industries6. Both of these industries have limited
versatility-auto suppliers supply auto makers, and photolithography suppliers supply
semiconductor manufacturers. Since they don't have the option of launching their
products to different customers, their most important innovative capabilities are design
and reconfiguration, so that they can quickly iterate products until they meet the exact
needs of their customers.
Disruptive theory has roots in the disc drive industry. Disc drives are highly
reconfigurable, and are fairly versatile-they can be used in many applications.
Christensen's research has shown that reconfiguration was an important tool for drive
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makers, but that market selection (he called it market innovation) was just as important,
particularly for entrants.
The complexity of materials (including both internal properties and external interactions)
makes them very difficult to reconfigure-the pace of change is slow and the range of
attainable properties is limited. However, they are very versatile-most can be used in a
wide range of industries and applications. Since they are not easily changed to meet the
needs of customers, the most important tool for materials innovators is market selection;
reconfiguration plays only a small role.
There is also the possibility of products that are unreconfigurable and lack versatility.
They are highly specialized, and effective, efficient research is the key capability
necessary in this space. Figure 9.1 is a foursquare model with versatility and
reconfigurability as the axes.
6l S
7-
Reconfigurability
Figure 9.1: Versatility vs. reconfigurability
Moving Forward
The research presented here suggests several strategic changes for the materials industry.
It is the most comprehensive work done to date on materials commercialization, but it is
certainly incomplete. It has uncovered questions which must be answered by further
work of both practical and theoretical nature.
The strategic changes suggested by this work will not be easy to implement. Changing
mindsets in organizations is notoriously difficult--particularly for companies such as
materials producers who have developed deep capabilities in quality, reliability, and
consistency. The attitudes and organizational structures necessary to develop these
capabilities are quite different from the attitudes and structures needed for creativity.
Future work should focus on identifying organizational models that can maintain
consistency while fostering the creativity necessary to identify and create enabler
opportunities.
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Enabler Model Disruptive Theory
(i.e. materials) (i.e. disc drives)
Key innovator Key innovator
competency: market competency: systems
selection understanding, market
selection
Architectural Modularity
Specific Creation (i.e. auto suppliers,
(i.e. military materials) lithography machines)
Key innovator Key innovator
competency: research competency: systems
understanding, CRM
The creation of models that engender both consistency and creativity may not be the
biggest organizational challenge to the strategies recommended by this research. The
bigger challenge may be creating mechanisms to reward enablers in the face of the large
capital investments required for materials. Many ways to do this have been suggested,
ranging from pulling the creation of enablers down to the R&D stage to developing a
separate organization to foster small ideas7 . However, most of these suggestions confine
the job of innovation to a small group; it would be much more powerful to harness the
creative power of the entire organization.
In addition to organizational models and incentive systems, early evidence suggests that
simple tactical tools are necessary to help materials producers identify enabler
opportunities. Although the myth that serendipity drives identification of big materials
markets has been debunked by this research, serendipity appears to play a very important
role in the identification of enabler applications. A more systematic method for strategic
identification of enablers would be useful. This tool should be developed with the goal of
using enablers to secure platform applications, and should include as many people within
the organization as possible. Serendipity is facilitated by network effects.
More research should be done on value chain obstacles. Materials producers don't truly
understand a material until they know what application value chains need to understand
about it. A simple value proposition is not enough: winners in materials innovation will
be the producers who develop the best capabilities for dealing with application value
chains. Sensitivity toward value chains must be developed.
This sensitivity would be a tremendous source of competitive advantage, and might be
best researched at the corporate level, in the context of organizations. The yield would be
a model to carry the insertion strategy matrix to a higher level.
Developing value chain understanding will require several streams of work. The most
obvious stream will create better resolution into value chain obstacles. This thesis has
shown that value chain obstacles exist, that experts recognize them, and that insertion
delay scales with them. In doing so, it has revealed a key question: which of the value
chain obstacles is most important? Future work, with much larger samples sizes and
input from supply chain management theory might be able to answer this question.
Understanding the true nature of handoffs between value chain nodes would also be
useful. This research has shown that handoffs can be avoided by market selection and
integration, but many markets have extremely complex value chains, making both
strategies impractical. Future work focused on exposing the exact nature of information
required to reduce the opportunistic behavior and environmental uncertainty that plague
handoffs could be very fruitful. It could facilitate supplier specialization and could have
a significant impact on the capital costs of materials innovation. It might best be done at
the intersection of law, transaction cost analysis, and materials science.
This work has focused on the supply side of materials innovation, suggesting changes by
materials producers to increase its potential. It would be interesting to take the opposite
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approach-to focus on the demand side of materials innovation by examining the
adoption processes of application manufacturers. This would likely produce insight into
organizational and engineering processes, and might be able to change the nature of
materials research and development to include a greater degree of market pull.
The nature of competition in the materials industry needs further investigation. The
nascent concept of the lowest cost perfect matach could be reinforced by development of
strategic tools (multiattribute utility analysis being the best candidate) to identify lowest
cost perfect match opportunities, and to identify several underserved or overserved
markets. However, more interesting research could be performed on the cycle of
competition in the plastics industry.
Although not quantified (and thus not reported in this thesis), the plastics industry
appears to have followed a cyclical pattern of competition, in which the basis of
competitive advantage shifts from product innovation to process innovation and vice-
versa. Product innovation in plastics can be defined as any innovation that creates
features for which customers will pay; process innovation can be defined as any
innovation which reduces cost, reduces defects, or increases reliability. Both types of
innovation extend markets. The basis of competition in the industry appeared to shift
between these two types of innovation, with each cycle creating an elevating ante for the
next one-once products improved, they never got worse; once quality improved,
expectations were set among customers that were never removed. Understanding this
cycle could be very important-materials producers that could predict the switch would
be in a position of perpetual first mover advantage. From a standpoint of general
innovation, it would offer further insight into modularity (a process innovation?) and into
the relationship between dominant designs, Foster's concept of"good enough", and
disruptive theory8.
The most important question that should be explored by further research is also the most
obvious: are the concepts learned from materials more generally applicable to
innovation? More specifically, are they useful as tools in "technology push", or do the
unique aspects of the materials business make them inapplicable? Answering this
question will require a different approach than the one taken here. It will require
examination of both successful and failed materials to refine the model, followed by
identification and examination of a broad range of industries and technologies in which
technology push is the dominant innovation diffusion mechanism.
A Final Word
The impact of materials on the quality of life of societies is hard to understate. New
materials have the power to elevate standards of living, to lift economies, and even to
improve the environment. However, the impact of materials is limited by their ability to
be commercialized and to achieve widespread adoption. The strategies presented here
can improve the commercial potential of new materials, but will require a concerted
commitment on the part of managers and business leaders to drive the necessary changes
of mindset.
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The materials commercialization pattern is just as applicable today as it was in the time
of the plastics industry. Although the most obvious materials have been discovered,
materials science has created tools which can accelerate the development of ever more
complex materials. Innovation of materials will continue.
Products today are more complex than they have ever been, and the value chains that
make them are, too. Vertical integration is much less prevalent now than it was in the
1950s and 1960s, and value chains are often dispersed across the globe. Nodes of value
chains are more specialized, speak different languages, and use more exotic equipment
than ever before. Furthermore, the liability climate has become much more stringent in
the past decades. The quality movement has made consumers less tolerant of product
failure, and the general loosening of tort litigation has made the consequences of failure
much higher. All of these factors raise the bar that materials must meet in order to be
adopted into mainstream applications.
Given the pace of change in today's attractive product markets, speed of innovation is the
key. Materials producers who can manage best insertion factors will reach the bar faster,
and will win with materials innovation.
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Appendix C: Expert Credentials
Author's note: the experts assembled here are among the most talented and
experienced people in the materials field. I am grateful for their willingness to
participate in this research project.
Lawrence E. Bell
Larry Bell has been the Global Business Manager-Automotive Group at Nypro, Inc., one
of the world's largest and most innovative molders of plastics, since 1998. In this
position, he is responsible for developing Nypro's automotive business by understanding
and predicting the plastics needs of automotive suppliers and OEMs. He has extensive
experience in the automotive plastics sector, having worked as Automotive Market
Segment Director at General Electric Automotive Plastics for three years and as a
Business Development Manager at Freudenberg-NOK for five years. He is the inventor
of two US patents for plastics in the auto industry, and is a registered professional
engineer in the state of Massachusetts.
Darran Cairns, PhD
Darran Cairns is a research specialist at 3M Touch Systems Optical Division in Methuen,
MA, where is responsible for the development of novel polymeric touch sensors and
conductive films. Prior to joining 3M, Dr. Cairns was a Research Associate at Brown
University, where he developed his reputation as a recognized authority on flexible and
conformable information displays, and subject on which he has a forthcoming book. He
holds a World Patent for his work on reflective strain gages and polarization sensitive
devices. He is the author of 9 refereed articles and more than 20 conference proceedings.
Paul Lagace, Ph.D
Dr. Paul A. Lagace is a Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics and of Engineering
Systems at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He currently serves as co-Director
of the Technology Laboratory for Advanced Composites (TELAC) and is a highly
regarded international authority on the response and failure of composite structures. He
is recognized as a national leader for the development of composite structures technology
and frequently serves as an advisor and consultant to industry and government agencies.
Since joining the faculty in 1982, Professor Lagace has conducted research in the areas of
mechanics, fracture, longevity, damage resistance, and damage tolerance of composite
materials and their structures. He has published more than 120 papers on these topics and
on general topics related to composite materials and their structures. He served for six
years as president of the International Committee on Composite Materials where he was
recognized as a World Fellow of Composites. He has received awards from various
organizations and has delivered invited talks around the world.
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Chris Magee, Ph.D
Professor Christopher L. Magee is a Professor of the Practice in the Engineering Systems
Division and Mechanical Engineering at MIT and director of the Center for Innovation in
Product Development. Before Dr. Magee joined MIT, he had more than 35 years of
experience at Ford Motor Company, finishing as Executive Director of Programs and
Advanced Engineering. In this position had global responsibility for all major technically
deep areas involved in Ford's Product Development Organization, consisting of about
7,000 people located in the United States, United Kingdom, and Germany.
Early in his career, Dr. Magee made major contributions to the understanding of the
transformation, structure and strength of ferrous materials. He was internationally
recognized for this work and won several prestigious awards in his early 30's. Dr. Magee
has led (from 1981 on) efforts at Ford to adapt systems engineering to the modern
automotive design process. In addition, he was instrumental in developing new
approaches to the program creation process at Ford and from 1987 through 1999 had the
technical lead for all major Ford product concept efforts. He is a member of the National
Academy of Engineering (since 1997), a fellow of ASM, and a participant on major
National Research Council Studies ranging from design research to materials research.
Frederick J. McGarry
Fred McGarry is Professor Emeritus of Polymer and Civil Engineering at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He has been an integral part of polymer science
at MIT since the 1950s, when he was director of the Monsanto House of the Future
program and director of the Materials Research Laboratory. He is a recognized authority
in toughening mechanisms and test methods for polymers and composites, having
published more than 215 papers and won several awards.
In addition to his academic interests, Professor McGarry has been an active consultant to
the plastics industry. He worked as a consultant to the Dow Chemical Company for 47
years, as a consultant to Goodrich Plastics for 35 years, as a consultant to Dow Coming
Silicones for 35 years, and with American Cyanamid for "about 25 years". A great deal
of his work was focused on rubber modified thermoplastics, although he solved problems
across the entire spectrum of polymers.
Chris E. Scott, Ph.D:
Dr. Chris E. Scott is President of Material Answers, an engineering consulting firm based
in Massachusetts. He specializes in polymer materials, properties, and processing. His
work emphasizes thermoplastics, thermosets, blends, composite, and multicomponent
formulations. He has extensive experience with manufacturing, product development,
product design, and failure analysis. Dr. Scott has published extensively on the topics of
polymer processing and structure relationships, sompounding and mixing in multiphase
polymer systems, and structure and morphology development during polymer processing.
He is the inventor on 9 US patents, author of more than 30 articles in refereed journals,
author of 40 conference proceedings, and has presented more than 50 seminars to
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industry and government organizations. He also has extensive experience in failure
analysis of a broad range of polymer applications.
Prior to joining Material Answers, Dr. Scott has been a Managing Engineer at Exponent
Failure Analysis Associates, an Associate Professor at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, and a Senior Chemical Engineer at Eastman Chemical Company.
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